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Why is there apparent inconsistency in U.S. presidential military intervention
decisions when cases exhibit similar characteristics that other scholars have argued
should be determinant, such as the magnitude of the conflict, economic ties, or domestic
political support? For instance, President Clinton committed troops in Haiti (1994) but
not in Rwanda (1994); and likewise, President George H.W. Bush intervened in Somalia
(1992) but not in Bosnia (1992). Previous studies have held an implicit assumption: if
the demand for action is high enough, an intervention will occur. This study moves the
operative element of the decision calculus from demand to feasibility, attempting to
answer the primary research question: what impact does operational feasibility have on
U.S. presidential military intervention decisions?
This research identifies what I call “feasibility factors,” which are based on
military planning considerations and provide observable measures for the expectation of
intervention success. Successful interventions are those that achieve the intervention
mission within a short time horizon at acceptable costs. Using a mixed methods design
incorporating both Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and an examination of
National Security Council and presidential meeting archives, the study finds that the
seemingly inconsistent behavior disappears when feasibility is included. Demand for
intervention is necessary, but insufficient; only when there is enough demand and the
operational feasibility factors are positively aligned do presidents intervene.
This study provides three main contributions. First, it argues for feasibility’s
inclusion in future intervention-focused studies. Second, this work elucidates the most
prominent feasibility concerns for the policy community: the conflict type, whether there
is a regime to intervene on behalf of, the enemy’s organization, and the logistical
accessibility of the crisis region. Finally, this work provides an alternative logic for why
presidents choose inaction despite overwhelming demand for intervention.
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GLOSSARY
Bush 41

President George H.W. Bush, the 41st president of the
United States.

Consistency

Measure in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
that “gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a
given combination of conditions agree in displaying the
outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44). Similar to
“significance” in regression analysis.

Coverage

Measure in QCA that “assesses the degree to which a
cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an
outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44). Similar to “correlation
coefficients and total variance explained” in regression
analysis (Bara 2014, 4).

Intervention

“An overt, short-term deployment of at least one
thousand combat-ready ground troops across
international boundaries to influence an outcome in
another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not
interfere in another state’s domestic institutions”
Elizabeth Saunders (2011, 21). Interventions occur in
response to crises ranging from civil wars to supporting
humanitarian goals.

Precision

Measure in QCA that accounts for false positives in
predictive analysis and reports the percentage of
predictions that are correct.

Sensitivity

Measure in QCA that is the percentage of cases that the
solution correctly predicted.
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ACRONYMS
CENTCOM: United States Central Command
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
EC: European Commission
EU: European Union
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR: Implementation Force (Bosnia)
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNA: Yugoslav People’s Army
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
NSC: National Security Council
NSC/DC and DC: National Security Council Deputies Committee
PC: Principals Committee
PDD: Presidential Decision Directive
PRD: Presidential Review Directive
QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QRF: Quick Reaction Force
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNM: Somali National Movement
SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement
UN: United Nations
UNITAF: United Task Force (Somalia)
UNOSOM: UN Operation in Somalia (I and II)
UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia
UNSCR: UN Security Council Resolution
USC: United Somali Congress
VCJCS: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
VRS: Army of Republic Srpska
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on recent military intervention decisions made my U.S.
presidents. Specifically, why is there apparent inconsistency in decisions to get involved
in some foreign crises but not others when they exhibit similar characteristics that
scholars have argued should be determinant, such as the magnitude of the conflict,
economic ties, or domestic political support? As this work will demonstrate, most
studies that attempt to explain intervention behavior hold an implicit assumption in
common: if the demand for action is high enough, an intervention will occur. I present a
different theory that moves the operative element of the decision calculus from demand
to feasibility. Based on military planning considerations, I develop what I call feasibility
factors. These factors measure “expectations of success,” or what others have discussed
as accomplishing the mission within short time horizons and at acceptable costs (Regan
2002, 5). Using a mixed methods design incorporating both Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) and a detailed examination of presidential archival records of National
Security Council (NSC) and presidential meetings, this study seeks to answer the primary
research question: what impact does operational feasibility have on U.S. presidential
military intervention decisions? Ultimately, the study finds that when feasibility
concerns are included in the analyses, the seemingly inconsistent behavior disappears.
Only when there is enough demand and the operational feasibility factors are positively
aligned do we see presidents commit troops.
This opening chapter has four parts. First, I frame the research by providing an
overview of the research problem and explanation of the key terms. Second is a
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description of the methodology used to answer the research question. Third, I present
the findings and their implications. Finally, I lay out the organization for the remainder
of the dissertation.
Research Overview and Key Terms
Scholars have long sought to understand the selective use of force by U.S.
presidents in international crises, or as Rosenau (1967) termed it, “intervention” (p. 168).
In this study, I use Elizabeth Saunders’ (2011, 21) definition: “an overt, short-term
deployment of at least one thousand combat-ready ground troops across international
boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an interstate dispute; it may or
may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions.” This definition rules out
covert operations and missions such as train or assist operations that run a low risk of
resulting in combat. This approach adds a level of consistency to the risk being weighed
by presidents when undertaking these decisions. Multiple explanations have emerged to
explain intervention decisions that call on a wide range of factors, and yet even a cursory
examination of cases reveals apparent inconsistencies in how these variables influence
whether presidents intervene. For examples, consider a few recent events.
A sarin gas attack on August 21, 2013, outside of Damascus, Syria, claimed the
lives of over 1,400 people in one of the most egregious acts in recent memory. The
culpability for this event rested upon Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as he prosecuted a
campaign to retain power amid intense intrastate unrest. At the time, this occurrence
was seen by many to have "crossed a red line" that would trigger an American or
multinational response, presumably including a military option (Good 2013). Yet,
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Obama did not initiate a punitive attack or forcibly remove al-Assad as some predicted.
Contrast this with just over a year later when Obama chose to recommit 1,500 troops to
neighboring Iraq to fight ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) (Collinson 2014).
Did President Obama decide not to intervene in Syria because significant
majorities of Americans polled were against involvement in yet another military action in
the Middle East (Sullivan 2013)? That is a difficult case to make because U.S. views
regarding intervention were low for both – 25% for Syria and 39% for counter-ISIS
operations in Iraq during the decision window for each (Pew Research Poll cited in
Gewurz 2012; Pew Research 2014). Alternatively, could the inaction in Syria be
attributable to confounding geopolitical arrangements within the region, upsetting
delicate power arrangements among Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others? After
all, scholars have often viewed international politics and security considerations as
determinants of conflict behavior (Moore and Lanoue 2003). Likely not, since the
would-be areas of operation are overlapping. Maybe President Obama did not intervene
because the United States was still at war in Afghanistan. War weariness has also been
determined to be a key indicator for inactivity given intervention opportunities (Levy and
Morgan 1986). Yet, both the decision to reinsert troops back into Iraq to counter ISIS
and the decision not to intervene to depose al-Assad in Syria occurred while the U.S. was
significantly engaged in Afghanistan. President Obama's administration is not an outlier
in this apparently inconsistent behavior. Observers could draw similar conclusions for
President Clinton, who intervened in Haiti (1994) but not in Rwanda (1994); and for
President George H.W. Bush who intervened in Somalia (1992), but not in Bosnia
(1992).
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Scholars in this field have argued in favor of determinants such as those above,
rooted in both domestic or international systemic concerns, with mixed results. Why the
apparent inconsistency? I argue that these studies base too much of their analysis on the
origins and strength of the demand signal for intervention, and too little on the part of the
decision based on expected efficacy. To remedy this, I propose a shift from the demandbased explanation to one that incorporates feasibility through a three-part causal chain: 1)
recognize an opportunity to intervene based on significant demand, 2) assess the
likelihood of success for the use of force given the constraints of the crisis environment,
and finally 3) given the anticipated costs associated with employing that force, determine
whether an intervention is still advisable. The question becomes, what are the most
important aspects of the situation to help assess part two of the mechanism – the
likelihood of success?
Although feasibility appears to be a logical factor to include in any study of the
use of force, it is surprisingly absent from studies attempting to explain the motivations
or dissuasions for U.S. military intervention. Authors have not completely overlooked
the tactical and operational levels of military involvement, with authors such as Stephen
Biddle (2004) calling attention to the importance of force employment in determining
outcomes of armed conflict. Yet, these considerations have not been included in the
debate that addresses the decision space preceding the intervention.
This study takes a stride in that direction by operationalizing expectations of
success through feasibility factors that indicate whether the use of force can achieve the
policy aims within a short time horizon and at acceptable costs.

Derived from the

planning processes used to develop military options within the U.S. national security
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apparatus, feasibility factors pose the key considerations that determine if the intervention
is likely to be long and costly, or if a reasonably quick win could be expected.
The four feasibility factors below were the most useful of those considered in this
dissertation1:
1. CONFLICT - What type of conflict is it? If the conflict is based on ethnic or
religious divides it is likely more intractable and will contribute to persistent
instability.
2. REGIME - Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install, or will it intervene
as a neutral party between warring factions?
3. ENEMY - How is the enemy/adversary organized? Is the structure hierarchical and
susceptible to strike, or diffuse and difficult to target?
4. ACCESS - How accessible is the crisis environment? Are there enough viable ports
and transportation networks available to sustain the intervention logistically?
Methodology
This study uses a three phase, explanatory sequential mixed methods research
design (Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006; Creswell and Clark 2017). Phase I employs
a configurational comparative method – QCA – to analyze 19 intervention opportunities
and identify the unique combinations of feasibility factors and demand signals from both

1

The study considers another feasibility factor associated with the population density of the crisis location:
POPULATION. The following chapter discusses the theoretical origins of this consideration and the QCA
chapter uses it as part of the analysis. However, it is omitted here and from the broader findings because it
did not prove as helpful in explaining intervention decision behavior compared with the other four
feasibility factors.
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domestic and international systemic sources that are associated with intervention and
nonintervention outcomes. From there, I build on the QCA findings in the next two
qualitative phases where I use the QCA outputs to guide the inquiry.
Phase II is a comparative historical analysis of two near simultaneous intervention
opportunities under the George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) administration: the famine and civil
war in Somalia and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Using primary resources from the
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, I evaluate the extent to which the demands for
action and the concerns over feasibility were explicitly discussed by those involved in the
decision-making process. This involves the detailed analysis of the minutes from NSC
Deputies and Principals Committees, as well as presidential small group meetings. The
aim is to determine whether feasibility concerns are an observable part of the decisional
dialogues, or if they are just implicit, and therefore of lesser analytic concern?
Finally, in Phase III, I conduct another comparative historical analysis of the
handling of the same crises by the subsequent William J. Clinton administration.
Clinton reverses both Bush 41 intervention decisions, withdrawing from Somalia and
committing ground troops to the NATO intervention in Bosnia. This presents an
opportunity to extend the application of the theory, looking at what happens when the
feasibility factors switch from favoring intervention to nonintervention, and vice versa.
Here again, I draw on primary sources from the Clinton Presidential Library to process
trace how the Clinton national security team adjusted to changing information and arrived
at their decisions.
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Findings
The analysis supports the contention that operational feasibility significantly
impacts intervention decisions. The QCA solutions in Phase I demonstrate that
feasibility figures prominently in both intervention and nonintervention outcomes. A
supportable regime and logistically accessible crisis environment were present in 88% of
the intervention cases. A hierarchical enemy structure was also present in every
intervention and absent in two-thirds of the nonintervention cases, adding weight to its
inclusion as a key consideration. Regarding noninterventions, the combination of an
ethnically- or religiously-based conflict with no regime to support accounted for 83% of
the cases, providing evidence that not only are these factors individually important, but
they may also have an additive dissuasive quality when negative attributes are combined.
More traditional determinants for intervention decisions also emerged in the QCA
outputs, including presidential approval levels, trade ties, and the magnitude of the
conflict. This reinforces the arguments made by previous scholars that both international
systemic and domestic factors hold sway. However, none were present on their own in
the QCA solutions, requiring the pairing of a positive feasibility factor to produce an
intervention. This finding bolsters the argument for the three-part causal chain hinging
on feasibility that this work advances.
The paired case comparison of the Bush 41 intervention opportunities for Somalia
and Yugoslavia/Bosnia in Phase II strengthens the QCA findings. Bosnia demonstrated
a stronger demand signal from the determinants previous scholars have argued in favor of
(e.g., media coverage or economic and political ties to allies), yet Bush chose to intervene
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in Somalia. The key differences between the cases is in their respective feasibility
assessments. Bush’s team saw Bosnia as a complex, ethnic civil war where the
intervening party would have to remain neutral between multiple warring factions. The
anticipated enemy forces were decentralized and likely to oppose entry into a region that
was already restricted in its accessibility. Compare this to Somalia where the projected
mission was limited to the delivery of aid, with little to no anticipated opposition, and
expected completion within 30 days (NSC 0065, 3-5).
The process tracing of the Bush 41 decision regarding Somalia yielded another
useful insight that underscores the importance of feasibility. The supposed mission that
a U.S. intervention would undertake in Somalia changed over time, going through a
series of transitions. Each mission transition carried a corresponding change in its
perceived feasibility. Only when the mission was scoped to create a short time horizon
with minimal risk did Bush decide to act. This realization fed directly into the final
phase of the analysis.
This Clinton administration case study in Phase III also found that the feasibility
factors were aligned with the outcomes as theoretically predicted.

Here, the primary

source materials that supported the NSC deliberations were able to identify how the
feasibility factor assessments changed under Clinton as he dealt with the same crises,
influencing the decision to withdraw from Somalia and intervene in Bosnia (Clinton
Library 1993b and 1993c). The Clinton administration adopted more expansive nationbuilding aims in Somalia than Bush 41 had proposed, necessitating revised feasibility
assessments to account for new mission requirements and their concomitant adversarial
responses (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 81-99; Clinton 1994). Faced with greater than

9

expected resistance against diffusely organized militias, with no regime to support, and
increasing costs over a longer time horizon, Clinton chose withdrawal. Conversely, with
the signing of the Dayton Accords, the situation in Bosnia changed substantially.
While still intervening in an ethnically-based conflict, the agreed upon cease fire
separated the combatants, reduced opposition, and provided access to the airports and
road networks. This, too, resulted in a decision reversal, with the U.S. taking part in the
NATO Bosnian intervention.
Contributions
This dissertation contributes to improved understanding of intervention decisions
for the scholarly community, for the policy realm, as well as for the general public. First
and foremost, the theory and the feasibility factors used to test it operationalize the
“expectations of success” concept that others have argued is an important consideration,
but had not fully developed (e.g., Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007). By
providing an alternative theoretical framework that incorporates meaningful measures of
feasibility, we can better explain what had previously appeared as inconsistent
intervention behavior. Beyond that, the three-part causal chain is a useful way for
scholars to think about the decisional process, understanding how demand signals interact
with feasibility assessments to arrive at a prudent decision. Therefore, for academia, the
findings indicate that feasibility factors should be included and potentially expanded
upon in future studies.
For the policy community, the idea that feasibility influences decisions is not
novel. Those that develop military options or present them for consideration are aware
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of the myriad challenges that pose risks to a potential operation. However, through the
systematic analysis of 19 intervention opportunities and two paired comparison case
studies covering previously classified discussions, this study elucidates the most
prominent feasibility concerns.

Knowing that presidents have incorporated these

concerns heavily in the past, this study informs those framing decisions by identifying
elements of their analysis that may be of greater interest to decision makers. This study
also validates the value of their work, demonstrating the decision to intervene or not is
much more contingent on the existence of feasible options rather than political whims.
More specifically, if the president chooses to intervene in instances where these factors
are aligned against success, the policy community should monitor progress carefully and
be ready to expose a failing strategy if, in fact, the intervention proves ineffective, as
these indicators might suggest.
Lastly, the general public benefits from a more nuanced view of what presidents
must consider when making these weighty decisions. Often, presidents are rebuked in
the media or on the world stage for failing to act (e.g., Rwanda coverage in New York
Times 1994). When this happens, the public, much like the scholarly community
discussed above, is using a demand-based argument, devoid of any deliberation of
whether feasible options exist. By presenting an alternative rationale for why a president
might fail to intervene, we open more space in the debate that surrounds these issues,
making room for matters that impinge on the potential mission success or failure and
what costs they might incur.
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Organization
The next five chapters are structured to systematically determine the impact that
operational feasibility has on U.S. presidential military intervention decisions. Chapter 2
reviews the literature and proposes a new theory for understanding intervention decisions
based on the three-part causal chain. To open, I first explore the intervention literature
and identify a gap in operationalizing the idea of an “expectation of success.” In
response to this gap, I articulate the theoretical framework upon which the subsequent
analyses are built. Extant literature uses a demand-based logic as theoretical
underpinning; I propose a shift to a threshold for intervention based on feasibility factors.
Chapter 3 provides the research design and conducts the first empirical tests of the
eight hypotheses relating to feasibility using QCA. I explain the rationale for using a
mixed methods approach and introduce the various conditions used in the QCA,
including both those that other scholars have argued as determinant and the feasibility
factors I propose. After providing an overview of the QCA process, I conduct the
analysis and identify the unique combinations of conditions that best explain intervention
and nonintervention. Using those solutions, I then conduct an out-of-sample test to
evaluate the predictive power of the causal recipes.
Chapter 4 is a comparative historical analysis of contemporaneous crises under
Bush 41: Bosnia and Somalia in 1992. The analysis builds on the findings from the
QCA in the preceding chapter by examining the role that the feasibility concerns
identified in Chapter 3 play on Bush’s deliberations. This is accomplished primarily
through the analysis of previously classified primary source documents from the George
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H.W. Bush Presidential Library, as well as supporting secondary sources. The material
includes the minutes from NSC meetings, small group discussions, and communications
between senior government officials involved in the decision-making process. The
purpose of the chapter is to understand why the Bush 41 administration chose to
intervene in Somalia but not in Bosnia and if the feasibility factors identified in the QCA
were present in the historical record of the decisional dialogues.
Chapter 5, drawing on primary sources from the Clinton Presidential Library, uses
the same method as Chapter 4 but compares the Clinton decisions to withdraw from
Somalia and intervene in Bosnia. The previous two chapters emphasized conditions near
crisis onset. Looking beyond the initial decision window and process tracing how the
Somalia and Bosnia situations change, I expand on the theoretical application of
feasibility factor analysis by demonstrating that Clinton’s decisions reverse when the
feasibility assessments change from positive to negative, and vice versa.
Chapter 6 concludes. In it I provide an overview of the central argument, a
summation of the empirical findings, and further expand on the implications. In closing
I discuss the limitations of this study outline some recommendations for future research.
Summary
This dissertation explores why U.S. presidents have decided to intervene
militarily in some foreign crises but not others in recent decades. By incorporating
feasibility into the theory behind intervention decisions where previously only concern
for demand existed, this work sheds light on a powerful set of factors that help explain
both action and inaction. As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, a crisis may emit
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a strong demand signal with many clamoring that something ought to be done; but
without feasible alternatives, U.S. presidents of the modern era have been reluctant to
send in ground troops. Therefore, to best understand and evaluate intervention
decisions, one must account for the role that feasibility plays in determining the final
outcome.

14

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
This chapter serves two purposes. First, it situates this work within the existing
body of literature. Second, based on a gap identified within the extant literature in
explaining what about the crisis environment makes a military intervention feasible, this
chapter articulates the theoretical framework upon which the subsequent analyses are
built. Previous intervention scholars had implicitly or explicitly hypothesized a
threshold for action, usually based on the accumulation of demand signals from both
international and domestic political sources. I reformulate that approach and argue that
the demands they describe create an opportunity for action, but that the decision threshold
is tied directly to the feasibility of a military intervention being able to achieve the policy
goals.
Literature Review
The following literature review looks at how scholars have analyzed military
intervention decisions and provides an understanding of where this work contributes to
the existing body of knowledge. In particular, it highlights the growth of a nascent
consideration often treated in the background as an assumption or precursor issue when
evaluating intervention decisions: the feasibility of military intervention given salient
aspects of the crisis environment. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, this
previously underrepresented factor proves useful in explaining the apparent
inconsistencies in U.S. presidential decisions regarding the commitment of U.S. forces to
resolve foreign crises.
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Attempts to understand the selective use of force by presidents, or what was
similarly termed "intervention" by Rosenau (1967, 168) have assumed a variety of
theoretical approaches. A recent review of research by Aubone (2013), provided a
useful typology for the literature, grouping the work into two different categories:
research centered on either external or internal determinants for the decision to intervene
(pp. 281-298). I follow her lead in this regard for two reasons: first, because I believe
her model appropriately portrays the development of the literature in concise fashion; and
second, it does so in a way that illuminates the limitations these determinants have in
fully understanding decisions to intervene. “External” and “internal” determinants refer
to the origin of the demand signal for an intervention. Discussed in greater detail below,
external refers for demands generated by forces and concerns rooted in the international
arena whereas internal refers to those stemming from domestic matters.2 The literature
supporting both sets of determinants ascribe to the same logic, that the cumulative weight
of the demand is what triggers a decision to intervene.
The graphical depiction below (Figure 2.1) portrays the common cumulative
demand explanation for interventions emphasizing the two demand source categories
(internal and external determinants) that exert pressure on the presidential decision space.
These sources capture everything from demands stemming from economic ties to allies,

2

This study acknowledges that there is another body of literature addressing presidential decision-making
that is situated on the leader and their personal or chosen organizational attributes. These include
significant works such as Horowitz and Stam (2014), Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005), Preston
(2001), and Vertzberger (1990), among others. However, because the focus of this research is on the
feasibility of military operations for the U.S., it necessarily must be temporally delimited to produce
consistency in the challenges faced and the types and capabilities of military tools at the presidents’
disposal. This necessarily results in a small N problem, making it impossible to draw significant
conclusions from differences in characteristics such as age, military service, or organizational models.
Beyond that, my contribution to this body of literature is not in the decision-making model itself, as most of
these studies propose, but instead in the content to be considered in the models. Namely, this study
recommends the inclusion of feasibility factors in whatever decision-making model is being evaluated.
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to geopolitical security interests, to congressional or public pressures at home. In all of
these views what matters is the rationale for action and whether there is enough pressure
exerted to trigger an intervention. Implied in these theories is that at some point a
threshold tied to the amount or type of demand signal is crossed whereby the benefits of
the intervention outweigh the costs and risks associated with failure. Where the studies
vary is in the types of demand that are said to elicit the greater response. What is not
commonly identified is what factors are tied to the placement of that threshold in the
decision space. Ostrom and Job (1986) argue that the threshold is tied to an appreciation
of the crisis situation as a whole as either conducive to a major use of force or not. I
agree. However, no one has adequately operationalized what separates an environment
conducive to intervention vice one that is not. I argue that understanding key feasibility
factors can help us know where that threshold lies. The omission of what influences the
placement of that notional decision threshold is central to understanding the gap in the
intervention literature. The following two sections expose this gap by elaborating on the
internal and external determinant categories that scholars argue influence intervention
decisions.
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative Demand Explanation for Intervention Decisions

External Determinants
Of these two categories, the external determinants are the more traditional form,
with their roots reaching back to the realist scholars who attribute the actions of state
leaders to issues of power, security, and state interests relative to other states within the
global system (Waltz 1959 and 1979; Morgenthau 1948; Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 2001).
This category also includes those that recognized the interdependencies (e.g., economic
and social) among states as exerting pressure on leaders and the formulation of their
foreign policy decisions (Keohane and Nye 1977). The externalist position views the
president as responsive to an external stimulus, such as a crisis abroad. This approach
served as the dominant paradigm throughout the majority of the Cold War, explaining
interactions in a bipolar and contested world.
Studies within the external determinants have also included more nuanced
approaches to alliance relationships (Smith 1996) and explored the role of global
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economic influences on state interaction as well (Fordham 2008). For instance,
Fordham demonstrates empirically that alliances are important, but that exports appear to
have an indirect effect on intervention decisions. More recently, a more constructivist
approach has lent its weight to the externalist position. Numerous scholars, especially
those considering the use of force for humanitarian purposes, have assessed the impact of
international norms on these decisions and found them to hold sway (Finnemore 2004;
Talentino 2005; Choi 2013; Wheeler 2000). Walling (2013) specifically calls out the
roles that argumentation and narrative play at the United Nations Security Council in
leading to intervention decisions. These works move away from the materialist
principles of their externalist forbears and identify the role of intersubjective effects on
states through their interaction and involvement within a more cooperative international
order. The hallmark of this category, for both the rationalist and the constructivist
approaches, is the position that domestic politics do not impinge, at least not to an
overriding extent, on decisions within international affairs. Various sources of these
determinants can be seen in Figure 2.1 above.
External determinant studies point to a number of relevant factors contributing to
decisions to use force within the international environment. However, at the core of this
perspective is the assumption that international systemic factors can and should be
isolated from the problematic whole, including the domestic influences on that decision
(Waltz [1979] 2010). This bifurcation results in these studies tending to look at
decisional stimuli as a matter of urgency, whether that urgency traces its roots from state
interests or international norms. It could be a threat to an ally, a disruption to
international trade, or a call to stop a genocide, but the research focused on external
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determinants is primarily concerned with the imperative for intervention – whether an
action should be pursued. These studies seldom emphasize the part of the decision
assessing whether the action can be effectively carried out with the means available given
the constraints of the situation. An apt example is Yoon (1997) who identifies a number
of factors as statistically significant in contributing to U.S. interventions into third world
civil wars between 1945 and 1989. These influences include whether the Soviet Union
or one of their allies were involved and if the target of the intervention was communist,
of strategic importance, and in geographic proximity to the U.S. (Yoon 1997, 582). Note
that these considerations are those that make an argument for intervention, providing a
rationale as to why an intervention may be considered; absent are concerns that would
squelch involvement.
Studies from the external determinant group that do attempt to capture some of
decisional concerns not associated with the “demand,” but instead with the pragmatics of
carrying out the operation, involve the notion of expectations of success. When
incorporated, this is frequently done in a relatively limited fashion with proxies designed
for the conflicts most prominent in the study. For instance, studies covering interstate
wars emphasize relative power between adversaries in dyadic relationships as a predictor
for expected outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 107; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman
1992, 294-297). These design decisions are often due to efforts to strive for parsimony
in formal modelling or statistical inquiry, serving these studies well in many ways.
However, calculations such as these are of little help when trying to understand the utility
of force in more nuanced applications such as stopping a civil war as a neutral party or
attempting to quell an insurgency.
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Critiques of overly-simplified analyses of decision-making processes are not new,
with many scholars incorporating a variety of considerations into their analytic
techniques including a range of considerations from the domestic political sphere as well
(George 1980; Ostrom and Job 1986). These studies acknowledged that the decision
space was complicated and that more than external factors bore on the decision. As
Allison (1971) observed, "[s]pectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and
thus not only lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, but
also...what he takes to be an explanation" (p. 251). In other words, the answers to the
questions we ask are limited to the possible answers we consider.

Internal Determinants
Juxtaposed to the externalist perspective is the view that internal determinants,
those influences stemming from domestic factors, contribute significantly to presidential
decisions to use force. This perspective does not view presidential intervention
decisions as solely responsive to stimuli external to the state, but rather responsive to
domestically-oriented concerns. Scholarship following this premise has explored the
impact of public opinion on decisions to intervene (Baum 2004; Entman 2004), as well as
the "diversionary use of force" to manipulate that opinion for political gain (see Levy
1989 for expansive critique on this contention). Other scholars have contrasted the
external influences with domestic economic conditions, finding linkages between the
state of the economy and decisions to use force (DeRouen 1995). Still others have
assessed the role of political institutions and electoral cycles to find explanations for
intervention behavior (Feaver and Gelpi 2012; Hildebrandt, Hillebrecht, Holm, and
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Pevehouse 2013; Howell and Pevehouse 2007).
As these arguments developed, internal and external determinant advocates have
attempted to pair domestic variables against international systemic considerations to
determine which holds more explanatory power and in what circumstances. Howell and
Pevehouse (2007) investigated the role of internal determinants including congressional
composition and the power of the president's party, pitting these factors against
traditional external determinants such as power, capabilities, and trade levels with the
U.S. for comparison (p. 94). They found that partisan composition does indeed have a
significant effect on decisions to use force (Ibid., 222). This subject area, as seen
through this sampling, reinforces Aubone's organization (see Figure 2.1) for two main
groups of determinants influencing presidential decisions.
The internal determinants scholarship pulls the field in a different direction from
the externalist position, finding statistically significant relationships between domestic
influences and military intervention. However, by emphasizing internal pressures at the
expense of other potential determinants, this approach, like the previous, makes an
argument for a singular determinant as the principle arbiter in choices to use force. An
example within this category is a study of public opinion's role in shaping foreign policy.
Matthew Baum (2004) finds that public opinion can be a constraint on the president's
decision to use force based on a study of United States' actions with Somalia over the
George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations from 1992 to 1994. Baum (2004)
hypothesizes that "unless the president is highly confident of success, as public
attentiveness increases, the president will be less willing to escalate or use force" (p.
196). He goes on to point out that in Somalia the expectation of success was high and
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the strategic stakes were low, and posits that it was the change in public opinion during
the conduct of the operations that caused the Clinton administration to withdraw forces
(Baum 2004, 199). However, this view again highlights the prominent issue within this
literature: attributing greater causality to the determinant of focus, in this case a domestic
political factor, while overlooking alternative hypotheses unrelated to intervention
demands.
Baum's is one of the few studies within the literature to attempt to integrate the
“expectation of success” as part of the research model, attempting to address some of the
operational aspects of the problem. However, Baum treats the portion of his hypothesis
dealing with the president's expectations of success as static, fixed from the outset; at the
same time, he allows for changing public sentiment over the course of the operation to
influence his analysis. This creates a noteworthy inconsistency. It is just as plausible
that the deteriorating operational situation in Somalia in 1993 altered what President
Clinton considered possible.
The availability of evidence supporting competing hypotheses from both camps
within the literature makes one wonder whether the incorporation of this consistently
underrepresented aspect of these situations – expectations of success – may improve our
understanding of presidential behavior.

Expectation of Success
Some scholars have chosen to build off an old idea – the importance of an
expectation of success. This factor was one of the chief concerns in Morgenthau's
principle of "selectivity," which advocates for a dual focus on the decision to intervene:
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one eye aimed at the goal and the other to the feasibility to achieve it (Morgenthau 1967,
436). However, over time, the question of efficacy faded into the backdrop. Scholars
such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) used probabilities of success as part of
their formal models. For the sake of parsimony and due to the dominant characteristics
of the international environment at the time, the variables largely reflected relative power
comparisons between would-be opponents (Buena de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 294295). This treatment, while proving prescient in a number of analyses, is largely limited
in its application to interstate wars based on the manner in which likely success is
measured. The types of simplification that became common practice because of their
utility in the bipolar Cold War served to obscure the feasibility factor, sheltering it within
the “security” rubric of the external determinants as the field emerged from the era.
Scholars have recently begun to expose feasibility to the analytical light.
An example of this recent shift is Patrick Regan, who laid the conceptual
groundwork for addressing this omission in the scholarship through his works discussing
interventions in civil wars (Regan 1998 and 2002). He adopts a synthetic approach,
factoring in both international and domestic factors, as well as an appreciation of the
situation itself. When evaluating the decision maker's use of force, Regan sees a
"reasonable expectation of success," a short "projected time horizon," and the necessity
for "domestic support" as three conditions necessary to commit to intervention (Regan
1998, 757-758). Although Regan is primarily interested in the efficacy of different
strategies, the introduction of these elements begins to bridge the divide in the
scholarship and hint at how the inconsistent conclusions drawn between internal and
external determinants can be reconciled. This may hold the potential to expose
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relationships between variables that heretofore have been unobservable. However,
Regan's operationalization of this concept poses some issues in overcoming the type of
puzzles referenced earlier. The variables he includes as part of his expectations of
success are limited to the following: "contiguity," looking at how close a potential
intervener is to the conflict in distance; "conflict intensity," assessing the amount of
casualties; and "refugee crisis" and "cold war" as dichotomous variables either occurring
or not (Regan 2002, 56). While Regan captured some important aspects that provide
greater sensitivity to the problem itself, I believe these have only limited utility in
determining whether the use of force is likely to produce the desired outcome, especially
when considering uses of force that go outside his civil war intervention focus area.
Gauging potential success as part of the decision-making process has become a
more consistent theme in humanitarian literature as well, although like Regan's efforts,
operationalizing the concept has varied in emphasis and approach. Taylor Seybolt
(2007) identifies a number of principles to aid policy makers in their decisions, one of
which is the concern for a "reasonable chance of success" (267-268). Central to
Seybolt’s point is the impact of inadvertent consequences, which is a significant issue for
the use of ground forces because of their concomitant effects on the crisis environment,
both intended and unintended. As Seybolt argues, we must face the issue of whether the
intervention is likely to cause more harm than good (Ibid, 269). However, like the
scholars discussed previously, Seybolt does not operationalize the concept, leaving it as a
subjective matter wherein the important consideration is the aim of the intervention. As
he states, "the question of how to intervene with a reasonable prospect of success is
essentially a question of strategy" (Seybolt 2007, 269). Therefore, according to this
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tautological reasoning, as long as the president chooses the correct strategy, success is
possible regardless of the crisis environment. This seems to contravene the point made
above, that conditions could be such that an effective strategy may not be devisable.

The Impact of Feasibility on Expectations of Success
What types of concerns must we account for when thinking of feasibility and how
it influences a president's expectation of success? The subset of literature dealing with
civil war interventions again proves lucrative. Aydin (2010), much like Regan before,
highlights important features of the conflict itself, specifically the role of uncertainty in
the decision to intervene. Of note, Aydin finds that states are more hesitant to intervene
the longer a conflict goes on and with the greater resiliency displayed by the potential
adversary (Aydin 2010, 47-48). Although his study does not employ variables aimed at
the expectation of success, it does illuminate an extraordinarily important aspect: leader
behavior in response to a dynamic environment. Aydin exposes this feature by
identifying the points when states choose to enter the fray. By revealing the halting
trend exhibited by leaders in the face of the previous failures of other actors, the emphasis
of the inquiry moves from the cumulative demand signal emitted from particular
determinants (e.g., horrible atrocity or ethnic ties to afflicted state), to caution emanating
from the problematic characteristics of the crisis (e.g., failure seems likely). Aydin does
not provide a clear grasp of what features should comprise a determinant category for
generating confidence in achieving the intervention outcome but does demonstrate the
meaningful effect that the challenging aspects of a crisis are likely to produce, namely,
decreased expectations for success.
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Ostrom and Job (1986) employed a "cybernetic decision making" model in their
study on presidential uses of force to capture the complexity posed by these situations
(pp. 543-544). They recognized the need to reevaluate the way presidents process the
information presented to them. However, like most scholars in this field, they
emphasized demand over all else when explaining decision outcomes. Unlike others
though, Ostrom and Job (1986) explicitly hypothesized the existence of a threshold
representing a “composite environmental evaluation,” identifying the point at which the
environmental context is conducive to major uses of force” (p. 551). If the cumulative
demand moves beyond this threshold then the result is a decision to intervene (see Figure
2.1). What they do not account for is what factors of the environment influence the
placement of that threshold.
What if the threshold for action was influenced by more than demand? What if it
had more to do with the expected ease of the intervention? The characteristics of the
crisis environment, if confounding, may be seen to reduce perceptions of the probability
of success. Alternatively, absent such characteristics, the situation may present
advantageous conditions that heighten perceived feasibility.
The preceding discussion, viewed holistically, indicates that perhaps the best way
to explain intervention behavior lies in the nexus between the demand signals for action
from the internal and/or external determinants and the feasibility assessment of the
operational characteristics of the situation. The next section addresses how these
elements interact to produce a presidential decision to either use force or sit on the
sidelines.
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Theory
One must begin with an assessment of whether intervention is desirable, then
address its feasibility, and then return to the question of desirability.
Intervening must pass muster both on its own terms and compared to the
alternatives.
- Richard Haass, former Special Assistant to
President George H.W. Bush (1999, 156)

Previous efforts to explore intervention behavior, as we have seen, have centered
on the desirability aspect of the decision-making process. What motivates the decision?
This approach does a good job of identifying the various demands for action. But what
happens when cases of nonintervention are queried as to why leaders failed to respond?
The motivational factors that gave rise to a positive decision are the only ones available
to provide an alternative explanation. Consequently, we have trouble understanding why
cases like the 1994 Rwandan genocide did not instigate a military intervention to stop
such a horrendous tragedy.
What I intend to do is reformulate the assessment of U.S. presidential decisions
around an alternative view that incorporates operational feasibility into the decision
process, introducing an important element that has either been presumed to be constant
across intervention decisions, or – in the case of Regan or others – has not been measured
with a very high degree of precision. The aim is to see if this new category of
considerations, underrepresented in the extant literature, can explain some of the
contradictory findings in U.S. military intervention behavior.
The point made above by former presidential advisor, Richard Haass, is a concise
way of stating the underlying premise for the following theory. I maintain that
presidents go through a process whereby they respond to the demand signals for action
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but temper that response through a judicious appreciation of the potential efficacy of
military force given the situational circumstances. The causal chain for intervention
decisions is comprised of three parts: 1) recognizing an opportunity to intervene based
on significant demand, 2) assessing the likelihood of success for the use of force given the
constraints of the crisis environment, and finally 3) given the anticipated costs associated
with employing that force, determining whether an intervention is still advisable.
This causal chain does not necessarily proceed in such a lock-step fashion in
reality; instead, it proceeds through multiple recursive iterations between assessing
demands along with the feasibility of potential options. Thus, the mechanism described
above is a simplification, but one that is useful for working through the central pieces of
the intervention decision process. It is rooted in real-world examples for how presidents
have sought and processed the advice of their military and security advisors.
Take the handling of the Syrian Civil War for an exemplar of how the strategic
assessment process works. Since the war began in 2011, more than 400,000 have lost
their lives, with violence causing over 5 million refugees and 6 million internally
displaced persons to flee their homes, creating a significant intervention opportunity
(Human Rights Watch 2018). Yet, no U.S. military intervention has been launched to
take on the Assad regime and end the crisis by either the Obama or Trump
administrations. This reluctance to engage began under Obama’s tenure when the
supposed “red line” was crossed by Assad when he used chemical weapons on his
people, creating the first real impetus for action. Obama directed Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey
to develop military options to deal with the crisis. The Joint Staff developed a range of
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options from training opposition fighters, to imposing a no-fly zone, to conducting air
strikes (Haber 2013). What the Pentagon did not recommend was a military intervention
to end the conflict. This reluctance was met with significant opposition by those, such as
Senator John McCain, who believed that something should be done despite Panetta’s
expressed concerns over identification of an achievable mission at acceptable costs (see
Figure 2.2 below) (United States Senate 2012, 15).

Figure 2.2 Excerpt from Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: The Situation in
Syria (March 7, 2012)

Through the Syria example we see the causal chain on display: there is a demand
signal for action, followed by a feasibility assessment, with a subsequent judgment as to
whether what can be gained warrants the anticipated costs. Both Obama and then Trump
chose to forego the military intervention option. In addition, Secretary Panetta’s
commentary in the excerpt above highlights some of the considerations that go into that
assessment, strengthening the central contention of this work – that the feasibility factors
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advanced in this theory are critical to developing that assessment and sway the
intervention decision in significant measure. What we see from examples such as this is
that the cost of potential failure often trumps the costs associated with not intervening –
e.g., the domestic or international audience costs, or in the potential for greater
deterioration of the situation over time.
After identifying the key assumptions upon which the theory rests, the remainder
of the theoretical section proceeds in accordance with Haass's characterization of the
three-part causal chain. First, we identify whether an intervention is desirable - does it
present an "opportunity" for intervention and is there sufficient demand? Second, we
determine whether the environment is conducive to intervention using feasibility factors
to gain an understanding of what makes a crisis environment more or less complex.
Finally, once feasibility has been incorporated, we return to desirability by introducing an
expected utility formula as a heuristic to demonstrate the interaction between the
demands placed on the president by the internal/external determinants and the feasibility
factors assessment.

Assumptions
This theory is predicated on four assumptions. First, I assume that U.S.
presidents are the key decider in decisions to intervene militarily (Bueno de Mesquita
1981, 20). While it can be argued that each administration's decision apparatus can
significantly influence decision (Allison 1971), the personal nature of the act is highly
consistent with U.S. presidential responsibilities as Commander in Chief. As evidenced
in the case studies in subsequent chapters, there are many voices that take part in the
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national security decision-making process in the United States, but the decision
ultimately falls to the president. This maintains the agency for the action or inaction
with the president. Others might argue that the adversary may have a role in
determining the outcome. For instance, it is possible that a potential enemy may adopt
an organizational structure or purposefully cut off logistical accessibility to the conflict
region for the purposes of thwarting U.S. interference. However, this study is about
understanding why presidents act, given the conditions they face. The possible
implications for would-be adversaries will be addressed in the implications of the study.
The second assumption, related directly to the first, is that a decision not to
intervene is a decision nonetheless, not an example of indecision. Passing on an
intervention opportunity in this view is a purposive act. That purpose is derived from
some rationale, the contents of which this study seeks, in part, to provide. I maintain
that, whether explicitly recognized or stated openly, the president is cognizant of the
feasibility factors addressed herein along with their implications. The factors this study
uses for analysis are gathered from “open source” resources. The president, with access
to the resources of the intelligence community and with planning conducting within the
Department of Defense, is at least be aware of the types of considerations noted here.
This assumption maintains agency with the president instead of granting it to the situation
itself.
A third assumption, common among the literature, is that presidents are "rational,
expected-utility maximizers" (Bennett and Stam 1996; Bueno de Mesquita 1981). This
assumption holds that presidents undertake a calculative effort, weighing costs and
benefits of potential outcomes along with the risk and uncertainty inherent to the task.
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The president can therefore be expected to make policy choices that they expect, at the
time of decision, to accrue greater political benefits than the costs they expect to incur.
Central to the president’s calculation is the expectation of success or failure – the value
placed on p and q in their notional formula. Where expectations of success have been
addressed in the scholarship prior to this it has usually been associated with some
variation on relative capabilities between actors, in levels of risk acceptance (Bueno de
Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), or in the magnitude of the crisis
(Regan 2002). This study adopts a different way of determining the odds of success or
failure in the decision calculus. I focus on the aspects of the situation that run counter to
the expectations of success addressed by previous authors who dealt with civil wars and
humanitarian interventions. If success means accomplishing military objectives within a
short time horizon without unreasonable exertion, then there are clearly situations whose
characteristics run counter to those expectations. The feasibility factors this study
presents address some of the key aspects of the operational environment that sew doubt in
the president’s mind when they are present. The more those problematic factors are
present, the less feasible military options appear, significantly altering the expected utility
calculation.
The fourth assumption is that presidents seek to retain power. Thus, the reason
for the word "political" to be associated with costs and benefits in the previous
assumption. This is commonly stated as a leader's preference to "stay in power" (Miller
1995, 764). In this interpretation though, presidential power goals are aimed at retaining
or gaining power and not merely staying in office. This stands to reason since a president
seeks the ability to govern effectively according to their policy preferences. Losses in
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the foreign policy realm (e.g., ill-conceived intervention decisions) can detract from
presidential power. Exercising what is seen as poor judgment lessens the persuasive
power of the office (Neustadt 1991, chapter 3). This is likely to cost the president's party
at the polls and their ability to govern from a preferred agenda due to the contested nature
of the U.S. political environment (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).

Desirability: Identifying Valid Opportunities
The first step in the causal chain is determining whether an intervention is
desirable, using Haass's word. This is about identifying valid intervention opportunities
for presidential decision. As the review of the literature has demonstrated, there are
sound arguments to be made for both types of determinants, internal and external. Since
that is demonstrable, it seems that what is considered an opportunity should incorporate
both types of drivers in its derivation. This study follows Blechman and Kaplan (1978),
Zelikow (1986), Meernik (1994; 2004), and Howell and Pevehouse (2007) in tethering
the decisions to the crises themselves and evaluating the unique situations they present.
This should enable clearer distinctions to be made between them.
Opportunities are classified here based on the strength of demand they represent
to the president, aggregating the overall effect on a single scale. These demands can
hold both positive and negative values. In some cases, the external influences may be
clamoring for action while the domestic audiences argue for U.S. troops to stay home.
This treatment ensures that both are factored in when weighing the overall demand
signal. The premise for this formula is drawn from the initial theoretical portion of
Ostrom and Job (1986, 551) and may be formalized in the following way:
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where Dₒ is the composite demand represented by the intervention opportunity, Eₒ and Iₒ
are the specific demand signals from external and internal determinants, respectively, and
eₒ recognizes that there are demands from other sources that unsystematically influence
the decision. If the net output of that signal is at least positive, the crisis in question may
be viewed as a viable intervention opportunity (see Figure 2.3). It is illogical to believe
that the president would choose to intervene in a situation where there is not a positive
demand signal emitted. The figure below notes that the crisis can be viewed from either
or both of these lenses and that they interact to produce an opportunity when the demands
for action outweigh those for inaction.

Figure 2.3 Opportunity Identification
This study, in line with the reviewed literature, expects that if the probability of
intervention is linked to the strength of the demand signal, both will increase in parallel,
ceteris paribus. The next step is to incorporate the potential impact of feasibility into the
president's calculation to see how it may potentially influence observed outcomes.
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Feasibility: Identifying the Operational Feasibility Factors
The scholarship on intervention may not address the idea of feasibility, but the
executive branch and the military assess feasibility regularly, holding a prominent place
in the decision calculus. This is evident in the accounts of key advisors that have been
involved in the decision process (Haass 1999). Feasibility is one of the five "validity
criteria" considered during course of action development within the Joint Operation
Planning Process (Joint Staff 2017). This is important to note, since the intervention
options presented for decision through the National Security Council often assume a
doctrinaire form; this is because the military develops them, typically the headquarters
that expects to carry out the mission (Hoar 1993).
Given a crisis, military planners are trained to evaluate the situation as part of
their mission analysis using what are called "Operational Variables" (Army Doctrine
2012, 1-7). These variables address everything that could impact the environment where
the potential mission could take place ranging from the political or economic conditions
of the state in crisis, to the state’s geographical characteristics and infrastructure. These
considerations are used by military planners to develop proposals used within the U.S.
national security apparatus.3 Based on this, I reason that presidents receive strategic
options for remedying these problems within a construct that incorporates these
considerations. The five feasibility factors used in this study to determine anticipated
expectations of success are rooted in the principles of these military processes and are
essential components of strategic assessment. These factors “are fundamental to

3

The author took part in developing these military options for numerous crises in Africa and participated
in planning forums for those in separate areas of responsibility, for consideration by the National Security
Council between 2015 to 2018.
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developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment” (Army
Doctrine 2012, 1-7). I develop observable measure for each of them here to capture
important attributes of a crisis that influence notions of feasibility.
The first feasibility factor is the type of conflict; it accounts for the “cultural,
religious, and ethnic makeup” within the problem situation (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7).
Is the conflict based on either ethnic or religious differences which are commonly
intractable, or on ideological or material concerns? If it is the former, the situation is
thought to be less feasible, requiring longer and more costly commitments to resolve, and
vice versa if the latter (see Wimmer et al. 2009). Moreover, military interventions aimed
at resolving religious or ethnic disputes have a poor record of accomplishment (Regan
2002, 30).
The second feasibility factor concerns the existence of a supportable regime.
Does the U.S. have a clear leader or regime to support in the conflict or are they expected
to intervene as a neutral party with belligerents on both sides? This concern is consistent
with scholarly findings on the success of interventions being associated with support for
one side or the other rather than assuming a neutral posture (Regan 2002). A
supportable regime would include an agreed upon ceasefire agreement where both/all
sides agree not to counter the intervening parties.
The third factor addresses the anticipated enemy’s structure, a departure from
previous studies that relied principally on capabilities. Instead, it is an assessment of
how the adversary is organized. Diffuse and networked militaries add greater
complexity to the situation than do hierarchical ones. Hierarchical organizations are
easier to target and to predict the outcome of strikes (King 2014). Alternatively,
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decentralized organizations must be countered in a coordinated way on multiple levels of
scale, increasing the complexity of the situation and the difficulty in predicting outcomes
(Bar-Yam 2004, 100). If the forces opposing the U.S. military are hierarchically
organized and tightly networked, this makes them susceptible to strike and opens the
possibility for a quick win. On the other hand, if the enemy is diffuse and loosely
networked, they are more difficult to target. Here again, the latter enemy type often
requires more resources and longer time frames to contend with. This can be
demonstrated through the simple comparison of the 1991 Gulf War with Saddam Hussein
in power lasting 100 hours versus the Second Persian Gulf War focused on quelling
secular civil war among militia groups that went on from 2003 to 2011, with arguably
negligible results.
The fourth feasibility factor covers accessibility, capturing the infrastructure and
logistics considerations for the operation. How logistically feasible is it to deploy and
sustain forces in the crisis environment? Limitations associated with the availability of
key nodes, the depth of sea ports, and the length and composition of runways directly
impact what U.S. forces can deploy. Logistics challenges have always presented
formidable obstacles, particularly as they pertain to interventions that require “opening”
overseas theaters of operations, meeting intra-theater transportation needs, and supporting
contingency operations where little infrastructure exists initially (Magruder 1994).
Finally, the last feasibility concern has to do with population density.4 Here, I
address “terrain complexity” (Army Doctrine 2012, 1-8). Will the intervention occur in
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As noted in Chapter 1, this feasibility factor did not prove as useful as the previous four in the study, but
it was included in the analyses and is therefore retained here.
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a primarily urban or rural setting? The former complicates the situation for ground
forces, making discernment of friend and foe difficult and collateral damage more likely
when applying force. Highly populated areas therefore pose a greater challenge for an
intervener (see Krulak 1999).
The greater the number of these factors trending toward infeasibility, the lower
the president’s expectation of success in achieving the intervention goals. This means
that there is an additive component to an appreciation of the situation. Like the demand
signal above, the feasibility factor effect can be formalized in the following way:

Fo = Co + Ro + Eo + Ao + Po
where Fo is the combined value of the negative feasibility factors for the intervention
opportunity, and Co is the conflict type, Ro is the existence of a supportable regime, Eo is
the enemy’s structure, Ao is the accessibility of the crisis environment, and Po is the
population density for the area of expected force employment.
Now that we know the value of both the demand for intervention as well as the
feasibility assessment for successful execution we can locate the feasibility threshold (h)
within the decision space. Ostrom and Job (1986) contend that there is a threshold
within the environmental factors where a potential intervention situation transitions from
unfavorable to favorable conditions (p. 551). Borrowing from their work, I agree that
such a threshold exists, but that it is not an unobservable element of the analysis as they
contend (Ibid.). Instead, the threshold is best understood as an interaction between the
demand signal and the feasibility factors that trend negatively, expressed thus:

h = Do ÷ Fo
The threshold incorporates both demand and feasibility because they are linked.
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Demand and feasibility affect one another in two directions. First, and most obviously,
infeasible characteristics of the environment undercut the effect of the demand signal on
the probability of intervention. When this is the case, it does not matter how strong the
demand signal, enough infeasible factors can thwart a response (e.g., Rwanda 1994).
Less obvious and working in the other direction, high demand can influence feasibility by
causing the president to modify the preferred policy position until the mission associated
with fulfilling it can be expected to succeed. In other words, the mission is tailored or
timed to increase feasibility. The later chapters covering George H.W. Bush’s evolution
on how to handle Somalia in 1992 or Clinton’s timing of the Bosnian intervention in
1995 are good cases in point. Acknowledging how this threshold affects the intervention
decision, we can revise the previous demand-focused intervention graphic to incorporate
the impact of feasibility (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4. Feasibility Explanation for Intervention Decisions
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Return to Desirability: The Expected Utility of Intervention
Now that we have articulated how feasibility factors influence the expectations of
success, the final step in the causal chain is to return to the president's decision calculus.
Just as Haass (1999) explained regarding intervention decisions, only after we have
addressed both desirability and feasibility can a president then weigh the two given how
they anticipate an intervention to unfold. This lends itself to an expected utility
consideration in the final step, set up here as a heuristic to explain the process. The
expected utility of intervention, weighing costs and benefits based on the likelihood of
particular outcomes has been addressed in myriad ways. An excellent theoretical
depiction of intervention decisions comes from Regan (2002, pp. 44-45). The two
formulas here for intervention and nonintervention are nearly identical to his and can be
expressed in the following way:

EUi = p(Ua) + (1-p)(Ux) - ∑Ci
EUni = q(Uax) + (1-q)(Uxo) - ∑Cni
where EUᵢ is the expected utility of intervening, Uₐ is the utility gained from a successful
action, Uₓ is the utility gained from acting unsuccessfully, and Cᵢ is the costs, "reflecting
human, material, and audience costs." EUni is the expected utility of nonintervention,
with Uₐₓ being the utility of their being an acceptable outcome without intervention, Uₓₒ
being the utility of the crisis continuing without having intervened, and Cni is the costs
accrued by nonintervention.
The key difference between this theory and Regan’s is that he maintains that it is
whichever option, intervention or nonintervention, that holds the greatest utility that
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determines the outcome (Ibid.). I maintain that that even if intervention is the preferred
option (i.e., EUi > EUni), the utility for intervention still must clear the feasibility
threshold (h) we established in the previous step for the president to intervene. Based on
this and recognizing that the president’s options are dichotomous, presidential actions for
a given opportunity can be represented as Iₒ = 1 for intervention and Iₒ = 0 for
nonintervention. Blending Regan’s (2004) and Ostrom and Job's (1986) theories, I posit
the following as the full expected utility calculation:

p(I = 1) = p[(EUi - EUni) > h)] =
p[(p(Ua) + (1-p)(Ux) - ∑Ci) –( q(Uax) + (1-q)(Uxo) - ∑Cni)] > (Do ÷ Fo)
This formula states that the probability of the president choosing to intervene does indeed
rest on a sufficient demand signal, but demand alone is not enough. While the demand
must be positive to register a call to action, the strength of the demand signal is not the
most important aspect in predicting intervention. Instead, the expected utility of
intervention must exceed a threshold (h) that incorporates the dynamic interaction
between both demand (Dₒ) and feasibility (Fₒ), beyond which feasible military options
are perceived to be possible (see Figure 2.4 above). This calculation adds a great deal of
weight to the feasibility assessment. This is the key difference between this study and
previous works: my approach emphasizes the critical role of feasibility in decisions to
intervene.
The preceding discussion yields the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1
As operational feasibility decreases, the probability of intervention decreases.
Hypothesis 1 can – in turn – be broken down further into the specific dimensions
of feasibility outlined above, and these are represented by Hypotheses 2 through 7.
Hypothesis 2: Conflict Type
2a. If the crisis is not the product of ethnic or religious cleavages and there is a positive
demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention
increases.
2b. If the crisis stems from ethnic or religious cleavages, the likelihood of intervention
decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.

Hypothesis 3: Supportable Regime
3a. If the U.S. has a clear leader or regime to support and there is a positive demand
signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.
3b. If the U.S. does not have a clear leader or regime to support, the likelihood of
intervention decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.

Hypothesis 4: Enemy Structure
4a. If the potential enemy is organized hierarchically (susceptible to strike) and there is a
positive demand signal from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of
intervention increases.
4b. If the potential enemy is organized diffusely, the likelihood of intervention decreases
regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.

Hypothesis 5: Accessibility
5a. If the target location is logistically accessible and there is a positive demand signal
from internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.
5b. If the target location is logistically inaccessible, the likelihood of intervention
decreases regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.
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Hypothesis 6: Population Density
6a. If the target location is primarily rural and there is a positive demand signal from
internal and external determinants, the likelihood of intervention increases.
6b. If the target location is highly urbanized, the likelihood of intervention decreases
regardless of stimuli from internal and external determinants.

Hypothesis 7: Too Complex
The greater the number of feasibility factors that trend toward infeasibility, the lower the
likelihood of intervention.

In addition to the hypotheses representing the feasibility factors, we can represent past
approaches to intervention with a hypothesis that focuses exclusively on demand signals.
Hypothesis 8: Demand Alone
Positive stimuli from both internal and external determinants combine to increase the
probability of intervention, regardless of feasibility factors.

Conclusion
This chapter explored the literature covering military intervention decisions,
exposing a gap in adequately addressing the types of considerations for developing
expectations of success. Based on an understanding of how military options are
generated within the U.S. national security community, I developed a theory for how
feasibility impacts the likelihood of intervention. This work is grounded in expected
utility theory and extends the scholarship of Regan (2002) to account for crisis
environments such as civil wars or humanitarian disasters. This approach offers a more
complete measure of an expectation of intervention success using five feasibility factors.
It is most important to note that the key theoretic premise of this work is the notion that
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feasibility underpins the threshold (h) that separates an environment conducive to
intervention from one that is not. This unpacks an idea that other scholars identified as a
key concern but had dismissed as unidentifiable - “relegated to a grey area of
understanding” (Regan 2002, 46).

The research design and empirical chapters that

follow evaluate the preceding hypotheses in explaining presidential intervention
decisions.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The preceding chapter provided an overview of the intervention literature and
identified a gap in how scholars have addressed the idea of expectations of success in
their analyses, a critical component in understanding decisional outcomes. The
underpinning factors that make presidents more or less confident in achieving their
desired objectives have not been sufficiently addressed in the extant literature. This is
particularly true for the types of interventions most common in the post-Cold War era.
To help explain these, I advance feasibility factors to operationalize these concerns and in
doing so shed light on this heretofore uncharted area of the decision-making process.
This purpose of this chapter is to articulate the research design for the remainder
of the study and test the hypotheses I develop to incorporate operational feasibility
through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The results from the QCA inform the
case selection and qualitative analyses in the subsequent chapters.

Rationale for a Mixed Methods Approach
As the literature review exposed, most intervention research has been quantitative.
This is not necessarily due to the nature of the research problem. Rather, scholars make
methodological choices based on the ontological and epistemological frameworks they
find compelling and applicable to their understanding of the subject matter. To
accomplish my goals, I employ a methodological approach incorporating quantitative and
qualitative components that can contend with the complexity of the presidential decisionmaking environment (Ragin 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009).
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The analyses below account for competing and complementary aspects of the
intervention opportunities stemming from domestic and international systemic demands
as well as force employment considerations. My choice to adopt an approach blending
qualitative and quantitative aspects stems from the way I have identified the potential
nature of the problem, situated on the presidents' deliberative processes and the meaning
they may attach to certain confounding aspects of a crisis.
This is not to say that this study embraces all the principles commonly associated
with qualitative research. In fact, because it is building off the extensive work of others
in the field, it starts from ontological premises and assumptions that are usually
associated with the use of quantitative methods. However, because this research delves
into and interprets the dialogues behind the decisions, the epistemological aspects are
clearly linked to the qualitative tradition (Guba 1990; Crotty 1998; Creswell 2013).

Research Design
This is a three phase, mixed methods research design. Phase I is contained in this
chapter and uses a configurational comparative method – QCA – to identify unique
combinations of determinants and feasibility factors that are associated with both
intervention and nonintervention outcomes. This phase is critical in identifying the
factors that will be the subject of deeper scrutiny in the second and third phases, which
are qualitative studies that build off the findings of the QCA.
Phase II (Chapter 4) is a comparative historical analysis of two crises that
occurred near simultaneously under the George H.W. Bush administration: the famine
and civil war in Somalia and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Here I use presidential library
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archives to evaluate the extent to which the demands for action and the concerns over
feasibility were explicitly discussed leading up to the final intervention decisions. The
goal, through process tracing, is to identify how feasibility concerns weigh on
intervention decisions. Is feasibility something implicit to the decisions and thus of little
observable concern; or as I theorize above, that these factors are openly discussed and
bear critically on presidential decisions?
Similarly, in the Phase III (Chapter 5), I again conduct a paired comparison, this
time of the William J. Clinton decisions concerning the same conflicts during his tenure.
Here though, Clinton decides to withdraw from Somalia where Bush had intervened and
intervene in Bosnia where Bush had decided it too complex of a problem to commit
troops. The aim is to extend the application of the theory, looking at what happens when
the feasibility factors switch from favoring intervention to nonintervention, and vice
versa. Do Clinton’s decisions change when the factors reverse? Here again, I rely on
presidential archival materials to test the theory.
In the remainder of this chapter I execute Phase I of the research design. First, I
explain my analytical framework, operationalizing the theory into observable criteria for
analysis and explain why QCA is appropriate for this study. Second, I lay out the
method and design for the execution of the QCA. Third, I analyze 19 intervention
opportunities for the U.S. between 1980 and 2013 and present the QCA solutions that
emerge for interventions and noninterventions. Finally, I conduct an out-of-sample test
of the solutions’ forecasting capability. The findings support my theoretical contention
that feasibility concerns are fundamental to explain both intervention and nonintervention
decisions. For cases of intervention, three combinations of conditions account for all
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cases of intervention in the sampled period. Of the three combinatorial conditions,
feasibility factors were an element of each. Similarly, two combinations of conditions
(both including two feasibility factors) explain all nonintervention decisions. In the end,
the evidence strongly suggests that operational employment considerations are an
important part of the presidential decision-making process and merit further scrutiny by
the scholarly community.

Analytical Framework
This analysis is built on the theoretical proposition that intervention decisions are
based on an interaction between the stimuli from the internal and external determinants
and an expectation of success or failure based on operational feasibility factors. It is not
solely the magnitude of the demand for intervention, but instead a combination of those
demands and advantageous force employment conditions that leads to military
intervention.

Demand Signals - Stimuli from Internal and/or External Determinants
In order to assess the importance of operational feasibility, we must understand
what we expect to be a sufficient demand for action, wherein operational feasibility can
then combine to either support an intervention decision, or thwart one. Concerning
decisions to intervene, we may find that either a key internal determinant or external
determinant proves potent and combines with operational feasibility to produce an
intervention. For instance, the magnitude of the crisis or the fact that the crisis state is a
significant trade partner may provide enough of a stimulus for action. On the other
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hand, domestic political concerns such as a high unemployment rate or a low presidential
approval rating may be enough of a political reason to consider actions abroad.
Alternatively, it could be that we only see an intervention when both types of
determinants combine. The important thing is that we consider the impact of operational
feasibility in varied demand environments so that its relative importance, if any, can be
revealed. If this approach is well founded, we could potentially see the importance of
feasibility with variance in the demands for action from both internal and external
determinants.
Intervention decisions are both a rare and complex phenomenon, making their
study somewhat challenging. The approach I take is different from the correlational
arguments commonly put forward in the literature. While these traditional large-N
statistical studies can include interactive terms to attempt to capture some of the
interactive qualities that are potentially at play, they are ill-suited to tackle complex
problems such as these based on their underpinning assumptions (Rihoux and Ragin
2009, 8). For instance, the traditional statistical models are forced to assume causal
symmetry. This may not necessarily be the case. “Causal asymmetry” may be a better
epistemological stance, which is simply the idea that different conditional combinations
may explain intervention and nonintervention decisions. The theory put forward herein
holds this latter position, allowing for an open investigation of the many possible
combinations of key concerns that may serve to induce intervention or nonintervention.
In addition, the study of modern U.S. foreign interventions suffers from the too many
variables and too few cases problem, making it ill-suited for standard regression analysis.
For both reasons, I have selected qualitative comparative analysis to help explain and
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understand these decisions.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
QCA is appropriate for this analysis because it is designed to deal with the causal
complexity we are trying to untangle here. QCA has been widely seen to be appropriate
for tackling problems that pose the “small N, many variables” problem (Rihoux and
Ragin 2009). That is precisely the case here, where we are limited to an intermediate
range of cases (19), and an array of potentially important conditions affecting
intervention decisions (12). Unlike correlational models that seek to identify the unique
contributions of independent variables, QCA assumes that variables are not independent,
but instead have varying influences on the outcome in question based on their synthetic
effect through “multiple conjunctural causation” (Braumoeller 2003, 210-213). Crispset QCA (csQCA), the form of QCA used in this analysis, is a case-oriented method that
employs Boolean logic to identify these combinations of conditions through a settheoretic approach.
This methodological approach allows me to reformulate the assessment of U.S.
presidential decisions around this interactive conception of the decision space. My goal
is to find out if there are unique combinations of conditions that exert causal influence on
the decision-making process. Uncovering these combinations requires an approach that
does not look at the variables in competition to achieve the outcome in question with
their own independent influence. Instead, this study holds that causal complexity is at
work and those unique combinations, or “causal recipes” of conditions will have
demonstrable influence on the investigated outcomes (Ragin 2008, 8-9).
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Method
QCA has been employed in a wide array of fields where causal complexity is
common, from violent ethnic conflict to public health policy (e.g., Bara 2014; Warren,
Wistow, and Bambra 2013). However, its use is not ubiquitous and requires some
elaboration. I will briefly describe the conduct of crisp set QCA (csQCA) to explain the
process and demonstrate its suitability for the questions addressed here (Ragin 2008;
Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thiem and Dusa 2013).
First, QCA begins with case-based research. The researcher identifies the
relevant conditions (variables) based on their theoretical and substantive fitness to the
problem and then operationalizes these conditions and compiles them in raw data form
(see Appendix A). The data used in this study come from existing data sets for some
conditions (e.g., trade data or ethnic conflict classification); for others, cases are
researched to find meaningful measures based on historical accounts or public records
(e.g., enemy structure or target state accessibility).
Second, in crisp-set QCA the researcher dichotomizes the data for analysis (“1”
for the condition being present, “0” for absent). Importantly, this part of the process
requires that the conditions be “calibrated” based on “external standards or guidelines
that have face validity” rather than just trivial or ambiguous criteria (Ragin 2008, 8). I
outline the concepts I use for each condition and their coding criteria in the following
section where I fully explain the determinant conditions.
Third, the researcher tests for necessity of conditions within the sample to identify
those conditions that have such high consistency in their presence as to have no
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meaningful part in the analysis (Ragin 2006, 43). If a condition is identified with a high
enough consistency (e.g., greater than .95 for quasi-necessary conditions) and coverage,
they may be dropped from the analysis (Bara 2014, 6). To accomplish this, I use fsQCA
Software Version 2.5 (2014).
Fourth, the researcher runs an analysis (called a “truth table algorithm” in QCA)
to identify logically possible combinations of conditions that explain intervention. This
is where we begin to account for conjunctural causation. Checking for set-theoretic
consistency, the researcher eliminates all sets of combinations that do not have a high
consistency; less than .75 is considered highly inconsistent (Ragin 2006, 46). Once I
have identified the surviving combinations of conditions, I use standard analyses
employing Boolean algebra (Quine-McCluskey algorithm) within the software to
minimize the solutions for the outcome in question. The analysis identifies the complex,
intermediate, and parsimonious solutions that lead to intervention using Boolean
multiplication (logical “and,” meaning a combination of conditions), addition (logical
“or,” specifying when either condition or set of conditions is present when
intervention/nonintervention occurs) and finally minimization (reduced to the specific
combinations that explain intervention/nonintervention once extraneous conditions are
removed) (Ragin 2006, 34-35).
I conduct this analysis twice – once for intervention, and once for nonintervention
(Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 57). Just because the presence of certain conditions leads to a
specific outcome does not mean an absence of those conditions will lead to the opposite
outcome in a symmetrical way. Therefore, the two separate analyses are required
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 112).
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For each combinatorial solution produced, there are two parameters of fit
estimated that can be used to evaluate their significance and explanatory power. The
first is consistency. Consistency “gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44).
The second parameter is coverage. Coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause or
causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44). These two
parameters - while different since we are dealing with set-theoretic rather than
correlational arguments - can be thought of as being similar to “significance”
(consistency) and “correlation coefficients and total variance explained” (coverage) in
regression analysis (Bara 2014, 4). A meaningful analysis will establish set-theoretic
consistency by properly selecting the combinations of conditions based on a high enough
threshold for consistency (as close to 1.0 as possible) and then establish the empirical
importance of that combination based on the coverage within the sample (Ragin 2008,
56).

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is the selective use of force by presidents
in external crises, or what was similarly termed “intervention” by Rosenau (1967, 168).
The operationalization of this term has assumed different forms in previous literature.
For the purposes of this study, I borrow my definition of military intervention from
Elizabeth Saunders (2011, 21): “an overt, short-term deployment of at least one thousand
combat-ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in
another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s
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domestic institutions.” I have selected this definition purposively to rule out covert
operations, those not employing land forces, or deployments that run a very low risk of
combat. My aim is to produce consistency in the types of risk the president must
consider in the comparative cases. An intervention where the U.S. only provides logistic
support from afar via an airlift does not run the same material or political risks for the
president as one in which troops are placed in proximity with adversarial forces.

Sample Selection
The unit of analysis for the study is an intervention opportunity. To identify
precisely when an intervention opportunity begins or ends is quite difficult. However,
following previous studies (e.g., Feste 2003; Seybolt 2007), here the opportunity
encompasses the years in which the crisis exhibited violence and personnel displacement
beyond the threshold used in the study (see discussion on Magnitude below in the
external determinants section). To identify these, I used the Center for Systemic Peace’s
Major Episodes of Political Violence data set (MEPV 2014) and selected intervention
opportunities that are alike in as many ways as possible (e.g., involving U.S. allies, key
trading partners, strong appeals from both international and domestic audiences, etc.), but
that also have variance in the dependent variable – intervention.
To select a sample of manageable size, I restricted attention to 1980 to 2013.
This focuses the inquiry on the post-Cold War era (almost two-thirds of the period) where
the U.S. was largely hegemonic from a security perspective; and includes roughly a
decade of the bipolar world, but a period in which the U.S. became resurgent following
the Vietnam era. A limited sampling is also required because of the technological
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differences that occur that change the capabilities and limitations of military equipment in
different time periods. For instance, one of the reasons for selecting the Reagan era
forward was in the shift in global airlift capabilities that corresponded to the Reagan
administration’s military increases. Reagan increased the C-5 Galaxy fleet by more than
60%, significantly altering the power projection capabilities for the U.S. in the years to
follow (Leland and Wilcoxson 2003). The same logic holds when considering the
advent of precision munitions and the potential for decapitation strikes against
hierarchically organized enemies.
According to Grimmett’s (2011) report on the “Instances of the use of U.S.
Armed Forces Abroad,” during this period there were nine U.S. interventions meeting the
intervention criteria used here. Using the literature on intervention as a guide, I
identified ten other cases from the MEPV (2014) data set that demonstrated sufficient
demand from the internal and external determinants. For instance, I selected cases based
on the total number of deaths or magnitude of the crisis, reasoning that greater demand
from international and domestic audiences would coincide with larger-scale atrocities.
This strategy produced 19 cases of intervention opportunities between 1980 and 2013
(see Table 3.1). To get an idea of how this sampling corresponds to the overall
opportunities during the time period, the MEPV (2014) data set identifies 41 separate
conflicts during the focal period that exhibited “serious political violence,” which
includes those with deaths ten to 50,000 deaths, and population dislocations in the tens of
thousands. Using that as a guide, and assuming that the U.S. would have considered
intervening in all of those locations (a liberal assumption), this sampling accounts for
roughly 36% of all intervention opportunities during the period.
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Table 3.1 Intervention Opportunities Sample: 1980-2013

Determinant Conditions: Feasibility Factors
This section explains how I operationalized the different determinant conditions
and the coding criteria I used to dichotomize the data for analysis. A table displaying the
conceptual to empirical linkages is found in Appendix B (Conditions Analysis Matrix).
As discussed in the previous chapter, the first five conditions here are the feasibility
factors developed for this study based on the U.S. Army and Joint doctrinal analysis (U.S.
Army Doctrine 2012, 1-7). I expect the presence of these conditions to increase the
likelihood of intervention. In other words, when present, they increase perceptions of
feasibility.
The first condition feasibility condition is CONFLICT. The goal here is to
determine if the crisis is the product of ethnic or religious cleavages. Using the Ethnic
Power Relations Dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009), I code “1” if the case is not an ethnic
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conflict and “0” if it is. I hypothesize that the presence of the “ethnic conflict” condition
reduces the likelihood of intervention. For conflicts not listed in this data set (e.g., post
2010), I use the Wimmer et al. (2009, 5) definition of ethnic conflict as those that
“typically involve conflicts over ethnonational self-determination, the ethnic balance of
power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic and racial discrimination (whether
alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights.” All others are considered
nonethnic.
The second feasibility condition is REGIME. The concept in question here is
whether the U.S. has a clear regime to support or install within the target state prior to
intervention. This condition is coded “1” if there is an identifiable leader or regime to
support and “0” otherwise. UN authorized multinational peacekeeping forces enforcing
agreed upon ceasefires by warring parties are considered “regimes” in this analysis. As
displayed in Appendix A (Raw Data Matrix), I used a variety of sources as references to
determine whether the U.S. had a supportable regime during the decisional period.
Check the appendix for specific sources for each case.
The third feasibility condition is ENEMY. Does the enemy present a hierarchical
organization that is vulnerable to defeat through strike (force employment not involving
ground troops – e.g., air or missile attacks) that may shorten the conflict? Alternatively,
is the adversary organized as a diffuse network that is difficult to identify and
discriminately engage? Or, is there no likely enemy to contend with, which is a
possibility if the intervention mission is expected to be administrative? These questions
lead to three classifications, two of which are coded “1”: hierarchical and no adversary.
I identify “hierarchical” organizations as those possessing an organized military typical
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of the modern era involving hierarchical chains of command and communications.
These are the common models of forces developed in most advanced countries and those
trained and supplied by those countries. I categorize a case as having “no adversary”
when combat is possible but not expected, providing a presence and administrative
function as a neutral party in support of a peace agreement. The third category within
this condition – diffuse – is coded “0” if the structure(s) warrants and if no peace
agreement is in place, assuming the U.S. would have to impose peace on one or more
parties to quell the violence. Examples of diffuse organizations are terrorist networks or
loosely affiliated militias, especially in conflicts where many different adversaries are
present. Like REGIME above, I used a variety of sources to code for ENEMY; check
Appendix A for specific references for each case. For example, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi
military structure is categorized as hierarchical (see Fontenot et al. 2012), whereas the
adversary force in Darfur in 2003 – the Janjaweed – were diffuse based on there being a
loosely organized, militia-like, tribal force (United Nations 2019).
The fourth feasibility condition is ACCESS. Are there adequate seaports and
airfields to facilitate deployment of units and materiel? To determine this, using the CIA
World Factbook for the applicable year, I first identified how many airfields were capable
of landing C-5 transport aircraft with full payload (min runway of 5000 ft/ 1524 m with
hard surface) in the country during the crisis year (Globalsecurity.org 2015). Second,
using the same source, I answer the question: how many major ports were available?
Next, I weighted the two types of access points prior to dichotomizing the data. Seaports
are weighted twice as much as the airports based on the ability to deliver greater
quantities of troops, equipment, and materiel at lesser cost. I then combine these

59

numbers to arrive at a composite access point score for each crisis. To account for
varying sizes of target states, I divide the area of the state by this access score to get an
accessibility ratio. This led to states falling on an accessibility ratio range from 44
(highly accessible – Grenada), to 27,642 (highly inaccessible – Sudan). I code the
accessibility “1” if less than a 3000 access ratio and “0” if greater than 3000 based on a
correspondence between a natural break in the data and knowledge of the cases. Take
Syria for example, which has three significant sea ports and 22 airports with modern road
networks throughout most of the country (CIA World Factbook 2018). Compare it to
Liberia’s four sea ports and only nine airports, with antiquated road network that is
among the most underdeveloped in Africa (Logistics Capacity Assessment 2018). The
break point used in this study is between these two countries.
The final feasibility condition is POPULATION. Based on the crisis
environment, is the conflict likely to be fought among civilians? Urban combat requires
the greatest amount of discrimination of violence due to the potential for collateral
damage. Urban areas are seen by many military forces as the most restrictive terrain for
the application of force (Smith 2007, 409-415). Here, using the CIA World Factbook for
the applicable year, I identify the population density of the country, or based on the case,
a particular region in question during the given year. For coding, less than 200 people
per square kilometer is coded as unrestricted terrain – “1”, whereas greater than 200 is
considered restricted – “0”. I base this coding on a natural break in the data and an
average population density of 107 people per square kilometer for the sample of
intervention opportunities.
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Determinant Conditions: Internal Determinants
Next are the internal determinant conditions, starting with UNEMPLOY. What
is the unemployment rate in the United States prior to the decision? Literature suggests
that presidents may choose to intervene when unemployment levels are high (Fordham
1998). Here I use the monthly unemployment percentage taken from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The average annual unemployment rate for the period inclusive of
these cases is 6.4 percent. Cases are coded “0” if less than 6.4% and “1” if greater than
or equal to 6.4%.
APPROVAL is the second internal determinant condition. Does the president
have a high or low approval rating? Some literature might expect that the president
would choose to intervene if he was experiencing high degrees of popular support (James
and Oneal 1991). Others, using diversionary theory, expect to see presidential decisions
to intervene at periods of low approval (Morgan and Bickers 1992). These data are from
the Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center (2014) and use the rating from the month
prior to the intervention opportunity. Based on the two different views on the role of
presidential approval, cases are coded “1” if 55% or above and when less than 45% (see
Appendix A for sourcing for presidential approval ratings for each case). This accounts
for both high political capital theories as well as diversionary war views. My coding
corresponds to Ostrom and Job’s (1986) empirical findings that presidents are more likely
to use force when public support swings from the mean by a standard deviation in either
direction (pg. 556). I code the data “0” if between 46-54%, when the president is not
incentivized to intervene, where they are unlikely to seek rally effects or have support
sufficient enough to withstand a potential foreign policy failure.
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The third internal determinant condition is PARTY. Does the president's party
control one or both houses of Congress, thereby lessening the amount of political
opposition (Howell and Pevehouse 2007)? I code the cases “1” if the president's party is
in control of at least one house of Congress and “0” if not using historical records from
the U.S. House and Senate (history.house.gov 2018; senate.gov 2018). There are few
periods when the full government has been united under a single party and this coding
criterion resulted in nearly an even split of the cases having the condition present.

Determinant Conditions: External Determinants
There are four external determinant conditions included in the analysis, beginning
with MAGNITUDE (MAG). This condition captures the magnitude of the warfare and
its impact on the societal systems. The higher the level of magnitude, the higher the
expectation that the U.S. will intervene. This assessment includes the duration of the
conflict, population dislocations and their degree, and the level of destruction as
represented in the Center for Systemic Peace Major Episodes of Political Violence
(MEPV) data set (2014). Crises are coded “1” if the conflicts are categorized as at least
“substantial and prolonged warfare,” which includes deaths ranging from 100,000500,000 with population dislocations exceeding 1 million. They are coded “0” if less
than this threshold, which includes “serious warfare” and all remaining forms of
“political violence” (MEPV 2014).
The next condition is TRADE. This condition intends to capture the U.S. trade
interests with the target state, assuming that economic interests could help spur an
intervention (Fordham 2008). This condition is operationalized by summing the inflows
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and outflows of trade between the U.S. and the state in question for the year prior to the
opportunity using the Correlates of War dyadic trade 3.0 data set (Barbieri 2012). The
average trade sum from the US to all countries over the period of the study is 209 million
dollars. Based on this, conditions are coded “1” for the state if their trade level is above
this threshold and “0” if below.
The third external determinant condition is ALLY. Are there alliances of any
kind between the U.S. and the state in question, or with other states that are involved in
the conflict/intervention? This includes alliances such as defense, nonaggression, and
entente as cataloged in the Correlates of War Alliance Data 4.0 data set (Gibler 2009).
Cases are coded “1” if there are alliances with the state or other intervening states, and
“0” if no alliances influence the potential intervention. The expectation here is that an
existing alliance increases the likelihood that the U.S. would become involved (Walt
1987).
The final external determinant and last condition considered here is UN. This
seeks to capture international support for the intervention. Specifically, did the United
Nations (UN) produce a mandate for military intervention? The indicator here is a UN
resolution authorizing an intervention that specifically calls for military employment as
an intervening force, fulfilling a role more than self-defense and monitoring. This aspect
is necessary to attain the level of risk involved to make the conditions analyzed here
meaningful. I used the UN Security Council Resolution search engine (unscr.com) to
research these cases and their specific mandates. Based on recent literature we would
expect that presidents would respond to greater international outcries for action with
higher frequencies of military response (Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2004). Cases are
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coded “1” if mandated by the UN and “0” otherwise. The dichotomized data set used for
the analysis are in Table 3.2 and the summary statistics are in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.2. Dichotomized Data Set

Table 3.3. Summary Statistics

Analysis
This section explains the QCA results for both intervention and nonintervention
using all the variables in Table 3.3.5 Before proceeding into the detailed outputs from

5

I note that all variables were used to arrive at the QCA solutions to point out that if the internal and
external determinants prove useful via the Boolean minimization, they will be present in the outcomes.
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the QCA, it is important to note up front that four of the five feasibility factors put
forward in the theory emerged as important in the analyses. Of those, accessibility and a
supportable regime were important factors regardless of whether we are looking at
intervention or nonintervention.
The analysis will discuss all three of the different solutions: complex,
parsimonious, and intermediate. The complex solution is, as its name portends, the most
complex combination since it does not attempt to simplify the results. The parsimonious
solution uses the computer algorithm to reduce the solutions via Boolean logic by
identifying logical remainders, producing the most simplified solution set. Finally,
between these two is an intermediate solution based on “easy counterfactuals” that
assesses “the plausibility of simplifying assumptions drawn from the pool of causal
combinations lacking empirical cases” (Ragin and Sonnett 2005, 5-6). This approach,
common in case-oriented, comparative research with limited diversity, is a useful
approach because it allows the researcher to employ theoretical knowledge in the
treatment of the logical remainders, aiding in the identification of unique combinations of
conditions (Ragin 2008). In addition to these three approaches to the analysis, I take the
resultants from both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions and test them for their
predictive ability on similar intervention opportunities on a small out-of-sample test. I
randomly selected this subset of cases from the full sample, ensuring representation from
across the entire period in question. A more detailed description of the analysis

The goal is not just to identify the feasibility factors that survive. That said, for readers rooted in the
correlational world, the internal and external determinants can be considered akin to control variables
because they are not the primary variables of interest. To a certain extent, they are antecedent. They must
be present before feasibility is considered and are therefore necessary but insufficient. As the study
demonstrates, the feasibility factors have both independent and interactive effects (with demand) on the
probability of intervention.
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following each step is found in Appendix C.

Necessary Conditions
The first step in QCA is to check for necessary conditions separately from the
question of sufficiency. By examining the question of necessity first, we can identify
those conditions whose presence is so common in cases with the outcome in question that
they may lack explanatory power when we are looking for unique combinations. That
said, just because a condition is “necessary,” does not mean that it is impertinent to the
discussion (Ragin 2008, 43). Quite the opposite; it can be considered as a contributing
factor to any of the combinations that are ultimately identified as having explanatory or
predictive power. The determination of the importance of the condition has more to do
with the theoretical examination of the condition based on our understanding of the
phenomenon. The necessary conditions check here proves the point.
A condition is “necessary” if it scores a 1.0 on consistency, present in every case
where the outcome in question occurs, and is deemed quasi-sufficient if scores a .95
(Bara 2014, 6). The analysis here identifies the condition of ENEMY – an enemy
organizational construct that is hierarchical and susceptible to strike – as necessary with a
score of 1.0 for intervention decisions. For the purposes of statistical analysis, therefore,
the condition/variable is dropped. However, it is important to note the presence of this
factor in all cases of intervention and incorporate it into the findings of the study.
For nonintervention decisions, there were no necessary or quasi-necessary
conditions identified. Therefore, all conditions are considered in the analysis.
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Intervention Decisions
Running the standard analyses with the eleven conditions (minus ENEMY) yields
a complex solution with perfect coverage (1.0) and consistency (1.0) but requires eight
unique combinatorial conditions to explain cases of intervention. Therefore, this is not
particularly useful for subsequent analyses.
However, the parsimonious solution from this initial analysis is quite informative
(see Table 3.4 below). The QCA table below is a standard means of conveying the
analysis (Bara 2014). The specific formula used is presented following “Model” in the
upper left, identifying the conditions analyzed. The asterisk between the conditions
means that the analytic outcomes to the right correspond to that combination of
conditions, representing a logical “and.” The plus sign between the combinations is a
logical “or,” and is used to group the conditional combinations into a group for the
solution, all of which when combined present the full causal formula. Restating the
parameters of fit used in QCA from above for clarity, “consistency gauges the degree to
which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the
outcome in question” (Ragin 2008, 44). Coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause
or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44). The
term “raw” refers to the outcomes that display that combination, and “unique” refers to
those covered by that combination alone.
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Table 3.4 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (all conditions)

The parsimonious solution above identifies four combinations of two conditions
that offer some explanatory power in this sample. Foremost among these, the
combination of two feasibility factors – having a leader or regime to support and having
sufficient accessibility to the target region – is present in 88% of the cases of
intervention. The only case of intervention that did not exhibit this combination was
Somalia in 1992, a case addressed in subsequent chapters. The second combinatorial
condition, a lower population density paired with not having one’s party in power (at
least one house of Congress), is also high in its coverage (63% of cases). However, the
lack of the PARTY condition’s presence goes against the theoretical argument commonly
associated with this internal determinant. With a coverage of 63% of the sample, it
could hint at the persuasiveness of a target environment that lacks the complexity
concomitant with urban applications of force. The third combination of no ethnic or
religious cleavages at the core of the conflict and a sufficiently high or low approval
rating for the U.S. president lends some support for the contention that domestic politics
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hold sway, particularly when combined with a tractable crisis. The last combination is
between an internal and external determinant – high unemployment and international
approval of the effort. In total, these combinations demonstrate a number of useful
insights. They speak to the importance of the feasibility factors put forward here, as well
as to the influence of both internal and external determinants, both in combination with
the feasibility factors and with each other. In particular, the combination of conditions
represented by Hypothesis 3 (Supportable Regime) and Hypothesis 5 (Accessibility)
proved to be extraordinarily powerful.
The parsimonious analysis only yields limited insights, however. To get the full
benefit of the analysis on such a small sample, we need to incorporate in the use of “easy
counterfactuals” and provide a theoretically consistent accounting of the logical
remainders, which are configurations that had no or too few cases. As noted above, this
requires the use of the intermediate solution; it considers all theoretical possibilities
including those combinations not represented in the sample and simplifies the
combinations based on the theoretical assumptions consistent with the theory. However,
the intermediate solution for all eleven conditions proved unhelpful, producing eight
separate combinations of conditions that are unique to a particular outcome.
To arrive at pathways that are more meaningful to understanding the intervention
decision, I test for combinations of conditions that exhibit higher consistencies and
coverages when combined using the necessary conditions check within the fsQCA
software (2014). The goal is to drop conditions from the analysis that apparently lack
explanatory power, while identifying conditions that are more influential when combined
with one another. This process initially identified seven conditions that had the greatest
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synergistic effects to retain for the analysis: CONFLICT, REGIME, ACCESS,
UNEMPLOY, MAG, TRADE, and ALLY. I then proceeded to extract a more
parsimonious solution using Boolean minimization, which is displayed in Table 3.5.6
By reducing to these seven conditions, we see a significant reduction in the most
simplified solution set that still produces perfect consistency and coverage for the sample.
Once again, we see the combination of a leader or regime to support with sufficient
access to be highly important, present in 88% of the cases of intervention, and now
uniquely so in 75% of the cases. This makes an extraordinarily strong case for the
determinant power of these two feasibility factors when combined (Hypotheses 3 and 5).
The other combination, exemplified by the Somalia 1992 case, pairs a lack of ethnic or
religious underpinning to the conflict with a high magnitude of violence and
displacement to arrive at an intervention decision. This lends some support to those
touting the importance of external factors, especially when paired with operationally
feasible conditions.
Table 3.5 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (parsimonious)

6

This is not to say that the other conditions do not have a useful role in understanding these cases or those
beyond the sample. The conditions selected here just proved more useful in arriving at a clear causal
linkage to the intervention decision in a parsimonious manner. The parsimonious solution for intervention
in Table 3.5 displays the results of the Boolean minimization.
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The parsimonious solution clearly identifies important conditions, but it does not
demonstrate the effect of more complicated causal recipes that address the other
determinants put forward by scholars. As a reminder, this examination is not intending
to identify a superior determinant for intervention, but the intervening conditions that
amplify or reduce the effects from the determinants most often posited by the scholarly
community. In order to do this, we need to look to the intermediate solution to
incorporate the logical remainders based on the theoretical assumptions regarding the
effect of the presence or absence of these conditions. As a result, we arrive at a richer
understanding of these combinations within this sample (see Table 3.6).
Table 3.6 QCA Solution for Military Intervention Decisions (intermediate)

The intermediate solution for military intervention decisions in Table 3.6 explains
all of the cases of intervention in the sample (1.00 coverage) without any outliers (1.00
consistency) through only three paths. Just as indicated in the parsimonious solution, the
combination of accessibility and a leader/regime to support proves powerful, part of the
first two combinatorial paths. In the first path, these two conditions pair with the
presence of allied involvement (ally in crisis or allies intervening to resolve the crisis).
This path accounts for half of the intervention cases in the sample. Two of these were
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interventions in “America’s backyard” occurring in Panama and Haiti, while the other
two (Bosnia and Kosovo) where directly affecting European allies (Jones 2000). This is
consistent with a recent treatment of allied behavior in the latter two cases, which found
that “alliance obligations ultimately played a necessary role in compelling intervention”
(Beckley 2015, 40). The second path combines the ACCESS and REGIME conditions
with two different external determinants – trade concerns and the magnitude of the
conflict. This combination captures three of the interventions: Lebanon and both of the
Iraq wars. This is no surprise since many within the national security policy community
identify the defense of economic interests to be a key circumstance that justifies the use
of military force (Haass 1999, 252). The first two causal paths reinforce the external
determinants arguments, highlighting the strategic importance of the crisis.
The third path provides a combination of all three determinant categories; it
combines a crisis of significant magnitude (MAG), not based on ethnic or religious
cleavages (CONFLICT), with an unfavorable unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY).
Interestingly, this combination of all three only captures the Somalian intervention.
Upon closer inspection of that case, the first two conditions seem to matter a great deal
more than the third. The communications of the G.H.W. Bush administration
highlighted the humanitarian motivation behind the intervention, as well as the high
expectations of success in a short time horizon (Wines 1992). This seems plausible
since Bush was a lame duck at that point within the election cycle with Clinton about to
take office. Therefore, in this case, the logic of intervention for the purposes of domestic
political gain becomes a stretch.
In total, the three paths that constitute this intervention solution demonstrate the
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critical importance of feasibility, especially regarding the conditions in Hypotheses 2
(Conflict Type), 3 (Supportable Regime), and 5 (Accessibility). The solutions also call
attention to the external determinants that provide the most pressing demands: ties to
trade partners and a high magnitude conflict. While an internal determinant did make it
through the analysis (unemployment rate), further scrutiny revealed a weak argument for
its inclusion as an important amplifier to the parsimonious solution above.

Nonintervention Decisions
Next, we address the opposite decision and the factors that influence it: When do
presidents choose to forego intervention? I follow the same process as above, but
instead use a negated-set. Here we are looking for conditions relating to nonintervention
with the assumption that the absence of the conditions will lead to a decision not to
intervene.
As before, using all of the conditions proved futile in identifying lucrative and
parsimonious pathways to nonintervention. The analysis produces complex and unique
combinations that provide little commonality. Therefore, I again drop conditions for
further analysis in order to identify combinations of conditions that can explain more than
single instances. This process yielded a new model for nonintervention that used the
following conditions to arrive at parsimonious and intermediate solutions: ~REGIME,
~ENEMY, ~CONFLICT, ~ACCESS, ~APPROVAL, ~TRADE (~ denotes the absence of
the condition).
The parsimonious solution for nonintervention in Table 3.7 again produces high
consistency (1.0) and coverage (1.0) with very few configurations of conditions. Similar
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to interventions, the impact of feasibility on these decisions is pronounced. Here, the
noninterventions in the sample reduced to three feasibility factors with no surviving
representation from the internal or external determinants. Most notably, a lack of
hierarchical enemy structure alone (Hypothesis 4) is the reducible factor in two-thirds of
the cases. Only Nicaragua (1981) and Syria (2013) were instances where presidents did
not intervene when given a hierarchically organized enemy. Interestingly, in both cases,
the presidents in question did intervene to a more limited extent – covert action in
Nicaragua and supporting the NATO operation in Libya with air and logistical support.
The other path is the potent combination of a lack of a leader to support (Hypothesis 3)
and a conflict stemming from ethnic or religious friction (Hypothesis 2). This second
combination accounts for 83% of the cases, and as with the first, perfect consistency.
This analysis may be an even stronger indicator of the importance of feasibility than was
evidenced in the decisions to act. This is important to note because presidents often
boldly proclaim their rationale for taking action in an effort to marshal support.
However, the opposite is true for nonintervention, with presidents and their
spokespersons remaining silent in the face of calls for action. Acknowledging that, the
decision not to intervene may be the one most important to understand.
Table 3.7 QCA Solution for Military Nonintervention Decisions (parsimonious)
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As in the analysis of interventions, we can look to the intermediate solution to
help provide even greater explanatory power by identifying linkages to other
determinants (See Table 3.8). This solution, like the parsimonious, provides perfect
coverage and consistency for the sample. Interestingly, it still reduces to just two paths
to explain all of the interventions. The first path is the same unappealing blend of an
ethnic crisis with no clear regime to support that proved troubling above, again
accounting for 66% of the noninterventions. This combination is exemplified by cases
across Africa such as Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, DRC, and the Darfur region of Sudan.
Table 3.8 QCA Solution for Military Nonintervention Decisions (intermediate)

The second combinatorial path provides an informative combination of feasibility
factors with both internal and external determinants. Together with a lack of
accessibility and diffuse enemy structure, a lack of sufficient trade interests and average
presidential approval (not high enough to provide significant support for action and not
low enough to support diversionary interests) are enough to account for half of the
noninterventions in the sample. When we look at the cases specifically, we find that the
ones this second path captures are Uganda (1984) and Rwanda (1994). If asked to write
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a compelling narrative for why the president chose not to act in these cases, it seems
these rationales would provide firm ground on which to base an argument.
This intermediate solution for nonintervention demonstrates two things: First,
accounting for feasibility is vitally important when understanding action and inaction
since it plays a significant role in both combinatorial conditions. Second, it validates the
views of both the scholars focused on the role of domestic politics and those prizing the
role of international strategic factors. Even when an opportunity for intervention exists,
if the political tides are not right (~APPROVAL) and there is not a sufficient U.S
material interest at stake (~TRADE), the decision to act is highly unlikely.
Predicting Intervention Decisions
The results of the initial analysis suggest that the feasibility factors significantly
influence the decision-making process. All but one of the feasibility factor hypotheses
(Hypothesis 6 concerning population density did not emerge) dominated the causal
recipes. Hypothesis 7 (Too Complex) was also supported because combinations of
feasibility factors did appear to have an additive effect. However, maybe this is true just
for this, admittedly small, sample. To determine if there is greater substance to the
claims, I conducted in- and out-of-sample tests to see how many of the cases are
predicted using the intervention and nonintervention solutions as appropriate for each
case. The process is relatively simple: intervention is predicted if any of the sufficient
paths specified in the intervention solution are present. The same is true for the
nonintervention combinations of conditions.
When evaluating these models for their predictive power, we are concerned with
how many of the cases they predict correctly (true positives), as well as those that they
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predict incorrectly (false positives) (Bara 2014, 11). The latter occurs when the solution
generates an expected outcome (intervention or nonintervention) and it does not occur.
Therefore, the intervention solution may predict a case accurately, but at the same time,
that case may also exhibit the requisite conditions for the nonintervention solution. I
follow Bara’s (2014) approach to account for both of these aspects with two measures:
Sensitivity and Precision. Sensitivity is the percentage of cases that the solution
correctly predicted. Precision takes into account the false positives and reports the
percentage of predictions that are correct.
I selected the cases for this subset of the sample across the range of years (marked
by an asterisk in Table 3.1). This means that I randomly selected five cases but did so
by dividing the period up into five segments. The weakness of this test is that it only
produced one intervention by the standards used in this paper: Grenada. All other U.S.
military interventions during the period were included in the initial analysis. However,
within this subsample is a case that may be seen as a partial intervention - Libya 2011 since the U.S. was actively involved with the NATO air campaign, intelligence, and
support operations that facilitated the toppling of the Gaddafi regime. This leads to a
breakdown within the sample of three clear noninterventions (Croatia, Liberia, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo), one intervention (Grenada), and one that blurs the lines
(Libya).
The results using the parsimonious solution are positive (see Table 3.9). The
solution was perfect for the in-sample analysis, identifying all cases of intervention and
nonintervention, as well as not identifying any false positives.
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Table 3.9. QCA Model In-sample and Out-of-sample Predictions (parsimonious)

For the out-of-sample test, the parsimonious solution did quite well in predicting
onset for both intervention and nonintervention. The solution predicted Grenada as an
intervention based on the conditions of a supportable follow-on regime and operational
accessibility. However, it falsely identified Croatia as an intervention based on the
presence of these same conditions. Croatia did lack both of the other conditions
(CONFLICT * MAG) that were in this solution set, exhibiting nonintervention conditions
as well.
The nonintervention solution captured three of the four cases. The deviant case
was Libya, which displayed every condition needing to be absent. As expected, based
on the initial look at the sample, Libya presents an odd case based on the high level of
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involvement that the U.S. had in the NATO operation. In fact, the Center for Systemic
Peace data set (2014) codes this case as a U.S. intervention. However, I have chosen to
code it as a nonintervention based on the definition for intervention used here, borrowed
from Saunders (2011), emphasizing the importance of greater than 1000 ground combat
troops. This is important because the concerns of troop employment (as it relates to
assumed risk) were essential in the conceptual development of the feasibility factors. If
the definition were broadened to include airstrikes, the Libya case would be captured by
the new solution but the logic behind the derivation of the feasibility factors would fall
apart.
It is important to note that Libya displayed two of the four conditions that were
part of the intervention solution above (REGIME and ALLY); they were just not in a
combination that Boolean minimization identified to trigger intervention. While a
capable and stable government has not followed the downfall of the Gaddafi, at the time
of decision President Obama could identify the Transitional National Council (Libya) as
the supportable successor, therefore meeting the REGIME condition. The ALLY
condition was satisfied by the involvement of NATO partners in the operation. Based on
this and considering the case-oriented stance of the qualitative comparative approach, it
may be useful to consider Libya a “near-miss” case for intervention rather than a
misidentified nonintervention.
How does the intermediate solution fare when we look to its predictive
capabilities? It produces mixed results (See Table 3.10). The sensitivity and precision
for the in-sample test remains unchanged, capturing both the appropriate interventions
and noninterventions and generating no false positives. Again, we might expect a high
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degree of fit since this is the data set used to generate the solution.
Table 3.10 QCA Model In-sample and Out-of-sample Predictions (intermediate)

Looking at the out-of-sample test, the intermediate solution for nonintervention
achieved mixed results. The intervention solution improved, capturing Grenada but
without any false positives. However, the nonintervention solution still failed to account
for Libya, but also narrowly missed Croatia (1991) based on the presence of a
supportable follow-on regime.
In total, both the parsimonious and intermediate intervention and nonintervention
solutions were able to explain and predict with a notable level of accuracy. Between the
two different solutions, the only case they consistently categorized incorrectly was Libya.
Both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions failed to capture it as a
nonintervention, but also did not claim it as an intervention either. Again, the fact that
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the U.S. was significantly involved in the NATO operation but not with significant
ground troops is commensurate with the findings here that it is an “in-between” case.
Conclusion
The common approach within the field of IR to understand military intervention
decisions has been to assign greater causal weight to either domestic factors or
international systemic conditions. This approach pits independent variables against one
another and assumes additive effects on the dependent variable (Braumoller 2003). Both
camps have found empirical support for their positions given different samples and
methods. Looking through either the internal or the external determinant lens, we see
apparent inconsistencies in presidential decision-making. Cases that appear to be very
similar produce different decisions regarding the committal of troops.
This study addresses this problem through an alternative approach and makes
three significant contributions. First, I operationalized the concerns underpinning
expectations of success associated with these decisions – feasibility factors. Feasibility
is a real concern for presidents and their advisors as evidenced by the military’s approach
to framing these problems and anecdotally in recent narratives of key presidential
decisions. However, the scholarly treatment of intervention behavior to date has not
incorporated this concept sufficiently into the analyses. Second, this study tests for the
impact of the feasibility factors on the decisions through a different methodological
assumption. Instead of looking at the decision space as an arena of competing variables,
this inquiry rests on the idea of causal complexity or “multiple conjunctural causation”
where different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome (Rihoux and
Ragin 2009, 8). Essentially, instead of asking whether one determinant is dominant, I
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asked whether there are combinations of determinants, both internally and externally
oriented, that have unique causal influences.7 This approach is appropriate because of
the complexity of these decisions and the myriad influences on the outcome. Finally, I
incorporated an out-of-sample test to demonstrate the forecasting ability of these
concepts for explaining and understanding intervention behavior in the future.
Both the intervention and nonintervention solutions performed very well for the
19 cases in the complete study. The parsimonious and intermediate formulations for
intervention predicted the actual decisions with 100% accuracy. The nonintervention
solutions scored 75% for the parsimonious and 50% for the intermediate, but without any
false positives. Accordingly, this study finds strong support for the explanatory and
predictive power of this approach for understanding presidential decisions to intervene
militarily.
The analyses found support for many of the hypotheses relating to feasibility.
Regarding intervention decisions, two conditions dominated the parsimonious solution,
combining to account for 88% of the decisions to intervene from 1980 to 2013: First,
(Hypothesis 3) is there a supportable leader or regime to back? Second, (Hypothesis 5) is
the target location logistically accessible? In addition to these, the question of the
enemy’s structure also figured prominently, present in all of the cases of intervention and
absent in two-thirds of the cases where the president chose not to intervene. This
condition addresses whether or not the potential adversary’s military structure is

7

Regarding unique causal influences, some may hold endogeneity concerns. If there is endogeneity
between the feasibility factors and the other determinants, the overlap is all between X variables, not
between X and Y (intervention or nonintervention). Given endogeneity between X's, we ought to see
greater and more consistent combinations between feasibility factors and the determinants than we do;
instead, feasibility emerges as an independent factor, or in combination with other feasibility factors. This
finding is only reinforced in the qualitative studies that follow.
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susceptible to strike (e.g., hierarchical and organized). Finally, the origins of the conflict
were also vitally important to the calculus. When the conflict stemmed from ethnic or
religious frictions and there was no clear regime to support, this combination accounted
for 83% of the cases of nonintervention. This also lends weight to hypothesis seven –
“Too Complex” – which argued that there would be an additive quality to infeasible
traits. All three of the conditions in the parsimonious nonintervention solution were
feasibility factors, and four of the six for the intermediate solution. It is easy to see how
these factors would affect the presidential decision space because they address issues
such as certainty, shorter time commitments, and costs.
Beyond these, all the feasibility factors carried some weight in the analysis,
except for population density (hypothesis six) which did not prove useful. Clearly, the
least substantiated hypothesis was number seven, which stated that internal and external
determinant combinations would prove impactful without concern for feasibility. These
findings support the theory put forward here, that feasibility factors are an essential
matter of concern when assessing intervention behavior.
The non-feasibility conditions that played the most significant roles here were
presidential approval, trade ties to the state in crisis, and a higher magnitude of conflict,
reinforcing arguments that favor both domestic politics and international systemic
influences on these decisions. However, no combination of these determinants emerged
as important without the addition of feasibility factors in the solution, undermining
arguments in favor of Hypothesis 8 which posited that demand alone is determinant.
This study produces two key findings. First, we can explain, at least partially,
the inconsistency within the literature concerning intervention behavior. From this
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analysis, a combination of both internal and external determinants (trade, presidential
approval, conflict magnitude) with feasibility factors. The intermediate QCA solutions
prove informative here (see Tables 3.6 and 3.8). Second, and more clearly, in both types
of decision we see the importance of feasibility. These factors predominate the internal
and external determinants, and no combinatorial conditions emerged from the analysis
that omitted feasibility as a necessary condition for action/inaction.
Based on this research, scholars should not view operational employment factors
as background noise that presidents view as dismissive with the right strategy. Given the
prominence of the feasibility factors within the combinations generated by these analyses,
they may well be the most important aspect when presidents consider whether to act.
This study provides a clear answer for a case such as Syria where there are numerous
demand stimuli, yet still no overt intervention. There is not a clear leader and regime to
replace Assad; there are numerous and diffuse competing belligerents; and there are
religious and ethnic roots to the conflict. These are just a few of the factors that make
this an unlikely target for intervention.
In sum, this work supports the theoretical argument that explaining intervention
and nonintervention decisions by the strength of demand alone may not be the best
approach. Instead, combinations of conditions, especially those incorporating feasibility,
can help explain why seemingly less important interventions occur while other calls for
action only reach deaf ears within the oval office. Armed with knowledge of which
conditions may best explain intervention behavior, the next chapter looks at the George
H.W. Bush administration’s handling of the Somalian and Yugoslavian crises to ascertain
whether the concerns exposed here are evident in the deliberative record.
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CHAPTER 4
GEORGE H.W. BUSH INTERVENTION DECISIONS:
YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA
Sometimes the decision not to use force, to stay our hand, I can tell you, it's
just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The former
Yugoslavia, well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know,
important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to now
it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the
United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the
desired effect, given the nature and complexity of that situation.
-President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at West Point, January 5, 1993

This chapter builds on the analysis of the last and aims to explicate the role of
operational feasibility concerns on the decision to intervene as seen through dialogues
among those influencing presidential decisions. To accomplish this, I select two U.S.
intervention opportunities for comparison sharing a number of key similarities – Bosnia
and Somalia in 1992 – and analyze the minutes from National Security Council (NSC)
and Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meetings along with previously published interview
material. These cases represent two of the most-documented instances of simultaneous
crises being weighed for intervention by a single administration, and by holding the
administration constant I am able to minimize the effect of rival explanations of
intervention, the different predispositions of presidents to use military force, or changes
in the international environment. The purpose is to gain an appreciation for why the
George H.W. Bush administration chose to intervene in Somalia but not in Bosnia and
what factors exerted the greatest influence on the actual outcome.
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This analysis accomplishes three things. First, it reinforces the work done by
previous scholars that international systemic considerations and domestic politics weigh
heavily on the decision to act. Second, this case comparison demonstrates the key role
that feasibility concerns play in the decision-making process when deciding where to act.
Third, it demonstrates through within case analysis that feasibility factors are paramount
in understanding intervention decisions because as they change over time, so too does the
president’s will to act. This is significant to the body of intervention literature because
the scholarship explaining or predicting presidential behavior often pits domestic and
international concerns against one another with mixed results.
The mixed results of these studies, I argue, are due to a failure to account for
differentiation in difficulty levels posed by the intervention opportunities. While some
studies have paid attention to the importance of a mission’s expectation of success or
whether it is “doable,” they have not attempted to factor this into the analysis by
operationalizing it into key variables (e.g., Regan 2002; Western 2002). The feasibility
discriminators put forward in this study have explanatory power heretofore unrecognized
and may serve as a guide to operationalizing feasibility for further scholarship.
The chapter proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the method of analysis and its
appropriateness for this study. Part II sets the context, providing a background
discussion for these contemporaneous crises. Part III discusses the prevailing theories
for why interventions occur within the literature and what predictions they would have
made for President George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) decisions given the situation at the
time. The principal contribution of this chapter is in Part IV, which explores declassified
NSC documents and related materials to uncover feasibility concerns explicitly addressed
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in the decision making process – What feasibility considerations predominated? To
what extent or impact? Part V compares and concludes.
Part I: Method
This chapter follows in the line of others who have employed the “comparative
historical method” to try to better understand phenomena that are both complex and rare,
two traits consistent with U.S. intervention decisions (Skocpol 1979; Moore 1993).
What follows is a comparison of Bosnia and Somalia intervention opportunities for the
George H.W. Bush administration in 1992. I selected these cases based on Mill’s
“method of difference,” wherein cases are selected based on their similar characteristics,
ideally on key independent variables, but with different outcomes on the dependent
variable, in this case the decision to intervene militarily (Mill 1884). Both cases are
similar in their independent variables that other scholars argue are important determinants
(e.g., strategic import, economic interests, media coverage). The period of analytic focus
is the Bush 41 decision space for when these options were being weighed. This
corresponds to the timeframe from the fall of 1991, when discussions on these two crises
began within the NSC, up to December 4, 1992, the initiation date for Operation Restore
Hope (the U.S.-led humanitarian effort in Somalia to enforce UN Security Council
Resolution 794).
Once familiarized with the background for these two intervention opportunities in
Part II, the comparative analysis occurs over Parts III and IV. Part III is a “disciplined
configurative” approach employing the “congruence method” to test what leading
theories would predict based on the conditions at the time (George and Bennett 2005,
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Van Evera 1997). This analysis is informed both by the literature to determine what
conditions are expected to lead to what type of decision (i.e., intervene or not), but also
by the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) outputs that yielded combinatorial
solutions to the cases in the preceding chapter. Part IV “process traces” discussions
framing the decision for the president with emphasis on operational feasibility concerns,
serving as a “plausibility probe” for theory development (George and Bennett 2005, 75).
There are a couple of difficulties or limitations associated with this method and
the cases selected. First, the reason for highlighting the plausibility probe goal for this
chapter is to call out explicitly the limitations of using only two cases, however similar,
for controlled comparison to arrive as solid conclusions. There are many elements of
these situations that this study will not explore. As a result, there could be any number
of intervening factors that are unseen determinants for these decisions. In addition, there
is the problem of assuming a multivariate logic which is at the heart of historical
comparative analysis (Skocpol 1979, 39). This presumes that the units of comparison
are independent of one another. In the tethered crises of Bosnia and Somalia in 1992,
this is clearly not the case; these opportunities were viewed in stark contrast and weighed
against one another by those directly advising the president (Western 2002, 138).
These methodological concerns are partially mitigated in a number of ways. The
unforeseen intervening factors are addressed by relying on the predominant theories from
the rich intervention literature to inform the inquiry. Also, as noted at the outset, these
two cases are contemporaneous and well-documented, presenting an excellent test bed for
research where variance is minimized as much as naturally possible. The multivariate
logic problem is addressed by the fact that this chapter builds on the feasibility factor
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findings of the last; QCA does not employ multivariate logic, instead assuming that there
are combinations of conditions at play. This chapter uses those conditions both
consistent with the literature as well as the QCA solutions from the preceding chapter to
inform the research (i.e., the conditions found to be useful in the QCA are carried forward
for this analysis). Finally, the fact that these cases are not viewed by administration in
isolation is actually beneficial to the central research question: why here but not there?
This allows the study to get beyond the question of a demand for action and gets to the
heart of what it is about a situation that causes an administration to either act or balk.
Part II: Background to Crises
The years of the Bush 41 administration were a period of great tumult on the
international stage. This presidency was witness, and participant in many respects, to
the end of the Cold War and in the transitions occurring as a result of the crumbling of
the bipolar world. Regimes were falling with new strong men vying for position and
influence as power vacuums emerged across the periphery of former areas of Soviet
influence. As a result, the Bush presidency was rife with opportunities for engagement
as the sole remaining superpower tried to make sense of the global landscape and hold
together “a new world order” (Bush 1991).
Military engagement during the Bush 41 tenure was significant as one might
imagine in a period of geostrategic transitions. Most notable was the decision to eject
Iraq from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, following their invasion in
August 1990. This was the largest military action undertaken by the U.S. government
since the end of the Vietnam War. At the same time, there were humanitarian demands
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for increased use of force and castigation of the administration’s military advisors for
having a “no-can-do” attitude (New York Times Editorial 1992). In response to these
allegations, Bush 41’s CJCS, General Colin Powell penned a response that demonstrated
that the administration was not bashful about using force but used it selectively where it
was likely to have “decisive” results (Powell 1992). Powell noted that in the three
preceding years the U.S. military had been used to remove Manuel Noriega from power
in Panama, stop a coup attempt in the Philippines, rescue an embassy in Somalia and
stranded personnel in Liberia, and assist in humanitarian relief operations in Iraq,
Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia, and Bosnia. In short, by the second half of 1992 the Bush
administration had a long track record of employing the military toward limited ends,
while at the same time it was experiencing significant pressure for even greater use of
military means to achieve political ends.
The two most demanding intervention opportunities during the last year of the
administration were the collapsing Yugoslavian state and the conflict-induced famine in
Somalia. Looking at the NSC/DC meetings starting in May 1992, we find that of the 88
total meetings, 30 meetings were held on the topic of Yugoslavia or its former states, and
28 for Somalia (See Appendix D for NSC and NSC/DC meetings). This means that 66%
of the national security decision making staff’s energies were fixated on these two topics,
roughly in equal expenditure during the last half of 1992 when these intervention
opportunities presented themselves. What follows is a brief sketch of each of these
crises and some of their key characteristics to paint a picture of what the Bush 41
administration was considering as they discussed their options.
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Breakup of Yugoslavia
The former Yugoslavia was a socialist state formed in the aftermath of World
War II and a civil war, bringing together six separate republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Two things contributed to their
ultimate fracture. First, the suppressive influence of President Tito, which squelched the
tensions among the groups for nearly three decades in various capacities, ended in 1980
with his death, unleashing old animosities. Second, the end of the Cold War brought
significant change (BBC 2016). The “Revolutions of 1989” and corresponding
retraction of Soviet military presence across their former sphere invited upheaval (Kumar
1992). Beginning in 1990, political protest, and ultimately extraordinary levels of
violence overtook the Yugoslav republics. Yugoslavia was always diverse with its six
republics divided along ethnic and historical lines. The tensions among the ethnic
minorities (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) created uncertainty about what the geopolitical
space would look like moving forward following the end of communism and waning
Soviet influence. With the loss of central state control came the opportunity for the
republics to go their separate ways along status quo political boundaries; or in the mind
of some, such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, an opportunity to reimagine those lines
and consolidate power to greater advantage (Magas 1993).
The initial breakdown of Yugoslavia began with secessionist movements in
Slovenia and Croatia. Croatia ultimately declared independence on June 25, 1991 while
under siege from an internal Serbian minority guerrilla movement. This faction was
operating in support of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) who actively
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campaigned within Croatia’s borders to expand Serbian control. The result of the
conflict spanning over four years was more than 20,000 dead and over 250,000 displaced
persons (BBC 2003). The magnitude of the conflict as well as its proximity to European
powers and key markets ensured that the situation garnered attention. The violence in
Croatia resulted in the deployment of the first United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping force
(UN Protection Force) to secure safe havens and help enforce a negotiated ceasefire
(United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, 1992). With the precedent set for
international intervention, additional UN mandates would look to contend with the even
more heightened violence occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Table 4.1 Yugoslavia Key Events Timeline
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Serbs were in opposition to independence among the former Yugoslav republics.
They envisioned a new Serb state (Republika Srpska) that would consolidate ethnic Serbs
under a common flag: the “Plan Ram.” Toward this end, the policy included the use of
ethnic cleansing and wholesale massacre of villages not submitting to Serbian “terms of
allegiance” (Lukic and Lynch 1996, 204). The results were stunning. The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) produced casualty estimates for a period
closely mirroring this study (April 1992 to July 1993) and found that just in that short
time there were approximately 169,100 dead, including civilians and soldiers (Tabeau
and Bijak 2003, 6). In addition, SIPRI found that there were over 1,150,000 refugees
and internally displaced persons as well (Ibid., 18). In light of these realities and their
growing prominence within public discourse, the Bosnian crisis elicited humanitarian
calls for action on a scale heretofore unseen.
Somalia Turmoil
During the Cold War, Somalia held significant strategic interests for the United
States. This was due not only to Somali proximity to oil transit routes, but also as a
counter-balance to Soviet influence in neighboring Ethiopia (Western 2002). Based on
this, the United States looked to secure a partner in Somali President Mohammed Siad
Barre.

President Barre took power via coup in 1969 and had relied heavily on Soviet

support during the first decade of his rule. Barre actively worked to consolidate power
by deemphasizing the clan-based structures upon which Somali society was built and
relied heavily on external support, initially from the Soviets and then the United States.
In 1977 Barre initiated a turn to the United States after a failed attempt to regain the
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Ogaden region from Ethiopia, with the Soviets siding with the Ethiopians (Hirsch and
Oakley 1996). U.S. administrations had overlooked many of the problems associated
with Barre’s authoritarian rule because of the Horn of Africa’s importance in the broader
Cold War context.
The failure in the Ogaden campaign prompted a shift in Barre’s leadership. In
order to retain power he returned to emphasizing the clan structures as the fundamental
political entities under the regime (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 8-12). Barre manipulated
these structures and fomented an environment that required personal insulation and
wholesale oppression of opposing clans in order to retain control. As a byproduct, these
opposed clans turned to Ethiopia for backing and produced significant internal
opposition. Unfortunately for Barre, this period of unrest happened to coincide with the
precipitous decline of Soviet influence at the end of the 1980’s, calling into question
rationale for continued U.S. support (Western 2002, 119).
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Table 4.2 Somalia Key Events Timeline
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Somalia, by the end of 1990, had devolved into chaos and full-scale civil war
between rival clans and the Barre regime. The United States chose not to risk its
embassy staff in such an environment and pulled its personnel out to Nairobi, Kenya to
observe from afar in January 1991 (Fox 2001). Barre, too, was not long to remain; he
left Mogadishu on January 27th under duress to relocate to his clan’s homeland to the
south near the Kenyan border. This movement was forced by the successful revolt
against the regime by the rival clan alliances and their associated militias. Most
prominent of these was the United Somali Congress (USC) under General Mohammed
Farah Aideed who was responsible for ejecting Barre from Mogadishu.
General Aideed initially did not assume a dominating leadership role among the
allied clans, allowing each to prosecute their fight against Barre’s forces in their
respective areas. However, when Barre was able to mount a series of counterstrikes and
try to take back Mogadishu in early 1992, it was Aideed who exerted authority and
adopted a “scorched earth” that devastated areas to the south, ultimately causing Barre to
flee to Kenya and then Nigeria (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 10-13). In the wake, Aideed
saw himself as the great liberator while other clan leaders presumed their own right to the
spoils of victory. The result was a competitive environment of competing networks of
alliances vying for supremacy along clan lines.
Anarchy reigned in post-Said Barre Somalia. Aideed and his principal rival, Ali
Mahdi, were leading their allied clans against one another in an attempt to control the
capital city. At the same time, on a lower level, teenage gangs were running rampant,
looting the aid supplies coming in and committing violence against the international
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workers. The aid materiel itself had become the currency in a collapsed state where
violence represented the only authority to which to appeal (Talentino 2005, 103-105).
The international aid coming in was principally food, which was necessary to combat the
famine which was simultaneously having devastating effects on the population, putting
nearly 4.5 million Somalis in danger of starvation by mid-1992. The results were
horrendous. There were an estimated 40,000 killed or wounded in an around Mogadishu
from November 1991 to February 1992, not including the uncounted deaths associated
with starvation occurring in camps holding over 200,000 displaced persons (Human
Rights Watch 1992). Between the famine and civil war, it was estimated that 350,000
Somalis had died leading up to Bush 41’s period of decision (Hogg 2008). As a result,
Somalia had captured the world’s attention and was seemingly a test for whether those
presumably able would be willing to respond.
Part III: Prevailing Theories and Predictions
There is a wide array of competing theories that aim to explain why leaders
choose to intervene or not. As we look at the cases compared here, quite of few of the
most prominent theories would have predicted the outcome incorrectly. Some
arguments have centered on the determinant role external factors such as geopolitical
considerations and state interests play (Aydin 2012; Bueno de Mesquita 1981;
Mearsheimer 2001), or the media’s coverage of the crisis based on its magnitude (Drury
et. al. 2005). Similar to media coverage, others argue for the role of humanitarian norms
and pressure exerted by international organizations to address atrocities (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, Herrmann and Shannon 2001). Still others posit that these decisions are
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no different than any other political decision and that they are ultimately tied to the
domestic politics, regardless of the president’s rhetoric (Baum 2004; Fordham 2002;
Hildebrandt et. al. 2013; James and Oneal 1991). This short section looks at a few of the
most prominent scholarly theories to get an idea of what we might have expected Bush
41 to do based on available knowledge at the time if he had acted in accordance with
their assertions.

As will be seen, each of the following theories got it wrong. Bush

41, rather than intervene in Yugoslavia – which exhibited extraordinarily strong demand
signals – instead chose to wait until after the U.S. presidential election and then intervene
in Somalia, a place with minimal strategic importance, weaker ties to key allies, and less
media coverage.
Beginning with international systemic factors, Aydin (2012) argued persuasively
that intervention decisions are driven by a combination of political and economic
objectives; these include economic ties to belligerents or crucial allies, containment of
conflicts from regions of concern, supporting international audiences, or supporting other
democracies (p. 148). Based on these considerations, we can evaluate the two
intervention opportunities. The fledgling states of the former Yugoslavia score on a
much higher scale in the concerns listed above when compared to Somalia.
Economically, the United States is much more tethered and subject to the market forces
associated with European states and the large-scale disruption of their economies. While
Somalia once served a significant geopolitical role as a regional counter to Soviet
influence in the Horn of Africa, that time had passed concomitantly with waning
communist presence in the region (Western 2002, 119). The perceived requirement to
support the Barre regime was over. Between these two cases, the geopolitical theory of
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action would have predicted incorrectly, finding more utility in backing an intervention in
the Yugoslavian republics.
Maybe there is something else at play. Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005)
found that international as well as domestic political factors were extraordinarily
important in most intervention decisions, but strikingly call out the additive “impact of a
disaster’s media salience,” noting that “one New York Times article being worth more
disaster aid dollars than 1,500 casualties” (p. 470). Perhaps there was a media coverage
disparity that stoked the will of the masses making Somalia seem a better intervention
candidate. Jon Western (2002) compared these same two 1992 cases of possible U.S.
military intervention and demonstrated the important role that rising political pressure
exerts on the decision to act over time as a crisis persists.

Western’s work does an

excellent job of process tracing the period of decision through interviews with key
players in the Bush 41 administration, supporting his contention that what triggered the
decision to act was the shift in public perception, as stoked by advocacy groups and an
increasingly informed media as they become familiarized with the situations on the
ground.8

However, what can we make of the so-called “CNN effect” when comparing

the two cases? It is often said that it was the news footage of starving Somalis that
brought Bush 41 to intervene, but that does not hold up to scrutiny (Western 2002, 114).
Strobel (1997) demonstrated that the media’s coverage of Somalia was virtually

Western’s (2002) study brings up two notable points in his findings that directly relate to this study and
may explain the inconsistency: how “doable” is the mission and the importance of military assessment to
the decision making process (pp. 140-141). Western (2002) notes that this aspect of analysis for the
decision making process is “highly subjective” and therefore leaves it as a consideration, but not
necessarily a point of analysis (p. 140).
8
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nonexistent until after Bush announced the decision to intervene. The same was not true
for Bosnia. Coverage of the Yugoslavian break up and the onset of violence came early
and was sustained. The comparative coverage between the intervention opportunities
was actually discussed publicly at the time, asking why the tragedies in the former
Yugoslavia should warrant so much more media attention to similar calamities in
Somalia (Richburg 1992). The imbalance in coverage was chalked up to everything
from the disparity in economic ramifications to notions of racism (Ibid.). Regardless of
why, the coverage was clearly weighted in favor of the crisis in Europe. So, as for the
impact of media pressure, it again seems as though Bosnia would have been the more
likely intervention choice.
The magnitude of the atrocity is also thought to impact organizations such as the
UN who figure prominently in organizing a response. Are there disparities in how the
UN dealt with these concurrent crises that may indicate which was the more likely choice
for the U.S. to intervene? Since the United Nations Security Council arguably serves as
the bellwether for leading action in cases such as these, we can look to it to assess the
relative demand of each crisis on the international stage. During 1992, the UN Security
Council adopted 73 resolutions. Of these, six addressed Somalia while 24 dealt with the
former Yugoslavia and its republics. In addition, the UN established a United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992, designed to be a multinational
peacekeeping force to stop the violence in the Yugoslav wars; the U.S. could have
contributed troops to this established effort. Alternatively, in Somalia the UN initially
stood up the United Nations Operation in Somali I (UNOSOM I) in April 1992,
consisting of only a small monitoring element; it was not until the end of 1992 when the
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U.S. volunteered to lead the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a more robust ground force
to facilitate humanitarian aid delivery. Therefore, with four times more resolutions than
Somalia and 33% of the total resolutions, and a more strongly supported response
capability, it can be argued that Bosnia elicited a stronger demand for U.S. action. But
the U.S. chose to intervene in Somalia instead of Bosnia.
What happens when we look to domestic politics? A common argument in this
camp is that presidents choose to act to produce a “rally around the flag” effect to sway
public opinion towards them at key moments (Baker and Oneal 2001; Heatherington and
Nelson 2003). Since 1992 was an election year, we might expect President Bush to
choose to entertain a foreign venture for such purposes, especially considering the
positive marks he gained at the beginning of his presidency with Desert Storm. Bush
41’s approval rating soared to 89% in March, 1991 following the conclusion of combat
operations in Iraq (Kagay 1991). Democratic Congressional members argued at the time
that Bush’s support aid to Somalia was plain old election year politics since the initial
announcement to provide an airlift for humanitarian relief came just three days before the
Republican National Convention (Lofland 1992, 57). Yet, there was a lack of public
awareness of the crisis at that point, so such a ploy, if it were one, would not likely have
resonated with the electorate. Media coverage did not begin in earnest until after
President Bush’s announcement of the impending airlift operation and scholars have
shown the argument for a news-driven intervention to be exaggerated (Livingston and
Eachus 1995; Robinson 2001). Yet, if the administration had wished to act in
accordance with this theory, the obvious choice would have been in the former
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Yugoslavia where there was already an approved UN Security Council resolution in place
and the establishment of a multinational peacekeeping force.
The question, then, is why did Bush 41 intervene in Somalia rather than in the
former Yugoslavia if so many of the prevailing theories point in that direction?
Operational feasibility can provide some answers.
Part IV: Operational Feasibility Considerations
This portion of the chapter exposes key points of differentiation between these
seemingly similar cases. Once these differences are factored in, we see that Somalia,
from the perspective of Bush 41 at the time, presented a lower cost, less complex, quick
win, when compared to the opportunity in Bosnia. Not only that, in the Somalia case we
see how the changing feasibility perceptions over time transformed the decision from a
clear nonintervention to an intervention.
To review, “operational feasibility” addresses the challenges of force employment
to a crisis location and that military force’s potential efficacy given the situation and
policy aims. This definition and the search for criteria that influence it are an
elaboration on what scholars have attributed to the vague notion of “expectations of
success” (Regan 2002, 40). In the previous chapter, I analyzed a subset of the
intervention opportunities presented to U.S. presidents over the last three decades using
QCA. This method produces combinations of conditions that, when present, are highly
likely to lead to certain outcomes – in this case, either intervention or nonintervention
decisions.
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In the QCA outputs for intervention and nonintervention, there were four
feasibility factors that emerged as meaningful elements to these causal recipes. The first
accounts for whether there is a clear leader or regime to support. If there is a leader or
an established regime to intervene on behalf of (including situations where there has
already been a brokered ceasefire), then feasibility increases. Alternatively, feasibility
decreases if the intervention is between two or more antagonists where maintaining
neutrality becomes problematic. The second factor addresses the roots of conflict. This
factor looks at whether ethnic or religious cleavages are driving the violence. If so, these
are often intractable problems given the preference for short time commitments. The
third factor addresses the structure of the enemy or adversary with which the U.S.
military force would contend. Is the enemy hierarchical and therefore susceptible to
strike, leading to short time estimates until conflict termination? Or, alternatively, is the
enemy diffuse in its organization or consisting of multiple organizations? If it is the
latter, longer operational time horizons should be expected because of the need to
develop useful intelligence, ascertain vulnerabilities, and arrive at useful approaches to
defeat the enemy. Finally, there is accessibility: how logistically difficult will force
employment and sustainment be given where the crisis is located? While possibly
considered mundane, accessibility problems such as those posed by austere or distant
operating locales can make the difference between the possible and the improbable.
The following section probes the historical record of these two decisions and
identifies two things: the explicit demands for the intervention and whether or not the
operational feasibility considerations above, as well as the previously discussed
determinants from the prevailing theories, were considered in the decision-making
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process. This research relies principally on two groups of material. First, I place
greatest emphasis on primary resources such as NSC records and the public papers from
the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, as well as the public statements made by the
president himself or his key advisors. The presidential library documents, most of which
were previously classified, were released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
and expose the dialogues behind the scenes of these decisions.9 Second, I augment these
materials with secondary sources containing interviews with individuals involved in
shaping Bush 41’s decisions based on their duty positions at the time.10 The goal is to
confirm or deny the existence of these feasibility concerns, along with any of the
previously discussed determinants, to assess their influence on the decision to intervene
in Somalia vice Bosnia.

9

All available archival material for these two cases was used in this study. In conducting the analysis, I
searched for not only feasibility factors referenced in the conversations, but for the other demand signal
determinants as well. The fact that feasibility is more prominent in the findings and excerpts below is
indicative of the evidence more broadly. External determinants such as the role of the UN and the
magnitude of the conflict and its effects were also replete in the dialogues. Internal determinants were not
as openly discussed, as might be expected. That said, the research must rely on the historical record, and
the fact that we find discussions concerning feasibility highlight that it plays a role.
10

There are four key resources that fall into this category:
1) Fox, John G. “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia.”
SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 147–158. (Winter-Spring 2001). John Fox served as the key Foreign
Service Officer working the crisis, first in Somalia, and then based out of the Nairobi U.S. Embassy.
2) Hoar, Joseph P. “A CINC’s Perspective.” National Defense University, Washington DC Center
for Counterproliferation Research, (January 1993). General Hoar was the commander for Unified Task
Force (UNITAF) and the principal commander in the development of the operational plan.
3) Lofland, Valerie J. “Somalia: US Intervention and Operation Restore Hope.” Case Studies in
Policy-Making and Implementation 6 (2002). Lofland’s research is based on interviews of members of the
NSC Staff and participants from the Department of State working the Somalia case during the crisis.
4) Oberdorfer, Don. “The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something
About.” Washington Post 6 (1992). Oberdorfer conducted interviews with key members of the NSC staff
and cabinet following the Deputies Committee meetings in November, 1992, offering insights into the
deliberation process prior to the declassification of the notes from the Somalia Deputies Committee
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Yugoslavia – Intervention Demands and Feasibility Assessment
The Yugoslavian collapse and the violence that followed it presented significant
pressures from both international and domestic audiences for something to be done. Yet,
Bush 41 chose not to weigh in militarily. This can be argued to stem from the concerns
expressed below regarding the feasibility of any intervention. The dialogues within the
administration are replete with concerns over the complex nature of the conflict, the
challenge of maintaining neutrality between opposing armies in absence of a cease-fire,
limited accessibility, and concerns over countering Serbian opposition forces waiting in
the surrounds of the Sarajevo airport. As the following analysis shows, these concerns
were both evident and too much to warrant military intervention under Bush 41. The
section below identifies the most significant demands for an intervention in Yugoslavia
and the feasibility concerns expressed for the presumed mission.
Intervention Demands
Initial NSC staff meetings on Yugoslavian fragmentation focused on identifying
the strategic implications and developing planning guidance for how to implement
approaches to counter the fallout. To address this, the NSC staff developed a proposed
strategy paper on Yugoslavia for consideration at the September 18, 1991 Deputies
Committee meeting. The impetus for this paper was the Croatian request for state
recognition. The paper, which provided a recommendation based on analysis of two
possible options – a recognition strategy and an isolation strategy – highlights a number
of key concerns within the decision calculus for the Yugoslavian situation more broadly.

106

First, the strategy paper addresses what was seen at the time as the impulse for
action: “With the collapse of the latest EC (European Commission)-brokered cease-fire,
European, Yugoslav, and Congressional attention will turn to us to see what we are
prepared to do. This will come at the same time that the level of violence may become
too much for the U.S. and European publics to act passively” (NSC/DC 1991a, 7). What
can we take from this? There are political pressures -international as well as domestic working in combination. In this case, the principal concern expressed in the strategy
paper and in the supporting documents is the spread of violence across the Balkans
leading to broader destabilizing effect on Europe as a whole (NSC/DC 1991b, 13).
Absent in the analysis are the merits of supporting the Croats or opposing the Serbs
generally speaking, detached from the anticipated outcomes. Instead, the emphasis is on
what actions – diplomatic, economic, and military – are likely to be required to assist in
stabilizing the situation if it worsens. In fact, the strategy paper’s recommendation was
to adopt a policy of “not recognizing Slovenian or Croatian independence” and to
“actively discourage others from doing so” (NSC/DC 1991a, 26). The reason for this is
because the staff believed recognition would contribute greater instability by fostering
downstream effects, regardless of its normative appeal (NSC/DC 1991b, 14).
Understanding what characteristics of a crisis exhibits that place it on the NSC’s
agenda is important because it speaks to what generates the perceived “intervention
opportunities” that are the subject of this literature. In this case, the way the intelligence
community and the NSC characterized the crisis lends support to those who argue in
favor of the power of international systemic factors such as concern over the impact on
allies and whether the magnitude of the conflict will be enough to cause significant
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repercussions. The Yugoslavian collapse and the ethnic violence that followed created
significant demands on both counts. Yet, Bush decided to stay out of what his
administration understood to be a complex, civil war. Looking beyond the call for
action and into questions of feasibility, we can see the aspects of the situation that gave
the administration pause.
Feasibility Assessment
The most prominent theme in the NSC meeting notes is the concern over the
drivers of the conflict and, in this case, their intractable nature. The crisis in Yugoslavia
centered on ethnic and religious cleavages, precisely the type posited here to appear as
more infeasible for producing timely desired outcomes. The NSC/DC notes are replete
with references to the “historical and ethnic complexities of the region” and their
propensity to lead to the “worst case outcome – an intensification and widening of the
conflict” where the “peacekeeping force becomes embroiled in hostilities in its efforts to
separate Yugoslav combatants” (NSC/DC 1991b, 16). The staff knew that these
situational characteristics lent themselves to a “prolonged crisis,” and as a result, they
stated that “our approach toward Yugoslavia has shown that neither our Government nor
our public is predisposed to involvement in ethnic-based local conflicts in Europe”
(NSC/DC 1991c, 6). This recognition over the challenges posed by ethnic conflict,
expressed early in the situational analysis, framed the thinking for the decision makers
throughout the crisis and persisted until the end of the Bush 41 administration. General
Colin Powell, the CJCS, argued in the New York Times in favor of selective inaction
because, “the crisis in Bosnia is especially complex, …one with deep ethnic and religious
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roots that go back a thousand years” (Powell 1992). Similarly, President Bush (1992a)
used this same rationale to explain the administration’s perceived impotence in dealing
with the crisis in August 1992:
Now, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is a complex, convoluted
conflict that grows out of age-old animosities. The blood of innocents is being
spilled over century-old feuds. The lines between enemies and even friends are
jumbled and fragmented. Let no one think there is an easy or a simple solution to
this tragedy. The violence will not end overnight, whatever pressure and means
the international community brings to bear. Blood feuds are very difficult to
resolve. Any lasting solution will only be found with the active cooperation and
participation of the parties themselves. Those who understand the nature of this
conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from
outside on unwilling participants (Emphasis added.).

A second emergent theme from the early NSC meetings pertains to peacekeeping
forces. What role would peacekeeping forces play, when would they be employed, and
what would their composition be (NSC/DC 1991a, 8)? Perhaps most interesting is that
the staff only saw a role for peace keeping and not peace enforcement. The Deputies
Committee strategy paper’s articulation of what conditions would warrant emplacement
of a peacekeeping force is telling: “ceasefire and JNA consent” (Ibid.). The thought of
putting troops in an intervening position between combatants was not even considered.
This is consistent with this paper’s operational feasibility factor regarding the preference
for a leader or supportable regime to be in place at the outset. Only when an approved
regime is present (in this case a ceasefire agreement and a permissive posture from the
would-be adversary) would the administration entertain the introduction of a
peacekeeping force.
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The NSC/DC meeting on Yugoslavia that occurred on January 16, 1992 looked
specifically at the challenges of supporting a potential peacekeeping operation.
Prominent in the discussion was the recognition that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had
not received answers to the “operational questions posed at the last DC” and that these
were needed in order to ascertain the United States’ preparedness in playing “a major
supportive role in the planning and execution of a UN Peacekeeping operation” (NSC/DC
1991c, 14). The discussion that followed in this meeting demonstrated two things: one,
there were many details missing to support a thorough analysis of the requirements; and
two, the concerns over the possible trajectory of the violence led them to desire a visible
but small footprint for U.S. forces if they were to be employed. On the latter point, the
staff remarks that “American presence would have considerable value, possibly through a
visible role in logistical teams or in observer units in bordering states. Presentation is
key: we should shape a U.S. role that gets the U.S. prominently involved on the ground
but short of troop presence” (Ibid. 68). Candidly conveyed thinking such as this lays
bare how significant the risk to troops figured into the analysis and possible U.S.
contributions to a peacekeeping operation.
Between January and June, two things happened in direct opposition to one
another. On one hand, the demand to respond to the crisis increased from both Congress
and international leaders; on the other, the military was working to fill the knowledge
gaps associated with the operational questions noted by the JCS above (Gellman 1992).
The two most challenging aspects of the situation that defense planners noted were
accessibility to the crisis environment and the structural composition and functionality of
the JNA opposition.
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Accessibility was a key concern for any potential peacekeeping mission because
of the limited availability of nodes to support troop and materiel throughput with the
closure of the Sarajevo airport. Those concerns tempered the thinking of the
administration leadership. Even while the Senate had passed a non-binding resolution
directing President Bush to call on the UN to develop a military intervention plan, then
Secretary of State, James Baker III, was downplaying any notion of a forcible military
entry. Why was this? Because “senior Pentagon officers and defense planners said that
seizing the airport and distributing relief supplies would be far more complex and costly
than is generally understood” (Ibid.). Barton Gellman, conducting interviews with
defense planners at the time for the Washington Post, writes that key situational
characteristics were causing the administration to drag their feet: The Sarajevo airport has
only a single runway, sits in a bowl, is over a mile and a half from the city center, and is
surrounded by dominating hills holding significant amounts of opposition artillery and
mortars, much “like Dien Bien Phu” (Gellman 1992).
Beyond accessibility, the planners expressed concern over the Serb forces
themselves. They noted that the Serbs “do not operate under centralized control but
rather in a loose alliance of roughly 40,000 former federal army troops and up to 50,000
irregular in Bosnia” (Ibid.). What does this mean to military estimates for the situation?
According to General McCaffrey, a spokesman for the JCS at the time, he estimated that
it would take 60,000 to 120,000 troops to “clear a 20-mile strip around the airport to
prevent it from being hit by artillery and mortar fire and to deploy troops to guard the
200-mile land corridor from the Croatian port of Split to Sarajevo” (Gordon 1992).
Feasibility factors such as these - accessibility and the structure of enemy forces – are
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precisely the considerations that I argue are most important in ascertaining whether a
force can be employed efficiently, at acceptable risk, and produce results in a timely
manner.
It is one thing to note that these matters are discussed and part of the record
among those framing the decisions for the president and his advisors. But the question
then becomes, do these considerations make their way from the analysts in the Pentagon
up through the NSC staff structures to those that make the decisions? The public record
says, “yes.” Just two months later in August 1992, when President Bush (1992b) was
pressed on why the U.S. was not readying the military for the use of force, he responded
with remarks that clearly display linkages between the NSC analysis and his public
position. Table 4.3 provides a few select remarks that demonstrate the point.
Table 4.3 George H.W. Bush Bosnia Remarks
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Despite the administration’s appraisal of the situation as overly complex and
holding the potential to become a quagmire, this did not lead them to ignore it. Rather, it
impacted the desire to contribute substantively to any military intervention directly,
limiting the array of options considered.
Bush (1992a) laid six steps the administration was willing to take to respond to
these calls for action at a press briefing on August 6, 1992. These steps ranged from
diplomatic recognition of the governments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
to strengthening economic sanctions on Serbia, to placing civilian monitors in adjacent
states to help prevent spillover effects. Notably absent in these “six initiatives,” as the
NSC referred to them, was a clear commitment of U.S. service members into the cross
fire (NSC Small Group 1992a).
Bush’s first initiative of the six did call for the passage of a UN Security Council
resolution authorizing the “international community” to use of force if necessary to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief (Bush 1992a). However, Bush was
balancing between calling for action and making it clear that it should not be a principally
U.S. undertaking. How do we know this? The administration’s reluctance to commit
forces to Yugoslavia but strong desire for a role for the UN and coalitions involving the
post-Cold War application of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were
explicit in NSC meetings leading up to these statements (NSC/DC 1992a). Key in those
discussions was the important but supporting role that the U.S. was anticipated to play in
any multinational efforts. An NSC Small Group discussion (1992b) on the subject made
this point clear: “We need to consider every possible means of American support and
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contribution – short of committing ground combat troops to Bosnia – to make this
operation successful” (p. 13). Viewing Bush’s public statements within the context of
the meetings that supported the decision-making process illuminates a more hesitant
stance for the administration instead of the active leadership posture they conveyed
publicly. Beyond that, Bush’s rationale to explain any perceived hesitancy in U.S.
action is directly in line with the analysis expressed by the military planners and in the
NSC/DC meetings.
Upon review, Yugoslavia’s dissolution presented strong demand signals for U.S.
action based on the impact the crisis had on European allies and from nascent norms
calling for the alleviation of human suffering in high magnitude conflicts. However,
these demand signals were muffled by competing concerns over what would be required
to actually achieve the humanitarian effects given the complex nature of the situation. In
fact, all four feasibility factors were aligned in opposition to intervention (see Table 4.4
below). The crisis was characterized as complex “blood feud” in which no quick
solution was likely (Bush 1992a). In addition, any intervention would be placed in
between the three antagonists without an agreed upon ceasefire. Finally, the Serb
opposition was decentralized and numerous, requiring significant amounts of ground
troops and thwarting access to the limited ports and logistics nodes required to support
the operation.
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Table 4.4 Bush 41 Yugoslavia Intervention Opportunity Feasibility Assessment

Bush not only received these assessments, he put them on the public record in his
statements on the matter. The bottom line is that the anticipated costs were too high, and
a viable military option just was not feasible. Maybe the strongest indicator in support
of this contention is the fact that President Bush did not hold an actual NSC principals
meeting to consider supporting an intervention (See Annex B for NSC meetings). The
same is not true of Somalia.
Somalia – Intervention Demands and Feasibility Assessment
The Somalian civil war and famine and Yugoslavia’s violent breakup presented
similar humanitarian demands when considering the magnitude of human suffering.
Where Somalia differed sharply is in the fact that it was a collapsed state in the Horn of
Africa, not having immediate impacts on allies, key markets, or geo-political competitors.
So with arguably less demand, how is it that Somalia becomes an intervention
opportunity seized upon by Bush 41 in his waning days in office? The answer to that
question is rooted in how the mission was framed, and from that, feasibility determined.
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The discussions within the NSC and military planning staffs demonstrate that the
administration’s appreciation of the situation in Somalia changes over time. They
initially treat the mission as a “quagmire” in the waiting, but a shift occurs in the thinking
of both the NSC staffers as well as the Joint Staff, treating Somalia as a much more
reasonable mission accomplishable within a shorter time horizon (Lofland 1992, 57).
While the demand signal for action plays an important role – the notion in these cases
that he U.S. should act somewhere (i.e., either Bosnia or Somalia) – it is the difference in
perceived feasibility that weighs most heavily on where that intervention occurs.
Initially, planners assumed that if the military ground forces were used, their
purpose would be to end a civil war and restore order throughout the country (Hirsch and
Oakley 1996, 37). However, once a potential intervention has the backing of the
President and the CJCS as evidenced by the directive to conduct such planning, the
mission is redefined in a more limited fashion, focusing on the safeguarding of supplies
to the famine belt (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 41). This, more restricted appraisal of what
was being asked from a policy perspective, influenced how the United States viewed the
conflict broadly, what mission was required, and finally what the opposition to such a
mission might look like. As the subsequent analysis demonstrates, the end result is that
Bush 41 seized the opportunity to use overwhelming military force in a mission that he
saw as low risk and consistent with his view of the U.S. in a “new world order” (Bush
1993). The following section details the decision-making process for Somalia, starting
with identification of the most operative demands for intervention, then the changes in
anticipated mission over time, and finally addresses the feasibility concerns associated
with the settled-upon mission.
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Intervention Demands
What was the driving force behind the intervention in Somalia? Strong
sentiments tied to the suffering in this crisis seem to be the most compelling demand
signal for action. It is clear from the deliberations among the NSC in the months
preceding the decision that there was very little geopolitics at play, or motivations that
expressed any U.S. interest at stake other than reputational (NSC/DC 1992). There was
a clear sense that something ought to be done and this had everything to do with the
magnitude of the tragedy.
The reports coming out of Somalia seemed to produce real anguish for Bush, who
expressed as much both in public and behind closed doors (Bush 1992b; NSC0065 1992).
For the President, the Somalian crisis resonated on two levels. First, Bush 41 appeared
to internalize the crisis, receiving pressure from those in his State Department, from
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and ultimately criticism for failing to alleviate
the suffering from UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali (Western 2002, 135). These
pressures coupled with his personal experience in Sudan with his wife in 1985 where they
witnessed the Sahelian famine firsthand, an episode that he later professed to have
influenced the decision (Lofland 1992, 60). Second, with limited time left in his tenure,
the Bush 41 legacy was in question and the President was outspoken about the leadership
role he envisaged for the United States in the post-Cold War era (Bush 1993). Based on
this, the strongest demands for intervention come from the severe magnitude of the
conflict and the emerging international norms for alleviating human suffering in such
crises. But these factors are consistent with the Bosnian case where Bush 41 chose to sit
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out. What was different here? Much of the difference lies in the manner in which the
anticipated mission was conceived.
Presumed Mission – End Civil War
Unlike the public in early to mid-1991, the Bush 41 administration was not as in
the dark regarding the situation on the ground in Somalia. By the time President Bush
made the final decision in December 1992 to initiate Operation Restore Hope, the NSC
had held 12 Deputies Committee meetings on Somalia (NSC/DC 1992). It was during
this process of NSC staff meetings supported by concurrent operational military analysis
that the situation was framed and understood.
Initially, when the unrest in Somalia first surfaced to NSC attention in the Spring
and early Summer of 1992, the Joint Chiefs painted the picture as bleak, convoluted, and
argued against any sort of military intervention. This was based on the assumption that
the military’s principal mission would be quelling the civil war and restoring order – the
drivers of the instability that resulted in the famine and violence. Their arguments for
nonintervention were based largely on the type of feasibility factors mentioned above
(e.g. intractable animosities between warring factions, difficulty in distinguishing
combatants from civilians, and complicating terrain) (Western 2002, 116). The result
was a unified Pentagon position that an intervention would be ill-advised given the
unenviable mission of ending a civil war.
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Mission Change – Airlift
However, the situation continued to deteriorate over the course of the summer,
increasing the demand for action. The interagency community deliberated on what to
recommend in response to pleas for assistance – at this point mostly emanating from the
State Department and NGOs involved in relief efforts – but they did not arrive at a
consensus (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 38-39). The breakthrough came with a similar
concern for the use of force in support of a humanitarian mission elsewhere: Operation
Provide Comfort, initiated to provide support to the Kurds in Northern Iraq and
sanctioned by the UN Security Council. With this recent case providing precedent, Bush
ordered a similar level of limited support (i.e., airlift) to the Somalia famine on August 14
with the decision to begin Operation Provide Relief (Ibid.). This mission was clearly
more feasible, only requiring the use of logistics assets without the risk of combat.
Once on board with the humanitarian mission, even in the limited role undertaken
with Operation Provide Relief, the challenges posed by warring clans for the NGOs and
the airlift campaign supporting them took on greater importance. The United States was
committed to some semblance of success on the ground at that point. Unfortunately,
growing violence and starvation began to demonstrate that the indirect approach was
likely untenable. This, along with media attention and congressional pressure, increased
the call for action. As a result, CJCS Colin Powell requested that the Department of
Defense develop options for a more robust military intervention, if one were to be
required to achieve the policy goals (Hirsch and Oakley 1996, 42). From Central
Command (CENTCOM)’s perspective, the military combatant command conducting the
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planning, this directive served to provide an opportunity to re-scope the mission yet
again. No longer were they framing their mission as a full-scale civil-war intervention,
nor was it a limited airlift operation; instead, it was the more refined problem of securing
aid delivery (Hoar 1993).
Mission Change – Secure Humanitarian Aid Delivery
Military planning along these lines facilitated the higher-level analysis at the
NSC/DC meetings leading up to the decision. There were nine such meetings held
between November 20 and December 3, 1992. Don Oberdorfer (1992), reporting for the
Washington Post at the time and citing sources at the meeting, said the November 21,
Deputies Committee meeting “was the turning point in the deliberations that led to
President Bush's order…to send thousands of American troops to Somalia.” In that
meeting, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(VCJCS) announced to stunned attendees that the “deployment of U.S. ground troops
could end the violence in Somalia and see that its people were fed within a short period”
(Ibid.). The military had scoped the mission to such a degree that it was focused on
securing key distribution sites to stop the famine and held the assumption that a follow-on
UN force would be able to relieve them in short order (Hoar 1993, 62).
Even with this limited mission and its accompanying newfound optimism, there
was growing concern among those influencing the decision (Powell and Cheney in
particular) that the operation may hold more dangers than were being conveyed
(Oberdorfer 1992). The subsequent NSC/DC meetings (November 23 and 24) addressed
this concern and teased out the various options available to follow through on the
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Admiral Jeremiah’s assertion that the military could do the job. Ultimately, Bush 41
was presented with three options: “1) U.S. air-power and sea-power in support of a
strengthened UN force; 2) limited U.S. military intervention as a prelude to an expanded
UN force; and 3) insertion of a U.S. division, plus allies, under UN auspices. To the
surprise of the committee, which had formed a consensus around the second option, Bush
selected the third, most aggressive approach” (Fox 2001, 149).

This was in keeping

with the so-called “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine,” deploying overwhelming force in an
attempt to achieve clearly defined objectives (here, the securing of aid workers and
delivery of relief supplies) as rapidly as possible (Campbell 1998).
In short, from the position of the administration evaluating the crisis, over the
course of just a few months, the famine in Somalia went from presenting a hopeless case
to a very “doable” mission. The increasing intensity of the crisis, along with a precedent
set in Iraq for supporting a humanitarian mission without ground troops, led to a small
U.S. commitment to assist in the delivery of aid. However, the situation on the ground
proved too much for that same approach to work and if success were to be secured, it
would require boots on the ground. The commitment of those troops had everything to
do with the reframing of the mission they would be conducting. As a result of the more
limited mission, the perceived feasibility of the operation was significantly altered.
Seeing the progression of the decision calculus and how it concluded, it is now
easier to see how Bush 41 viewed the feasibility factors for Operation Restore Hope.
The remainder of this section analyzes the records of this decision-making process to
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determine the degree to which feasibility factors were considered in the intervention
decision. As demonstrated below, feasibility was very much at the forefront.
Feasibility Assessment – Secure Humanitarian Aid Delivery
In the final NSC meeting before the decision (December 3, 1992), the president
and his NSC principals met immediately following Bush 41’s military briefing where he
had selected the third option. The thrust of the President’s concerns at this meeting, the
only one on record of the Bush 41 discussing Somalia with his NSC principals, are on the
possible intervention’s legality and funding. These two issues are subsequent to the
determination of whether the mission can be done; he had already committed to the
mission in concept following the military briefing, of which there are no notes.
However, the minutes from the NSC meeting provide a clear impression of how Bush 41
and his team had conceived of the intervention and how they anticipated it to unfold.
In the December 3, 1992 NSC meeting, Bush 41 demonstrated how he viewed the
conflict and what the U.S. was prepared to do. First, in Figure 4.1 below, Bush 41 notes
that “there could be 28-30,000 troops involved for an unknown period of time, although I
expect that within 40 days troops can start coming out” (NSC 0065 1992, 1).
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Figure 4.1 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 1
In a later exchange (see Figure 4.2 below) Bush 41 asks Secretary of State
Eagleburger, “If the operation, goes smoothly, why will we need many peacekeepers”
(NSC 0065 1992, 4)? These comments make plain that Bush 41 viewed this as a very
limited mission focused on relief delivery, rather than on restoring order to a country
suffering a civil war. Even if history were to prove this as misconceived or naïve, the
president saw this U.S.-led, multinational action with a limited mandate, both in scope as
well as time. This means that Bush 41 saw the type of conflict as largely irrelevant, and
therefore advantageous, because they did not intend to weigh into it themselves. In
addition, while at the point of decision the UNSCR 794 had not passed, Bush 41’s team
worked to get it passed prior to announcing the mission publicly (Bush 1992).
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Figure 4.2 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 4
Next, how had Bush 41 anticipated the enemy likely to oppose the U.S. forces?
Under a standard military planning model, enemy actions are anticipated and planned
against for both the most anticipated and worst-case scenarios (Joint Staff 2017). In this
case, it seems as though the most likely scenario was allowed to dominate the thinking.
As General Hoar, the CENTCOM commander at the time noted, “Great care was taken to
develop an approved, well-defined mission with attainable, measurable objectives prior to
the operation commencing. Disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was
neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a
secure environment for relief operations” (Hoar 1993, 58). Why was the requirement for
disarmament omitted or significant combat unexpected? Because they assumed that
rapid, overwhelming force would quell the violence and there would be little resistance.
After all, they were not dealing with an actual “enemy;” instead the warring clansmen
were viewed merely as “brigands” (NSC0065 1992). This is a sentiment echoed up to
the highest levels. Bush 41 captures the thinking quite succinctly in the NSC meeting
where he stated that the mission would “provide relief in a benign setting. We may have
to kill some people, but I do not expect any major resistance. Right Colin [Powell]”
(NSC0065 1992)? From the President’s perspective, the feasibility consideration for
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enemy composition was clear: the enemy was largely nonexistent and unlikely to
interfere with delivery of aid given the arrival of prodigious U.S. forces.
Lastly, I address the question of accessibility. Here too we see a shift in how the
facts of the situation are interpreted over time. Initially, Somalia was seen to present
significant challenges, operationally as well as logistically. General Hoar remarked that
“deploying to Somalia was like going to the moon” (Hoar 1993, 60). In the CENTCOM
commander’s retelling of the operation’s planning and execution, he was careful to note
all of the challenges that had to be overcome, ranging from the extensive air-bridge that
had to be established, the limitations of the harbor at Mogadishu, and the generally
austere conditions that required enormous efforts on the part of engineers (Ibid.). Yet,
just because the problem presents difficulties or great expense does not make it
infeasible. Every decision is contextual.
In this case, competing crises played a key role. There was a sense that an action
was going to take place, either in support of the humanitarian mission in Bosnia or in
Somalia. The Pentagon began to compare the two situations and look at them as an
either-or proposition (Western 2002, 138). With that, the Somalia problem appeared in a
different light. As Lofland (1992) notes from her interviews with staff members, “The
brass began to believe Somalia was ‘doable’ on the ground and much less risky than
Bosnia. The terrain in Somalia was relatively flat, unlike Bosnia, where thick woods and
mountains would cause new challenges” (p. 59). In addition, the military could explore
other options to support operations in Somalia that were sea-based, increasing
accessibility without procuring additional infrastructure on the ground (Ohls 2009).
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When compared to the Bosnia problem set, Somalia, for all its challenges, was
clearly the simpler of the two (see Table 4.5 below). In every feasibility factor category
Somalia scored more positively, to include the supportable regime. Even though neither
crisis had a ceasefire or government to support, active opposition was not anticipated in
Somalia, making even that category more favorable. Given this, Bush 41, if compelled
to intervene and demonstrate U.S. leadership in meeting humanitarian challenges, would
clearly have viewed Somalia’s accessibility in a fairer light than Bosnia.
Table 4.5 Bush 41 Intervention Opportunities Feasibility Assessment Comparison

Part V: Comparison and Conclusion – Why Somalia and not Bosnia?
The comparison of these two cases accomplishes a number of useful outcomes.
First, the findings reinforce the previous chapter’s results where specific combinations of
conditions are tied to respective intervention and nonintervention decisions. Here, again,
we see that demand signals for action need to be combined with advantageous feasibility
factors for an intervention to occur. This might seem overly obvious, but it is clearly an
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underappreciated attribute of these situations based on a body of literature puzzled by
inconsistent intervention outcomes.
Second, we gain a better understanding of how the types of demand signal can
influence the decisions. These two cases were similar on their calls for action. Both
crises were of significant magnitude regarding deaths, refugees, and internally displaced
persons. Both were championed by international bodies as calamities warranting
intervention citing the application of international norms. The differences between the
two were in favor of the Bosnian side of the ledger, with increased incentives from both
media coverage and ties to significant allies and markets. In this respect, the comparison
adds some weight to those who argue on behalf of those determinants in common. That
said, it clearly shows that demand alone, no matter how strong, is not enough.
Third, the comparison demonstrates how powerful differences in feasibility
interpretations influence the decision. These two cases varied greatly in how the
administration viewed the type of conflict where the interventions would occur, whether
there was an established regime to support, the composition and organization of the
enemy, and the operating environment’s accessibility. Not only did they differ on these
counts, more importantly, these factors were candidly discussed among those influencing
the decision. The explication of how and at what point in the process these feasibility
considerations were taken into account helps us better understand the “subjective” realm
of expectations of success and the military’s role in shaping that notion that scholars like
Western (2002) have labored to understand.
Finally, the Somalia case’s shifting conceptions of mission requirements provided
a valuable opportunity to assess how changing key aspects of the situation affect the
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intervention outcome. In this case, certainly there are those that can argue that media
coverage of the atrocities increased over the months, along with associated political
pressure from domestic and international audiences. However, when we look at the
discourse within the national security community, we see a much more important shift –
the anticipated mission being used to assess operational feasibility. As the mission
changed, so did the feasibility, making Bush 41 more confident in a lower risk
deployment of troops with a higher probability of success.
The next chapter expands on the implication of changes in perceived feasibility
over time. Will cases that seemed too complex at the outset become ripe for
intervention, or will interventions once undertaken become withdrawals once the
appreciation of the situation shifts, and along with it, these same feasibility factors? If
so, greater weight will be added to the explanatory power of operational feasibility in
explaining intervention decisions.
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CHAPTER 5
WILLIAM J. CLINTON INTERVENTION DECISIONS:
SOMALIA AND BOSNIA

This chapter expands on the theoretical application of feasibility factor analysis in
understanding intervention decisions. The previous chapters emphasized conditions at
crisis onset, or near to it, and how they may have influenced the decision to intervene or
not. This analysis explores how presidential intervention decisions are affected by
changes in the crisis environment over time, specifically focusing on the feasibility
factors illuminated in the work heretofore.
The Somalia case from Chapter 4 demonstrated that intervention may appear to be
infeasible at one point, but subsequently changes based on different assessments of the
situation. In the George H.W. Bush (Bush 41) Somalia case, this stemmed from changes
in how the mission was conceived based on different policy expectations, which
themselves were tied to different sorts of demands (e.g., growing magnitude of the
conflict and increased media coverage). Ultimately, Bush 41 chose not to undertake the
mission until the military provided realistic options based on policy goals that were
amended to become more tenable. What once was a likely quagmire becomes a
probable success. The same did not hold true for Bosnia, which like Somalia had
increased pressure from both international and domestic audiences, emitting significant
demands for action. However, no reasonable policy goal with a feasible military option
emerged, and therefore no intervention occurred.
This chapter looks at whether decisional shifts like we saw in Somalia under Bush
41 hold true in other cases based on the same changes in feasibility factors. Specifically,
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does it go the other way? Does a case where a president decided not to intervene later
become an intervention, and if so, what factors changed? Alternatively, does a case
where a president intervened become a withdrawal when those same factors shift in the
opposite direction? If they do, this adds explanatory weight to the notion that feasibility
factor analysis is a central component to understanding presidential intervention
behavior.
In answering these questions, this chapter focuses on the same two crises from the
previous chapter, Somalia and Bosnia, but in the period immediately following: the
William (Bill) Clinton presidential decision space. As depicted above, the Bush 41
administration determined previously that one crisis was overly complex and unlikely to
be improved by the introduction of military force (Bosnia), while the other was limited in
scope, low in risk, and capable of rapidly achieving the mission goals (Somalia).
Clinton reverses positions on both of these crises, precipitously withdrawing from
Somalia before mission objectives were accomplished, and committing ground troops as
part of a United Nations (UN) force in Bosnia.
This analysis finds that as the operational feasibility factors change, so too does
the intervention decision. In Somalia, the mission becomes more complex over time and
draws more capable armed resistance than originally anticipated. The cost of success
and timeline to achieve it for Clinton becomes untenable. Likewise, the Bosnian Civil
War emits extraordinary demands for U.S. support through domestic politics, the UN,
and later NATO, but Clinton balks…until the Dayton Accords provide a regime to
support and lower the risks and expected duration for a U.S. troop deployment. In both
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cases the evidence strongly supports the contention that operational feasibility factors are
a powerful tool in helping to understand presidential decision making.
The chapter is broken into five parts. Part I describes the theory and method
behind the analysis. Part II provides a background to these crises from the perspective
of the Clinton administration. Parts III and IV address the Somalia and Bosnia crises
respectively, covering two sections for each case: first, I provide a chronological
overview of the crisis to illuminate key events that influence the president’s decisions
space over time; and second, based on that changing environment, I explore how the
presidents’ feasibility assessments change as a result. Part V compares the cases and
concludes.
Part I: Theory and Method
Theory
The theory in this chapter remains unchanged from the previous: operational
feasibility affects military intervention decisions. The last two chapters tested and
illustrated this point. This chapter pushes the causal illustration further by exploring if
these same feasibility factors are useful in understanding reversal decisions: withdrawals
or later interventions under different circumstances. Think of feasibility factors as
switches that are either “on” in favor of an intervention, or “off” for nonintervention.
This chapter looks at what happens once those switches are flipped in the opposite
direction as a crisis unfolds.
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The insight behind this application of the theory is rooted in the epistemological
observation regarding the causes of conflict and peace by the renowned author, Geoffrey
Blainey; as he noted in Causes of War (1988, 293),
War and peace are more than opposites. They have so much in common
that neither can be understood without the other. War and peace appear to
share the same framework of causes. The same set of factors should
appear in explanations of the outbreak of war…and the ending of peace.
Blainey argued that the elements of the decisional context that lead one to be confident of
success and therefore increase commitment when they are present are the same ones that
give pause when found in absence. Blainey’s insights can easily be extend to military
interventions and the theory I propose, since this analysis is addressing these very same
considerations, namely the risks associated with being unable to achieve a desired
outcome by using force. The differences are in degree rather than kind when
considering limited military intervention instead of full-scale war. Here, we are looking
at the same type of factors – those increasing the probability of success within a given
time horizon at acceptable risk – but suited to interventions that likely have lesser
thresholds for risk and time commitment based on limited policy goals.
That being the case, we expect the following logic to hold true: factors that help
explain why presidents commit forces to the fray should also cause them to withdraw
those forces when those conditions change in ways that are no longer supportive of
intervention.

Likewise, when factors that arguably dissuade an intervention change,

they should then persuade action. This, of course, assumes a certain consistency in
demand signal. With that, case selection to minimize variance on these scores is
essential.
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Method
This chapter, like the last, uses the “comparative historical method” to compare
two interventions that occur in similar time periods under the same administration
(Skocpol 1979; Moore 1993). In this comparison, I again look at Somalia and Bosnia,
but in the Clinton presidency. As National Security Advisor at the time, Tony Lake
explained in an interview with PBS in 2001, these were the two most important
intervention considerations during President Clinton’s first term: the Somalia intervention
already underway upon Clinton’s arrival in the White House and growing in importance
as things trended downward; and Bosnia as a forefront issue based on Clinton making it
an election issue during the campaign.
Selecting these two cases for comparison has a couple of benefits. First, by
viewing this chapter as a continuation of the last, it is a longitudinal comparison since it
compares the same crisis environments. As a result, I hold certain things somewhat
constant over the two administrations, such as the strategic importance of the crisis state,
economic ties, and ally interests. Second, in this chapter as in the last, by examining two
crises that are occurring concurrently for a single administration, many other
unintentionally omitted or unobserved factors are able to be held constant.
However, what is gained in maximizing consistency through this case selection
(e.g., minimizing effects from geostrategic shifts over time or crisis state characteristics)
also serves to limit the broader applicability of the findings. To mitigate these concerns,
I employ a combination of “process tracing” and “congruence method” focusing
primarily on the operational feasibility factors identified in the Qualitative Comparative
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Analysis (QCA) and in the Bush 41 comparative case study (Van Evera 1997; Bennett
and George 2005). The coupling of process tracing with the congruence method allows
for a deeper dive to ensure that the presence or absence of a feasibility factor is more than
just a coincidence, that it is actually part of the considerations among those shaping the
decision for the president. The aim is to demonstrate how variance in feasibility factors
over the course of each crisis contributes to the policy reversal decisions to withdraw
from Somalia and commit ground forces to Bosnia.

The operational feasibility factors referenced above refer to the elements of the
crisis situation that pose challenges to the military force’s potential efficacy. These
factors elucidate the types of concerns that are at the heart of what other authors have
hinted at with “expectations of success” or short expected time commitments (e.g., Regan
2002, 40). The previous chapters have lent support for the theoretical proposition put
forward here that the presence of some conditions have a high degree of consistency with
intervention outcomes, while their opposite holds true for nonintervention outcomes. In
this study, I explore what happens as they shift over time within an administration. Does
the policy change to match the shift in feasibility, or not?

There are four feasibility factors this study will use based on their explanatory
power in the previous chapters. First, what type of conflict is it? Is it ethnic or
religiously based, and therefore likely intractable? Or, is it based on material or political
desires where middle ground may be found? The former is infeasible while the latter is
less so. Second, is there a clear leader or regime to support (including situations where
there has already been a brokered ceasefire)? If so, then feasibility increases. If not,
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and the intervention requires the separation of multiple factions, some of whom oppose
the intervention, then feasibility decreases. Third, what is the structure of the enemy or
adversary for the U.S. force? Is it hierarchical and susceptible to strike, opening up the
potential for quick conflict termination? Or, is the enemy diffuse and nebulous? If the
latter, quick strike options prove difficult and more time and boots on the ground are
likely required. Finally, how accessible is the crisis environment? Does it pose
significant logistical challenges such as limited port infrastructure or vulnerable road
networks? Considerations such as these can make force deployment and sustainment
much costlier, or in cases where infrastructure does not exist, near impossible. These are
the four feasibility factors that will be contrasted between Bush 41’s initial decision and
Clinton’s final decision in Part’s III and IV.
The time period for the analyses are not identical but are overlapping. The
Somalia decision space goes from the Clinton inauguration in January 1993 until his
decision to withdraw troops in his address to the nation on October 7th of the same year.
The Bosnian decision space begins with the inauguration but goes until November 27,
1995 when Clinton announces the pending deployment of U.S. troops. The next part
provides a broad overview of these crises leading up to the Clinton presidency.
Part II: Background to Crises
Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in 1993 at an inflection point in American
foreign policy. The Cold War had just ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and the
previous administration had only scratched the surface on articulating the role the United
States would play on the global stage moving forward. Clinton did not campaign as an
international adventurist, instead focusing on domestic politics and the economy.
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However, his foreign policy advisors had differing designs and promoted the idea of
“Assertive Multilateralism” in which the U.S. would assume a leadership role in
interventions taken on by multilateral institutions aimed at alleviating suffering and
injustice, often against the rules of the old order based on independent sovereignty (Boys
2012).
As Clinton took the leadership reins, two crises were prominent. First, Somalia,
an intervention already underway, was endorsed by Clinton via consultation with Bush
41 prior to assuming office (Wines 1992). In this sense, while it was inherited, Clinton
was part of the decision-making process that led to Bush 41’s decision to go into Somalia
and the Clinton foreign policy team supported the mission. By the time the
administration had formed, the Somalia mission, Operation Restore Hope, was in midstride and seemingly going well. The mission sought to enforce UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 794 (3 December 1992), charged with providing “a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” This multinational, UNsanctioned mission was in response to the international outcry to alleviate the suffering
due to famine and violence that emerged in Somalia as a byproduct of the overthrow of
President Siad Barre. In the warlord-centric struggle for power that ensued, suffering
increased greatly for the Somali public. Reports coming out of Somalia indicated that
there were potentially 4.5 million Somalis in danger of starvation in the months leading
up to the intervention, with over 40,000 killed in the capital of Mogadishu, and over
200,000 displaced persons (Human Rights Watch 1992). Somalia was to be the test case
for whether the international community could mobilize under its most esteemed
institution at its own behest to end an atrocity.
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Second, Bosnia was the administration’s primary concern. While Clinton had
tacitly supported Somalia, he openly campaigned on a stronger stance regarding Bosnia
and doing more to deal with the ongoing atrocities in the former Yugoslavian states (Lake
2001). What began as secessionist movements on the part of Croatia and Slovenia in
1991 in the wake of waning Soviet influence, had become full scale civil war by the early
days of the Clinton administration. The former Yugoslavia was comprised of six
separate republics, primarily split along historical and ethnic lines. Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims were interspersed among these states and in the vacuum that formed following
the collapse of the Yugoslav state, and competing goals among them emerged. Croats
and Muslims envisaged independent states and moved to consolidate along status quo
lines; while Serbs sought to retain a Serbian state that redrew the lines to consolidate
ethnic Serbs. These political disagreements transformed into full scale atrocity as the
Serbs set out to impose their will and were met with resistance.
Bosnia voted for independence as well in March 1992, a vote boycotted by the
Serb population. Following recognition by the European Union in April, the Serbs
moved to take the country by force under Radovan Karadzic. War broke out among all
parties, first between the Muslims and Croats aligned against the Serbs, and later between
the Muslims and Croats themselves. The scale of suffering was startling. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated casualties from April
1992 to July 1993 at approximately 169,100 dead, including civilians and soldiers, and
over 1,150,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (Tabeau and Bijak 2003, 6-18).
Here too, the UN organized to respond, deploying the UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) to secure safe havens, first in Croatia, and then expanded into Bosnia in
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Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde (Reuters 2008). It was this chaotic landscape that the
Bush 41 administration observed as too complex and riddled with age-old animosities to
warrant a commitment of U.S. forces to stop the killing (Bush 1992).
This was the backdrop for these two crises as the Clinton White House assumed
leadership in January 1993. Parts III and IV that follow provide a chronological
overview and feasibility factor assessment for each situation during the Clinton decision
space, starting with Somalia.
Part III: Somalia
Chronological Overview
The UN-sanctioned mission to Somalia beginning in 1992 aspired to alleviate the
suffering of millions of people in a country ruptured by civil war and drought. This
mission fulfilled the desire of a nascent international conscience that sought to rewrite the
rules on when, where, and by whom force should be applied to pursue humanitarian
goals. The United States, starting with the Bush 41 administration and carrying on into
the Clinton presidency, was eager to lead this charge. This mission, a test bed for such
action for the international community, proved to be much more challenging than it was
originally conceived. Ultimately what was intended to set a precedent for UN-led
humanitarian causes became a cautionary tale for this type of mission, at least from a
U.S. perspective. In many respects the shadow of Somalia cast a shadow over
subsequent humanitarian missions in the same way that the Vietnam experience in the
1960s and 1970s suppressed military adventurism more broadly in the decades that
followed.
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This section details the evolution of the mission in Somalia, explaining how a
mission that was universally supported in the beginning became a vastly different
problem, one from which the Clinton administration desperately tried to extricate itself
less than a year later. The mission in Somalia underwent five different transformations,
shifting from (1) ending a civil war, to (2) limited humanitarian aid delivery, to (3)
nation-building, to (4) offensive targeting, and finally back a focus on (5) aid delivery
and withdrawal. Appreciating the mission’s evolution, and along with it notions of
operational feasibility, are key to understanding the president’s decision to withdraw
from Somalia before all of the UN-directed goals were achieved.
Mission 1: End Civil War
As originally conceived, the intervention would be expected to squelch a civil
war, and consequently no U.S. mission was implemented (Western 2002, 116). The
Joint Staff framed the mission in the extreme, not based on policy guidance from the
White House, but on an understanding of the Somalian environment following Barre’s
departure. They assumed that if order were to be restored it would require not only a
significant military intervention, but also a political solution to arrest the disintegration of
the country (Ibid., 117). This anticipated mission would change with a desire to do
something, albeit with lower risk tolerance, as reports of starvation increased over the
course of 1992.
Mission 2: Humanitarian Aid Delivery
Months of deliberation between early 1991 to the fall of 1992 on the part of the
NSC and Joint Staffs, supported by military planning conducted by U.S. Central
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Command (CENTCOM), redefined what success looked like, and thereby what was
required to achieve it (Hoar 1993). Reimagining the mission became a necessity as
pressures grew for humanitarian action from both domestic and international audiences
with the twin crises of Somalia and Bosnia (Lofland 1992). Ultimately, the Bush
administration was able to influence the UNSCR to restrict its mandate to providing a
secure environment for the purposes of delivering humanitarian aid relief (UNSCR 794
1992). It was this narrowly focused mission that George H.W. Bush agreed to execute
on December 3, 1992 (NSC 0065 1992). In his small group NSC meeting, Bush 41
anticipated little, if any resistance, minimal violence, and to have the mission completed
within 40 days (Ibid., 1). This is the mission as envisioned when launched in the waning
days of the Bush 41 administration.
This limited mission is the problem set that Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice
VCJCS said could be accomplished with the deployment of U.S. ground troops at the
November 21, 1992 NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (Oberdorfer 1992). This is
important, because it was a complete reframing of the problem by the Pentagon.
Mission 3: Nation-Building
President Clinton inherited the humanitarian aid mission with its more than
25,000 deployed troops upon assuming office in January 1993. The limitations on the
mission as conceived by Bush 41 were not to last, however. Clinton named Madeleine
Albright as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who proposed a new policy - what
she called “Assertive Multilateralism.” Although a tactic more than a goal, Assertive
Multilateralism focused on the U.S. leading coalitions in curing global ills (Boys 2012,
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2). Albright’s designs on broadening the mission in Somalia beyond securing the
delivery of aid were echoed by key members of Clinton’s national security advisory
team, including Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger. The ideological predisposition within
the administration for more expansive humanitarian goals found like minds in the UN as
well. As a result, the mission expanded, as evidenced by UNSCR 814 (26 March 1993).
Table 5.1 UNSCR 814 Mission Excerpt
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The aims expressed in blue italics in Table 5.1 above altered the mission significantly.
The shift occurred in a period after the initial mission was met with relative success in
terms of immediate relief of suffering. But with success, came expanded goals. It was
clear that the root causes of the suffering were not going to be addressed simply by
delivering aid. The challenges for Somalia were institutional and systemic, requiring a
full “nation-building” effort (UNSCR 865 1993).
The Clinton administration was fully behind this shift in the UN mission. This is
clear through the words of Ambassador Albright’s characterization of the change: “"With
this resolution [UNSCR 814], we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at
nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable
member of the community of nations” (as quoted in Preston 1993). With these changes
came the broad recognition that the mission was not going to be accomplished within the
same time horizon. What was not accounted for was the increased difficulty in pursuing
such goals.
Trying to orchestrate the efforts of over 28 troop contributing countries and staff
members from over 70 nations in a single command structure proved extraordinarily
difficult to manage (Clinton Library 1993a). The administration openly acknowledged
these challenges throughout the summer of 1993, being forced to account for longer than
expected deployments and little progress as domestic political grumblings began to
mount (Clinton Library 1993b). These challenges were not anticipated by the
administration and as a result, they appeared to be always reacting and underperforming.
Clinton’s political opponents turned the handling of Somalia into a key issue, remarking
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that, “under Clinton, U.S. foreign policy [was] marked by inconsistency, incoherence,
lack of purpose, and a reluctance to lead” (Boys 2012, 10). Criticism was not limited to
Republicans. Even members of the Clinton’s own party were reluctant to get on board
with the expanded mission, calling into question presidential authorities under the War
Powers Act (Clinton Library 1993b). The mission was becoming unwieldly on the
ground from an organizational standpoint, and a political liability on the home front with
pushback from both sides of the political aisle.
Mission 4: Offensive Targeting
Pushback on the mission not only occurred at home in the U.S. as time wore on,
in Somalia the warlords and their militias more aggressively opposed UN forces on the
ground. On June 5, 1993, Somali militiamen under General Mohammed Farah Aideed
attacked Pakistani UN peacekeepers, killing 23. This incident led directly to the UN
again modifying the mandate, this time targeting Aideed and those responsible for the
attack (Bolton 1994, 63). UNSCR 837 (6 June 1993) authorized UNOSOM II (the force
charged with this second phase of the Somalia intervention) to investigate, arrest, and to
detain those conducting attacks against the UN forces for subsequent prosecution, trial,
and punishment.
The expansion of the mission under UNOSOM II was supposed to coincide with a
reduction of U.S. forces, shifting to a more multinational face but with the U.S. providing
logistic and enabling support (Hoar 1993, 63). However, with the need to actively target
Aideed and other militia opposing UN efforts, the residual U.S. forces would continue to
play key roles, even if reduced in number. These residual forces included the types of
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capabilities required to identify and pursue targets in accordance with the new policy:
intelligence, air mobility, quick reaction infantry, and special forces. What marks these
as unique when compared to the other elements is their propensity for combat. Their
mission set within the broader nation-building effort was much more focused on
offensive action. With that came greater risk.
Aideed and his militia proved more problematic to target and dangerous than the
U.S. had imagined. On September 25, 1993 three U.S. soldiers were killed when a
Black Hawk helicopter was shot down. Immediately following this incident, political
pressures increased with Congress passing a nonbinding resolution for the President to
seek approval for U.S. forces to stay in Somalia by November 15 (Hirsch and Oakley
1995, 127). Clinton made his case for the continuance of the mission, not to Congress,
but to the UN on September 27 to the General Assembly, attempting to outline more
clearly what the actual peacekeeping policies were (Bolton 1994, 65). However, the
resolve would not last long.
On October 3, 1993 the U.S. Rangers led a raid to capture Aideed at the Olympia
Hotel in downtown Mogadishu. Resistance was greater than expected and the mission
went awry when another Black Hawk was shot down and the Rangers became pinned
down in the city. This necessitated the launch of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and
additional UNOSOM forces into the bloody fight that became known as the Battle of
Mogadishu. The result was 18 dead, 78 and wounded and one hostage among U.S.
soldiers; and between 500 and 1,000 Somali casualties (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 127).
Media coverage amplified the effects of the devastation by broadcasting the dragging of
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an American soldier’s desecrated body through cheering throngs along the Mogadishu
streets.
Mission 5: Back to Humanitarian Aid Delivery
How did Clinton react? National Security Advisor Tony Lake (2001) recounted
that Clinton did not make an immediate decision but was instead interested in the views
of Congress and his advisors. Senior members of the Senate were pushing to get out
within a week or two while those close to the president were urging not to back out,
worried that it would set a precedent that said, “you kill Americans, America withdraws
from that situation,” effectively “putting a bullseye on every American around the world”
(Ibid.). Clinton chose to do the former while appearing to do the latter.
On October 6, just three days after the initial attack, Clinton convened a meeting
with key officials to select a withdrawal date and ordered General Hoar to halt attempts
to pursue Aideed or other Somalis and to only act in self-defense (Hirsch and Oakley
1995, 128). The next day, October 7, Clinton (1993) formerly addressed the nation, but
cast the withdrawal in a way that appeared to be a doubling down – sending over
additional forces (quick response forces with additional armor protection) – but in pursuit
of a more narrowly defined mission.
President Clinton (1993) reversed the administration’s previous position and now
held that it was “not our job to rebuild Somalia’s society or even to create a political
process that can allow Somalia’s clans to live and work in peace. Somalis must do that
for themselves.” Acknowledging this, Clinton reframed the mission in terms very close
to the original mandate, as can be seen in Table 5.2 below.
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Table 5.2 President Clinton Address to the Nation on Somalia Excerpt

The humanitarian relief mission that took a turn toward nation-building as Clinton’s team
took charge, and then took on a more offensive tone in light of increased resistance, had
now returned to its original form.
Both in the presidential address, and subsequently in correspondence to Congress,
President Clinton recommitted the U.S. to a limited and short duration mission
undertaken with the addition of 1,700 Army personnel and 104 armored vehicles, along
with 3,600 Marines stationed offshore (Clinton 1993; Clinton Library 1994). The
addition of combat capability in the short term created the impression of doing more, but
clearly the newly arriving forces were more focused on facilitating the safe withdrawal of
U.S. troops than on supporting the mission more broadly. Clinton (1993) made his main
point clear: “All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st,
except for a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.”
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In total, once committed to the intervention, the U.S. role in Somalia took on four
different missions over the course of nine months: securing the delivery of aid; nationbuilding; and targeting of militia leaders; and finally, a return to restricted humanitarian
relief. The last conception of the U.S. role was quickly deemed a success and paired
with a precipitous withdrawal. What was it that caused the change? Was it political
pressures? No, both Republicans and Democrats had been openly questioning the
continued presence in Somalia since March (Clinton Library 1993b; Boys 2012). Was it
the so-called “CNN effect” associated with a humiliating loss to a militia and unexpected
U.S. casualties? If that was the case, Clinton would have not attempted to make the case
for perseverance at the UN General Assembly in light of the September 25, 1993 loss of
three soldiers in the helicopter ambush. As established in the preceding chapters, we can
look to differences in operational feasibility factors to see how changes in the situation
alter the decision calculus. Here the analysis demonstrates that changes in feasibility can
work in the opposite direction as well, changing an intervention into a withdrawal once
the situation proves too problematic.
Feasibility Factors
This section provides two feasibility assessments for the Somalia intervention.
The first is the initial assessment associated with the time of Bush 41’s decision and the
conclusion that the mission was achievable within a short time horizon. The subsequent
assessment pertains to Clinton’s decision window and his choice to withdraw. As
discussed previously, the four feasibility factors addressed here are the type of conflict
(e.g., ethnic, religious, or social), whether or not there is a leader or regime to support, the
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structure of the enemy or enemies (e.g. diffuse or hierarchical), and the accessibility of
the crisis environment.
Initial Assessment (Bush 41)
First, what was the type of conflict in which Bush 41 anticipated U.S. forces to be
involved? The administration’s appreciation of this factor is based on the tightly
circumscribed view of the mission that emerged: facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid
for a limited time – “40 days” or less (NSC 0065, 1). While certainly true that initial
assessments earlier in the spring of 1992 had a clear-eyed view of Somalia as an ongoing
civil war, those assessments faded under executive pressure to find a way to arrive at a
mission that was within the bounds of the possible (Western 2002). As a result, the
military and the NSC reframed the problem around the very specific mission of securing
aid delivery. Instead of saddling themselves with dealing with the drivers of the conflict
(e.g., inter-clan rivalry, weak governance, limited resources) that could quickly turn into
a quagmire, the administration chose to focus on the minimum actions required to
alleviate immediate suffering. The residual challenges would be left for whatever
capability the UN could muster as a follow-on operation. As a result, what was
originally recognized as a civil war came to be seen as a route and logistics node security
problem. As discussed by the President in his NSC Small Group Meeting on October 3,
1992, there was no intention of attempting to solve the crisis at its core (see Figure 5.1
below.). U.S. forces would be protecting lives of relief workers by setting up enclaves in
a “benign setting” (NSC 0065, 1). Based on this, the feasibility factor for type of
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conflict would be viewed as favorable since the administration had no intention of
grappling directly with the myriad challenges posed by the Somalian crisis.

Figure 5.1 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 1
Second, there was no supportable regime. A ceasefire was initially brokered on
January 31, 1992, including key warlords, Al Mahdi and Aideed; but enforcement for this
regime was lacking and therefore largely ignored (United Nations 2018). By the time
Bush 41 was at the decision point at the end of the year, it was obvious that no
meaningful ceasefire was acknowledged by the powers on the ground. However, the
importance of this fact as a feasibility concern was lessened in this case based on mission
expectations. The administration anticipated UNSCR 794 to be forthcoming within days
based on their significant involvement in its crafting at the UNSC. Confidence in this
eventuality is demonstrated by Attorney General Ball in Figure 5.2 as he speaks of the
resolution during deliberations with the President as if it already had passed. This
resolution would have added legitimacy and clarity on the role of the various troop
contributing countries, easing some of the concerns over having a supportable regime and
ensuring the U.S. forces could hand over responsibility in short order.
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Figure 5.2 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 2
However, the situation with the UN was not yet firm. There was subsequent
consternation about the composition of the peacekeeping force and which countries
would be providing what capabilities, all of which still needed to be worked out (NSC
0065, 4-5). In addition, Vice President Quayle’s remark that the President should brief
Congress even if the UN has not passed the resolution (see Figure 5.3 below) indicates a
desire on the part of the administration to conduct the mission regardless of a UN
mandate at the outset. With or without the resolution, Bush 41 was confident that there
would be “pretty broad support when the people see the picture” and was preparing to
move forward (NSC 0065, 5). Therefore, at the initial decision, Bush 41 did not have a
regime to intervene on behalf of but did anticipate a mandate from the UN that would
ultimately provide the follow-on peacekeepers to relieve the U.S. forces. Perhaps more
important, Bush 41 had restricted the mission for the American initial entry forces to the
point that it almost precluded conflict. Any concerns over how the force would be
perceived by antagonists over time would largely be the problem for the follow-on
peacekeeping element, not the limited intervention to which Bush 41 was committing.
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Figure 5.3 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 5
Third, as noted in Figure 5.1 above, Bush 41 did not expect significant opposition,
especially since they would be arriving with overwhelming military force and be focused
on aid delivery at isolated “enclaves,” not inflicting violence against the warlords or their
militias. The U.S. forces would not be a third party intervening in between warring
factions, attempting to be neutral but in essence fighting against all; instead they saw
themselves as a security force on the periphery. In addition, the limited opposing forces
that were envisioned by Bush 41’s advisors were not viewed as professional, competent
military elements that would pose a significant martial challenge. The national security
team referred to the warlord’s militias as “brigands” and “juvenile delinquents” (NSC
0065, 3). Therefore, the feasibility factor for anticipated enemy’s structure would have
been viewed positively because Bush 41 did not anticipate a significant enemy at all.
Fourth, accessibility for the Somalia crisis environment was first seen as
problematic, with limited port facilities, road networks, and infrastructure (Hoar 1993).
However, this improved as the military conducted further analysis that explored more
sea-based options that mitigated some of the traditional shortcomings (e.g., lack of
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airfields and port space) (Ohls 2009). Therefore, while certainly not easy logistically,
the mission was supportable, albeit with extraordinary and unconventional measures that
were more costly than conventional approaches (Hoar 1993). However, costs would be
minimized based on a short, expected deployment.
The administration based the limited expected deployment duration on their
anticipation that the UN would be able to rapidly build a peacekeeping force to replace
the U.S. ground troops, eliminating the need for U.S. boots on the ground past the first 30
days (see Figure 5.4 below.). This reinforced the positive feasibility factor attributes
above because Bush 41 and his team expected to rapidly get in and out. Therefore, the
team paid little concern to complications that could emerge over the longer-term mission.

Figure 5.4 NSC 0065 Minutes Excerpt Page 4
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Finally, on December 3, 1992 at the point of initial decision, the feasibility factors
were aligned largely in support of intervention. While there was no brokered ceasefire
with the warlords, the administration believed a U.S. force could secure the aid
distribution network with little resistance and the administration was confident a UN
peacekeeping force would form in short order to facilitate a rapid redeployment.
Subsequent Assessment (Clinton)
This section characterizes the four operational feasibility factors in October 1993
when Clinton arrived at his decision to withdraw forces, closely following on the heels of
the Battle of Mogadishu and its fallout. The type of conflict, existence of a supportable
regime, enemy structure, and logistical accessibility all change in significant ways in the
infeasible direction, calling mission success at acceptable costs into question.
Concern over the type of conflict changed significantly between the Bush 41 and
Clinton administrations. As detailed above, the roots of the conflict were of only limited
concern for Bush 41 because they saw their role as restricted in both time and scope,
anticipating a rapid handover to a follow-on UN peacekeeping force. However,
Clinton’s team treated the problem more extensively, recasting Somalia not as a limited
application of force but instead as a wholesale nation-building effort. This included
everything from refugee resettlement, to establishing a Somali police force, to efforts to
rebuild civil society (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 81-99; Clinton 1994). As a result, this led
to a completely different assessment of what would be required, for how long, and at
what risk. In effect, the Clinton administration had returned to arrive at the initial
assessment from the spring of 1992 where Somalia was properly understood as an
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anarchic collapsed state in the midst of a civil war with societal fissures rooted in ancient
clan rivalries (Fox 2001, 155). Expanding the mission to engage with the drivers of
conflict began in collaboration with others on the UNSC, leading to additional resolutions
(UNSCRs 815, 837, 865) over the course of 1993 that added more requirements to the
mission. The shifts in focus, or mission creep, acknowledged the challenges on the
ground that the warlords’ incentives were at odds with the goals of the UN and the
peacekeeping forces were going to have to adopt more offensive roles. In the end, the
type of conflict adapted from an anticipated non-conflict under Bush 41 to an attempt to
change social, political, and security conditions in Somalia as a neutral party in the midst
of a civil war with competing militias opposed to the UN’s presence.
A second feasibility factor that influenced the Clinton administration was the
existence of a supportable regime. Here again, we are looking at either if there is a clear
side that the U.S. is backing in a conflict, or if there is a ceasefire agreement in place that
the U.S. intervention would support. In this case the focus was on the latter with the UN
attempting to maintain neutrality. Like the first attempt at establishing a ceasefire under
Bush 41, subsequent attempts during the Clinton administration also failed. Starting
early in 1993 when the UN attempted a multi-prong approach to reestablish a supportable
ceasefire agreement, acknowledging the urge to place intervenors in a position accepted
by the warring parties. First, the UN attempted a negotiated ceasefire and disarmament
at the Addis Ababa Accords in January, a conference attended by both Aideed and Ali
Mahdi (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, 93-95). This effort was paired with a subsequent
Humanitarian and National Reconciliation Conferences, aimed at solving infrastructure,
economic, and political challenges. While there was general agreement reached at these
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events in theory, challenges came in implementation. Warlords feared that by ceding
power or position they would ultimately be left in a vulnerable position when these
measures failed or if the peacekeepers were to depart (Ibid., 99). Therefore, no
supportable regime ever came to pass. The U.S. role as part of the UN force remained as
an intervening force throughout, unable to back any leader or enforce an agreed upon
ceasefire agreement.
The characterization of the enemy forces is perhaps the most notable change in
the four feasibility factors. Initially discounted as “juvenile delinquents” and not
expected to mount significant opposition by Bush 41’s team, events on the ground
indicated otherwise as the U.S. presence continued through the spring (NSC 0065, 3).
The most notable was the June 5 ambush of the Pakistani peacekeepers that resulted in 23
killed and many more wounded (Bolton 1994). Perceptions were shifting. Warlords,
and in particular Aideed, posed significant challenges to UN military forces in 1993 that
led the U.S. Intelligence Community to reevaluate their capabilities and overall strategy.
The Central Intelligence Agency assessed that Aideed posed a significant threat even
though his forces and capability were relatively small (see Figure 5.5 below). This
conclusion was based on the supposition that Aideed’s diffuse militia (approximately
300-500 fighters) would continue to be difficult to target and that through “hit-and-run
tactics” they would be able to wear down the UN resolve, ultimately leading to a
withdrawal and the elevation of him as the dominant warlord (Clinton Library 1993c, 15). These traits of Aideed’s militia are precisely those that, according to the theory put
forward here, should dissuade intervention. The enemy is difficult to locate and target
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because of its small, nebulous structure, and their success is based on the ability to inflict
minimal but persistent losses on those that did not anticipate them.

Figure 5.5 CIA Intelligence Memorandum Excerpt on Aideed
Finally, the accessibility of the crisis environment also became a point of concern.
Initially seen as presenting challenges that could be overcome through ingenuity in offshore basing and unprecedented strategic lift networks, these modes became costly.
Near the end of 1993 the administration was exploring more traditional options, trying to
find ports (e.g., Chisimayu and Boosaaso) that presented lower cost options for the
continuation of a mission that was not originally thought to last that long (Clinton Library
1993c, 8-9). While not viewed as a matter that contributed greatly to the decision to
withdraw, the economic strain of the mission was a bone of contention between Congress
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and the administration going back to as early as March 1992 (Clinton Library 1993b).
This continued up until after the Battle of Mogadishu (October 3-4), when legislators
opposed to the continuation of the mission used threats to cut the funding as a lever to
influence Clinton’s decision (see Figure 5.6 below).

Figure 5.6 Email from White House Military Office Director (Maldon) to Liaison to
Congress (Paster)

Therefore, on October 7, 1993, when President Clinton announced the
forthcoming departure of the U.S. military from the Somalia intervention, feasibility
concerns had moved markedly in a negative direction. The conflict was largely viewed
as intractable and requiring systemic gains in political, economic, and social institutions
than in security, greatly extending the anticipated time horizon. After a year of laboring
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to achieve a ceasefire, none materialized, leaving the intervention force in the unenviable
position of trying to maintain neutrality among competing factions. As the situation
deteriorated in the summer, the intelligence community had the opportunity to reassess
the enemy forces that were thwarting UN efforts. They came to the two-part conclusion
that the militias were both difficult to target because of their small numbers and nebulous
organization, and that the warlords could achieve their aims with minimal effort because
of the limited will among intervening countries to sustain casualties. Lastly, the growing
costs of the intervention, tied in large measure to logistics funding requirements,
increased the sense of burden and became a political liability.
Somalia Summary
Bush 41 foresaw a limited intervention that would have the majority of U.S.
forces successfully redeployed within a month with whatever problems that would
emerge to be dealt with by a UN peacekeeping force. Clinton’s team reimagined this
role, seeing Somalia as a testbed for Assertive Multilateralism, acknowledging that the
problems undergirding the crisis would not be alleviated by delivery of aid alone. Not
only that, they envisioned the U.S. as a leading agent to facilitate the needed change. As
a result, the Clinton administration, along with the rest of the UN troop contributing
countries, actively contributed to the morphing of the crisis over the course of 1993. The
mission focus shifted from delivering aid, to nation-building, to offensive targeting, and
following tactical failure and unexpected losses, a quick pivot to claim victory on the
initial goal before departing.
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Previous scholarship on the Somalian intervention points to the power of the
media (e.g. Baum 2004) as the key determinant influencing Clinton’s decision to
withdraw. However, the research presented demonstrates that alternative explanations
deserve consideration. While certainly true that the media coverage of the Battle of
Mogadishu’s aftermath was powerful and shocking, it would be a mistake to look at the
media as the solitary agent eliciting a decision to withdraw. The media after all is
reacting to a change in the situation in the same way that the president is. With this in
mind, and as demonstrated here, more than just media coverage and public opinion
changed from the beginning of the crisis to its conclusion. Notably, the expectations of
success for the operation had changed significantly, particularly when achieved at the
costs the American public had implicitly supported when Bush 41 articulated the
intervention’s scope in 1992.
Table 5.3 Somalia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison

Ultimately all of the feasibility factors for the Somalia intervention shifted in a
downward direction (See Table 5.3 above). When Bush 41 evaluated the decision to
intervene he viewed the type of conflict, enemy structure, and the accessibility of the

159

environment all favorably. Only the absence of a supportable regime worked in the
opposite direction, and then only slightly so since Bush 41 was not expecting opposition
to such a limited intervention. When Clinton evaluated the situation in 1993 it was a
different story. Along with the administration’s expanded goals to achieve the nationbuilding outcomes came a far different assessment of the four feasibility factors. The
intervention, if it were to achieve the stated aims, would have to contend with a civil war
against diffusely organized militias over a longer time horizon, increasing sustainment
costs. In addition, there was still no supportable regime, but the situation worsened due
to the recognition that the intervention was opposed. Therefore, at least in this case, the
contention that feasibility factor changes in the direction of infeasibility should produce a
withdrawal is borne out in the historical record.
Part IV: Bosnia
All I can tell you is that, at this point, I would not rule out any option
except the option that I have never ruled in, which was the question of
American ground troops.
- President Clinton (April 16, 1993)
Chronological Overview
The breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in violence and atrocities not seen
since World War II. The Serb “ethnic cleansing” campaign dislocated Muslims and
Croats and employed systemic rape, concentration camps, and unrelenting sieges of
major cities, resulting in tens of thousands killed and over a million refugees (Daalder
2000). Like Somalia at the time, there was significant international outcry for a response.
The UN generated a peacekeeping force to secure safe zones (UNPROFOR), but it
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largely proved futile because its mandate was for peacekeeping, not peacemaking.
UNPROFOR were ill-equipped to deal with the aggression posed by the Bosnian Serb
Army (Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)) and the associated counterviolence in an
ethnically fractured state comprised of 44 percent Bosniak Muslims, 31 percent Orthodox
Serbs, and 17 percent Catholic Croats (Reimann 2017). If an international intervention
was to succeed it would require a more significant presence with a different mandate.
From 1993 to 1995 the Clinton administration wrestled with this thorny problem,
moving from being firmly resolved to refrain from putting troops on the ground to finally
providing leadership (both diplomatically as well as militarily) that brought about a stable
peace. To assist in understanding how Clinton’s decision to intervene changed over
time, the evolution of the Bosnian crisis and the political landscape during the decision
space can be divided into three periods. First, from the end of 1992 through 1994 was a
period of expanding crisis and failed peace. Second, significant change came with the
Bosnian Serb offensive of 1995 and its aftermath, altering the willingness of the Clinton
administration to respond. And finally, the period leading to the Dayton Accords, where
a combination of political pressures, diplomatic maneuvers, and military victories proved
to change the conditions to support a U.S.-led intervention. The following section
details these three periods.
Expanding Crisis and Failed Peace
Upon assuming office, Clinton was poised to take a more active role in the
Bosnian crisis based on campaign criticism of Bush 41’s ineffectiveness (Kempster
1992). That does not mean that Clinton came into office with a complete reversal in
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mind, wanting to put U.S. troops in UNPROFOR and assume leadership on the ground.
To the contrary, the administration had clearly thought through what they were prepared
to do and under what circumstances.
Clinton immediately had his staff conduct analyses of key issues, producing
Presidential Review Directives (PRDs). The first of these was PRD 1 covering the
situation in Bosnia (Lake 1993). At the end of the interagency process that framed the
issue, Clinton held a Principal’s Committee (PC) meeting on February 5, 1993 that
recommended a range of different policy positions, including enforcement of the no-fly
zone, increased sanctions on Serbia, and supporting political discourse with both allies
and Russia. What was also made plainly clear by Secretary of State Christopher (1993)
following that review was that the U.S. would not commit ground troops until there was a
“viable agreement containing enforcement provisions” agreed to by all parties.
Clinton’s team thought that peace could be achieved by manipulating some of the key
factors of the situation from a distance: increasing the defensive capability of the
Muslims and Croats and reducing the offensive capability of the Serbs.
In May 1993 Clinton and his team offered a new strategy that they thought could
relieve the pressure being applied to the Bosniaks and Croats by the Serbs. It hinged on
air power. Called “lift and strike,” the strategy proposed ending the 1991 UN arms
embargo on the former Yugoslav states because it limited the U.S.’s ability to supply
Bosnian Muslims with arms, putting them at a disadvantage compared to the Bosnian
Serbs being supplied directly from Serbia (Brune 1999, 99). As Clinton’s National
Security Advisor Tony Lake (2001) explained, the “strike” aspect of the strategy was in
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relation to the Serbs, whom the proposal called for striking if they “tried to take
advantage of the situation before we [the U.S.] could build up the Muslims.” The intent
was to try to produce military parity, thereby giving leverage to the Muslims and
incentivizing the Serbs to negotiate a peace.
The administration tried to persuade allies to employ the “lift and strike” strategy
in various forms for the first year and a half, but to no avail. This approach failed for a
variety of reasons. First, the French and British opposed the strategy because they
believed the addition of more military capability to the crisis would prolong the war, not
shorten it, and that the air strikes would put their forces on the ground at risk (Barthe and
David 2004, 6). There was also no consensus among Clinton’s own staff. Vice
President Gore, Lake, and Albright argued for air strikes, while Secretary of State
Christopher and Secretary of Defense Aspin wanted to strictly pursue diplomatic options;
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (first General Powell and subsequently General
Shalikashvili) argued that the air strikes would be ineffective without a ground offensive
(NSC Principals Committee 1993; Daalder 1998). Important to note, there were strong
voices inside the principals who openly advocated for action early in the administration
(see discussion from NSC Principals meeting in Figure 5.7 below). The demand for
action was ever-present; it was not something that sprang up in the final days before the
decision to intervene.
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Figure 5.7 Excerpt from NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, FEB 5, 1993
Finally, domestic politics were also at play, thwarting any support that Clinton
might have been able to muster. Republicans characterized the president’s handling of
the situation as ineffectual and indicative of the overall foreign policy, using Bosnia as an
angle of attack approaching the next election cycle (Lake 2001). As a result, the
splintering of positions among key advisors, and a dearth of support from Congress and
key allies who resented the fact that the U.S. was unwilling to put troops on the ground,
ensured that Clinton’s strategy would not be tried.
Throughout this period Clinton continued to cede leadership to the UN and
European Union (EU) while fostering peace-seeking efforts through U.S. diplomatic
support. But without any change in the dynamics between the opposing sides on the
ground, and without a viable deterrent force, no change came. Two peace proposals
faltered, first the Vance-Owen plan and then one devised by Norway’s Thorvald

164

Stoltenberg (Brune 1999, 100). All the while, the VRS laid siege to Sarajevo, starving
thousands, and carried out ethnic cleansing throughout the countryside. As the crisis
expanded throughout 1993 and 1994, the demand for action increased both
internationally and domestically without meaningful change in the U.S. response, which
at this point supported the defense of the six UN-designated “safe areas” serving as
Muslim enclaves.
The Clinton administration struggled to make positive impacts on the ground
during this period, yet two diplomatic initiatives were vitally important to the longer-term
success. First in February 1994, the Washington Framework Agreement established the
Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats. The framework began from the recognition
that fighting between the two parties benefitted the Serbs, an idea proposed by U.S. State
Department negotiators following yet another violent disaster in Sarajevo (Daalder 2000,
26-27). Ultimately this effort led to a cease-fire agreement between the Bosniaks and
Croats in March 1994, allying the Republic of Croatia and the newly Federated Bosnia
and Herzegovina in common cause against the Serbs. This development led directly to
military cooperation among the two groups, significantly altering the dynamics of the
crisis.
Second, the “Contact Group” formed in April 1994 consisting of the United
States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. The impetus behind the formation of the
group was a Serb artillery shell that exploded in Sarajevo killing 68 and wounding more
than 100, increasing recognition of the escalating nature of the problem (Brune 1999,
101). This brought the main states with vested interests to a small group setting,
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removed from the perceived ineffectiveness of both the UN and EU systems. Most
notably, it brought in the Russians who were important because of the leverage and
influence they had over Serbia. The Contact Group devised a plan that proposed a
geographic breakdown that split Bosnia-Herzegovina between a Muslim-Croat federation
and the Bosnian Serbs, providing a foundation for the peace talks to follow in the next
year.
Bosnian Serb Offensive and Aftermath
The first two stagnant years of the crisis under Clinton’s watch were far different
than 1995. This was the year in which everything shifted. Extraordinary levels of
violence, faltering allies losing their resolve, and rising criticism among political
opponents heading into an election year increased the demand for action and for the U.S.
to assume a greater leadership role.
During the five-month ceasefire brokered by former President Jimmy Carter in
December 1994, the Bosnian Serb leadership decided to adopt a much bolder strategy in
1995, making it the final year of the war. Following the cessation of the ceasefire in
April, they planned to swiftly attack three lightly protected safe areas in the east –
Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde; then shift to take Bihac in the northwest before finally
taking Sarajevo to force final capitulation (Daalder 1998). However, they overstepped
in the execution of their plan.
The Serb attack on Srebrenica on July 11, 1995 significantly altered all that
followed. The UNPROFOR element under Dutch command requested air attacks to
fend off the assault but was denied for the sake of maintaining neutrality, leaving the UN
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force ill-equipped and unsupported in any attempt to stop the Serbs. As a result, General
Mladic’s unopposed Bosnian Serb force gathered over 23,000 Muslim women and
children from the surrounding areas and subjected them to torture and rape. The men
and boys, totaling almost 8,000 were summarily executed (Rohde 2012). The magnitude
of the conflict escalated significantly in light of this attack, not only in sheer numbers, but
in its impact on the psyche of world leaders who believed they were uniquely situated to
prevent occurrences like this in the modern world. This is evident in reversals made by
Britain and France regarding the use of air power that result from growing awareness of
the Serbian atrocities.
Another concerning part of the fallout over Srebrenica was the glaring recognition
of the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR. The offensive had exposed the reality that the
peacekeeping force was positioned where there was no peace to keep. Based on that
recognition, Clinton was forced to deal with the real possibility that UNPROFOR would
be withdrawn, or worse, require extraction. Either way, the U.S. would be an essential
provider of the needed troops and logistics to facilitate that withdrawal, putting
Americans into danger (Lake 1995). This led to a reconsideration on the part of the
administration for what ought to be done. Previous thinking had supported maintaining
the status quo and the European position of working through UNPROFOR, but now the
U.S. was potentially committed to facilitating a withdrawal or coming up with an
alternative course on their own terms that would employ U.S. troops under more
favorable circumstances. This was yet more pressure to assume greater leadership.
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Finally, the international crisis scene is not divorced from domestic politics.
Republicans had been critical of the Clinton administration’s handling of Bosnia since the
inauguration. One of the key points of contention was the arms embargo. Republicans
wanted to end it and provide military aid the Bosnian Muslims, but the British and French
opposed this, not wanting to exacerbate the violence. Clinton was not keen to act
unilaterally in opposition to those he was attempting to leverage. However, the
Republicans retook both houses of Congress in 1994 and prepared the “Dole bill,” named
after would-be 1996 presidential challenger, Senator Bob Dole, preparing to force the
president’s hand. While Congress had initially agreed to sit on the legislation over the
winter with the ceasefire in place, the 1995 Serb offensive pushed the Republicans off the
fence. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995 (Dole, 1995), approved
by Congress on August 1 with numbers capable of overriding presidential veto,
authorized the termination of the 1991 arms embargo in conjunction with the withdrawal
of UNPROFOR. It was clear the approach of the last two years was about to change,
and the U.S. would be assuming much more responsibility in either the success or failure
that followed.
Leading to the Dayton Accords
In the fall of 1995, building off of the tremors of the Serb offensive, three things
transpired to bring about a supportable solution, as agreed to in December at the Dayton
Accords. Military victories by the Bosnian Federation of Muslims and Croats and a
more assertive NATO bombing campaign changed the situation on the ground.
Diplomatic maneuvers brought Serbian President Milosevic to the bargaining table on
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behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, altering the incentive structure and space for agreement.
And finally, the political pressures at home were realigned with the agreements specified
in the Dayton Accords, bringing bipartisan consensus in support of a limited mission.

Figure 5.8 Bosnian Map following the Dayton Accords (CIA World Factbook)
Part of the reason the Bosnian Serbs had not earnestly negotiated a peace prior to
the fall of 1995 was because they had made all of the gains (approximately 70% of the
Bosnian territory was controlled by Serb forces) and therefore were not willing to make
concessions (Daalder 2000). That changed in August 1995 with a three-prong offensive
against Serb forces in Krajina (the area surrounding Banja Luka above in Figure 5.8.)
The offensive was first initiated by the Croatian Army, then the Bosnian Army attacked
out of the Bihac pocket in the northwest, and then their forces united to recapture
approximately 51% of the country (Ibid.). This turned the tide on the ground, making it
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such that the area held on the ground much more closely resembled the proposition put
forward earlier from the Contact Group Plan. That same plan would serve as the
foundation for the negotiations at the Dayton Accords.
At the same time, NATO’s air power was finally unleashed to much broader
effect. Within just a few weeks, Britain and France finally pledged with the United
States to undertake an air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs press their attack east to
Gorazde, the next “safe area” slated for cleansing. As Secretary of State Christopher
warned, “The Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice…There will be no more pinprick
strikes” (Darnton 1995). This marked a change in the allies’ willingness to support
significant air strikes. UN troop contributing countries had been in opposition to NATO
air strikes previously because of the Serb tactic of taking hostages, as had occurred in
May when almost 400 peacekeepers were captured. However, Srebrenica changed that
concern. The result was NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force that went from August 30
through September 14, totaling 3,515 aircraft sorties that attacked 338 aim points and 48
Bosnian Serb targets with 1,026 strikes (Daalder 2000, 131). This combination of the
ground forces from the Croat-Muslim Federation and the NATO airstrikes was enough to
bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table.
That seat at the table would not be taken by the Bosnian Serbs, but instead by
Serbian President Milosevic. This shift moved Bosnian Serb “president” Karadzic and
their military’s commander, Mladic to the periphery. This was achieved through both
the pressure of sanctions over time on Milosevic as he grew more and more isolated, but
also through political maneuverings. Clinton had made outreach to Russia a key part of
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his negotiations with the Croatians and Bosniaks, ensuring that they included President
Yeltsin in the process, even if at a cursory level (Clinton Library 1993d). This
diplomatic maneuver increased the room for agreement with a negotiating partner that
was more than willing to concede territory that was not going to be part of his state in the
end.
Finally, before committing to an agreement, Clinton looked for bipartisan support
because public polling was far from supportive for risking American lives in the Balkans
at the end of November – only 37% support (Sobel 1998, 275). Clinton stated early on
in a conversation with the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina that he had two preconditions
before he would consider using Americans to enforce an agreement: that NATO rather
than the UN execute the mission, and that Congress would approve the mission and fund
it (see Figure 5.9 below) (Transcript of conversation between President Clinton and
President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Clinton Library 1993d). NATO, already
expanding the bombing campaign was preparing to take over for UNPROFOR in the
event an agreement could be reached had taken care of the first part. But Republicans
had been using Bosnia’s mishandling as a wedge heading into the 1996 election,
preventing action. That changed when Senator Dole reversed his position on December
1, seeing that an agreement was likely and that the U.S. would need to support NATO in
this endeavor. Dole thought that division on this issue would cut into troop morale and
work at counter-purposes with the national interests, ultimately throwing his support to
the president (Sciolino 1995).

171

Figure 5.9 Excerpt of President Clinton conversation with President Alija Izetbegovic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina

The combination of these factors paved the way for a peace agreement – the
Dayton Accords – signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris. The Accords were in basic
agreement with the Contact Group Plan developed in September. Bosnia-Herzegovina
would continue within existing boundaries and consist of two entities, the Muslim-Croat
Federation and Republika Srpska, occupying 51% and 49% of the country respectively
(Daalder 2000, 138). The UNPROFOR would be replaced by an Implementation Force
(IFOR) that had a very specific mandate and limited mission that, as the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs explained in a joint hearing before the Senate
(1995), would “not include reconstruction, resettlement, humanitarian relief, election
monitoring, and other non-security efforts.” This was the limited mission required to
enforce the Dayton accords that Clinton used to arrive at a decision of whether the U.S.
should take part in the intervention. Obviously the more tightly scoped mission
significantly altered the expectations (what required, how long, at what risk) for the
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intervention. More foundationally, that agreement provided an enforceable ceasefire
that all parties agreed to, producing an environment with less anticipated hostility. This
is the most notable change in conditions from what had existed over the previous three
years. While Clinton called out NATO and Congressional support in his discussion with
the Bosnian president, these were not Clinton’s most important preconditions; it was the
“if you reach an agreement” comment in the previous sentence (see Figure 5.9 above).
An agreement, as I will demonstrate in the next section, changes the feasibility factors
and explains why ground troops “were never ruled in” prior to its existence.
Feasibility Factors
As with the prior Somalia case, this section provides a feasibility assessment
comparison of two periods. Here though, the initial assessment corresponds to the
beginning of the Clinton administration in early 1993 rather than the period of the Bush
41 decision not to intervene. President Clinton could have easily chosen to intervene in
Bosnia upon assuming the office, especially since he had campaigned on tackling the
issues there in a way that his predecessor had not (Lake 2001). The second feasibility
assessment corresponds to the period around the decision to send U.S. ground troops in
December 1995. Again, the four feasibility factors addressed here are the type of
conflict, whether the U.S. has a regime to support, the structure of the enemy, and the
crisis environment’s accessibility.
Initial Assessment (Clinton 1993)
First, did the Clinton team view the conflict in Bosnia as an ethnic civil war in
same way the Bush 41 administration did? The evidence clearly supports that they did.
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The ethnic tensions at the root of the conflict were obvious in the ethnic cleansing stories
regularly published in the New York Times at the time (Sudetic 1992). Not only that,
the broader complexity of the situation was also apparent to the Clinton team as
evidenced by the specific questions resident in PRD 1 that the NSC was using to develop
their policy (Clinton Library 1993e) (see excerpt below in Figure 5.10). The conflict
region’s ethnic and historical ties to the surrounding states and key international actors
such as Russia and prominent Islamic countries all figured into the assessment of the
situation. Facts such as these are at the heart of the logic behind concerns over the type
of war. The more complex the crisis, the more intractable it appears and the greater the
uncertainty regarding how an intervention might unfold. Therefore, for Clinton in 1993
just as it was for his predecessor, the type of conflict was dissuading for a potential
intervention.

Figure 5.10 Excerpt from Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1: U.S. Policy Regarding
the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
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Regarding whether there was a supportable regime in 1993, there was not. In the
early stages of the war there were three distinct groups in conflict: the Bosnian Serbs
(supported by Serbia) against the Bosniak Muslims and Croats independently, and the
Muslims and Croats against one another to a more limited extent (Brune 1999). An
intervenor would have been placed in the unenviable position of attempting to be neutral
protector of relief supplies amid these conflicts. This is precisely the position in which
UNPROFOR found itself that contributed to its inability to stop the massacres as the
violence increased (Daalder 1998). Here too then, the feasibility factor for a supportable
regime was not favorable.
Next, what type of enemy formations would a U.S. intervention face? There is a
clear answer to this question from the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) response to
the Clinton Transition Team’s questions regarding the Balkans. The Transition Team
posed questions to the NIC to prepare the incoming president and his team for the
decisions they would face in the administration’s opening days and months. The NIC’s
December 28, 1992 report provides a thorough record of the assessment the Clinton
national security team received as they prepared to take the reins of power (Clinton
Library 1992). The excerpt below (Figure 5.11) paints a vivid picture of what threat
they anticipated in the event of a “large-scale international military intervention,” the
type of operation they believed would be required to end the crisis. The report
specifically calls out that the “Bosnian Serb forces are doctrinally disposed to protracted,
decentralized defense” and that they would be “widely deployed in rough terrain with
good concealment that favors defense” (Clinton Library 1992, 38). The estimate is that
guerrilla warfare would predominate and result in a lengthy occupation, precisely the
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concern this feasibility factor is meant to address. Clearly the Clinton team would not
have viewed the enemy structure in a positive light.

Figure 5.11 Excerpt from Response to Clinton Transition Team Questions on the Balkans
Lastly, the Clinton administration, like Bush 41, viewed the region as inaccessible
in 1993. This is predominantly because of the necessity of using the Sarajevo airport to
employ forces and protect the humanitarian supplies (Gellman 1992). In the early
months of the Clinton presidency more and more graphic images poured illuminating the
horror of the tragedy in Bosnia. Ivo Daalder (2000), who conducted interviews with
administration officials on the subject and subsequently served on the NSC from 2005

176

and 2006 working the Bosnia issue, notes that this caused Clinton to ask National
Security Advisor Tony Lake to revisit the options, including deploying American troops
(19). The Pentagon conducted their analysis and the CJCS Admiral Jeremiah assessed
that it would take 70,000 troops to halt the siege of Sarajevo, primarily “due to the fact
that the airport’s closure meant that the troops would have to traverse hostile territory to
get to the city” (Ibid., 20). Therefore, the inaccessibility of the Sarajevo airport and the
high costs in troops and equipment to secure long and hostile alternative routes proved
prohibitive. These limitations and restrictions put this feasibility factor firmly in the
negative as well.
These four feasibility factors in early 1993 were not conducive to intervention.
Clearly the demand for action was already there. As noted before, members of the
national security team, most notably Albright and Lake were openly advocating for
intervention options that included the deployment of the U.S. military as early as
February (NSC Principals Committee 5 February 1993). In addition, President Clinton
himself was swayed by the reports coming in on CNN while on his Group of Seven (G-7)
trip to Tokyo, causing him to have his staff relook at what could be done, including the
possibility of using troops (Daalder 2000, 19). Yet still, there was no decision to change
course on the question of U.S. boots on the ground until the end of 1995.
Subsequent Assessment (Clinton 1995)
This section assesses the four operational feasibility factors in December 1995
when Clinton decides to deploy troops to Bosnia as part of IFOR. Here we see a
significant change in all four factors stemming from one key event – the signing of the
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Dayton Accords. The expectations for the military intervention change significantly
with all sides agreeing to the ceasefire and its concomitant conditions. Everything from
the appreciation of the conflict type, to there being a supportable regime, to the
anticipated enemy the intervention would face, and even the logistical accessibility is
altered with the agreement in place. It is important to note that the ceasefire agreement
was always the lynchpin for President Clinton, making it the principal condition that
would warrant U.S. involvement in the peacekeeping effort (Clinton Library 1993d, 11).
This was blatantly clear in Clinton’s conversations from the beginning of his handling of
the crisis to the very end (See Figures 5.9 above and 5.12 below from his conversations
with the presidents of Bosnia and Croatia). Seeing how that agreement changes the
following feasibility factor assessments, it is easy to understand why.

Figure 5.12 Excerpt from President Clinton Meeting with Presidents Izetgebovic (BosniaHerzegovian) and Tudjman (Croatia), October 24, 1995

Beginning with the appreciation of the type of conflict, Clinton still recognized
that it was an ethnically-divided civil war. However, the war itself ended with the
signing of the Dayton Accords. Clear provisions to avoid conflict between the ethnic
groups were emplaced and IFOR was given authority over the forces of the previously
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warring factions, reducing the risk of significant combat (Brune 1999, 110). In addition,
the IFOR mission was restricted to prevent “mission creep,” something the administration
might have learned from the Somalia experience. Here, as noted before, senior Pentagon
officials made it clear that the Bosnian intervention would not be about nation-building
(Daalder 2000, 142-143). IFOR would monitor and enforce a zone of separation
between the newly established territories. Therefore, the type of conflict moved from an
ethnically-based civil war to a tenuous peace. The situation was still not certain to
remain stable, but at least provisions limited contact among the groups through agreed
upon lines of demarcation.
Next, the factor addressing a supportable regime changed over time. Initially, the
conflict was waged among all three parties – Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The first
intervening force, UNPROFOR, had to maintain neutrality while trying to separate the
parties and facilitate the delivery of aid. However, a key shift occurred in February 1994
when the Washington Framework Agreement established the Bosnian Federation of
Muslims and Croats. As Clinton conveyed to both Bosnian and Croatian leaders in
1995, the cooperation between them marked a significant shift in the conflict, providing a
level of parity between the opposing forces that could help induce negotiation (Clinton
Library 1993d, 38) (See statement by President Clinton in Figure 5.13 below).
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Figure 5.13 Statement by President Clinton in meeting with President Izetgebovic
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) and President Tudjman (Croatia), October 24, 1995

Even though the partnership between the Croats and Muslims altered the balance
of power positively, it did not provide a supportable regime in 1994. This is because the
mandate authorizing an intervention, one that the U.S. supported, was UNSCR 743,
which created UNPROFOR (United Nations Security Council 1992). If the U.S. had
advocated intervention at this point it would have been blatantly taking one side over the
other, in direct opposition to the neutral peacekeeping character outlined in Resolution
743. Therefore, the advent of the Washington Agreement was well received and paved
the way for a sustainable peace, but it still did not provide a supportable regime given the
nature of the conflict and the fact that he U.S. had committed to a multinational response.
That would not come until all parties agreed at Dayton and subsequently signed in Paris.
The “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” or
simply the Dayton Accords, ultimately served as the “supportable regime” in and of
itself. IFOR, as agreed to in the accords, was not intervening on behalf of one of the
parties as I have maintained is preferable to neutrality; instead it had the most preferred
situation. The regime was a clearly articulated set of rules that all the belligerents agreed
to abide by, including ceasing hostilities, relocating and restricting the movement of their
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forces, and most importantly the empowering of IFOR to use force against them if found
in violation (United Nations 1995). Beyond that, the U.S. forces were limited in their
scope to enforcing the military aspects of the agreement, providing separation between
the parties and monitoring compliance (Daalder 2000, 145). Like the change it induced
for the type of conflict, the Dayton Accords provided a clear side on which to act, one
that was agreed to by those being acted upon.
The last two feasibility factors, enemy structure and accessibility, are closely
linked in this case because the latter is primarily influenced by the change in the former.
First, with the Dayton Accords in place, the concern over the decentralized Bosnian Serb
forces and their potential to wage a long-term guerrilla war is significantly reduced. In
fact, the President was most concerned about forces beyond the control of either the
Serbs, Croats, or Bosniaks once the peace agreement was in place. Clinton conveyed
this point in conversation with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, expressing concern that
Iranian-backed Mujahedin forces that had come into fight against the Serbs could
potentially fight on in opposition against U.S. forces (see Figure 5.14 below). This
passage also demonstrates that Clinton did not anticipate losses to enemy fire as a result
of the agreement being in place since losing “a couple of soldiers to forces connected to
Iran…could wreck this whole thing” (Clinton Library 1993d, 56).
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Figure 5.14 Conversation between President Clinton and President Izetgebovic (BosniaHerzegovina), December 14, 1995

With the concern over armed opposition largely gone, the accessibility challenges
of using the Sarajevo airport or the long routes for logistic support changed as well.
Access limitations were always a great concern. Following the bombing campaign in
the fall of 1995, General Mladic came to bargain with NATO over what he was willing to
concede if the attacks halted. NATO rejected Mladic’s proposal and made three specific
demands, one of which was “complete freedom of movement for UN forces and
personnel and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and unrestricted use of Sarajevo
airport (Daalder 2000, 132). With the Dayton Accords these concerns were finally
alleviated. The main airport and all road networks became accessible and their use
unopposed.

182

Bosnia Summary
The Clinton administration’s appraisal of the Bosnia situation in 1993 was not
that different from the Bush 41 perspective (See Table 4 below). All four of the
feasibility factors dissuaded Clinton from committing troops. In line with this
assessment, the incoming administration saw the prospects of a military intervention
being able to solve the crisis without a peace agreement as remote, at least not within
acceptable timelines and costs. Clinton maintained from his earliest days in office that
an agreement would be a precondition for U.S. troop contributions to the effort.
Fortunately, the series of advantageous developments in 1995 made an agreement
possible (i.e. Bosniak and Croat ground offensive, NATO bombing campaign, Milosevic
negotiating on behalf of Bosnian Serbs).
Table 5.4 Bosnia Intervention Feasibility Assessment Comparison

When the Dayton Accords were signed in December, all of the feasibility factors
shifted significantly in a positive direction (See Table 5.4 above). The conflict, while
still ethnically-based, was a more positive environment for intervention due to the
separation of the opposing forces and willing halt to the hostilities. Next, there was a

183

regime to support, namely the Dayton Accords and its provisions. Third, the expectation
of enemy opposition was significantly reduced based on the ceasefire agreement. And
finally, the accessibility to the region was vastly improved because of the agreement to
allow unfettered access to the Sarajevo airport and all main routes. In short, the mission,
once scoped to limit expected conflict and anticipated time commitments for IFOR,
displayed the characteristics supporting intervention.
Part V: Comparison and Conclusion
The Somalian and Bosnian interventions provide useful cases to test the utility of
operational feasibility factors in understanding more than just an initial decision to
intervene or not. In theory, if an appreciation of an intervention’s feasibility factors
changes from positive to negative, this should be accompanied by a decision to withdraw
forces. Likewise, if conditions initially stifle demands to intervene but later are
conducive to intervention, we ought to expect a decision reversal. The Bush 41 and
Clinton White House’s perceptions of the Somalian and Bosnian crises provided a unique
opportunity to assess this notion.
The four feasibility factors considered in this study – the type of conflict, whether
there is a supportable regime, the structure and capability of the enemy, and the
accessibility of the crisis environment – all trended from favoring intervention in some
degree under Bush 41 to supporting withdrawal under Clinton in the Somalian case.
Therefore, the decision to withdraw given the change in these conditions supports the
theory posited here that operational feasibility affects intervention decisions. Similarly,
while both Bush 41 and Clinton agreed that putting boots on the ground in 1992/1993
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was ill-advised, the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 changed the feasibility factors
in the direction to promote intervention.
One might argue that these cases exhibit a great deal of covariance between the
feasibility factors and the internal or external determinants, harkening back to the idea
that the media drove the U.S. out of Somalia or the increased magnitude of the conflict of
Bosnia finally warranted U.S. involvement. Covariance can most certainly take place, as
the process tracing of these cases identifies. Just as in the last chapter, as conditions
shift, so to do the options generated for presidential consideration. However, the
question at the heart of the study focuses on explaining both action and inaction in the
face of similar demand signals. What this research has shown is that it is not until the
options presented for decision are considered feasible do we see intervention. And,
likewise, when the feasibility assessments become increasingly negative, we see
withdrawal. It is certainly important to note the demands that sway and tailor the types
of options being considered, but the operative element of the decision calculus is
feasibility.
More than that, building upon the findings of the previous chapters and the
explicit reference to operational feasibility considerations in the historical record, the
results are striking. There is remarkable consistency of these factors with their
corresponding theoretical prediction in outcome. This is true whether supporting
intervention outcomes, or in this case, nonintervention/withdrawal.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This work focused on answering why U.S. presidents choose to intervene
militarily in some foreign crises but not in others. Specifically, why do we find
seemingly inconsistent intervention decisions when the situations in question exhibit
similar qualities, particularly with respect to those variables argued by other scholars as
being determinant? Throughout, I have argued that there was an important element
missing from these analyses: a way of operationalizing the concepts surrounding
“expectations of success,” an element often cited as an important part of the decisionmaking process (Baum 2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007). Toward this end I
have provided operational feasibility factors as a way of identifying observable and
measurable aspects of situations that presidents use to arrive at their expectation of
success. Using a mixed methods approach and primary sources that included the
minutes from presidential and NSC dialogues, this study was able to explore the degree
to which these feasibility factors influenced the decisions. When these feasibility factors
align favorably, the prospects of intervention increase given that there is enough demand
for action. Alternatively, when the factors exhibit unfavorable qualities, the president is
unlikely to commit ground forces regardless of the demand signal’s strength.
Answering this question is important. Presidential policy positions are the
subject of much debate, especially when those decisions involve the expenditure of
America’s blood and treasure. The results of these analyses not only help us explain
perplexing outcomes, they pass knowledge from the realm of practice to the world of
political analysis, filling in gaps that offer more consistent and, in some cases, more
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parsimonious answers to perennial questions. This study has sought to do just that. By
employing the analytic concepts used by military planners to develop assessments and
options as part of the national security apparatus, this work identified factors that explain
intervention and nonintervention decisions with a high degree of consistency.
This concluding chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I revisit the theoretical
argument upon which the analysis is built. Second, I summarize the empirical findings
from the previous three chapters. Third, I explore the implications for the research and
policy communities, as well as for the public more generally. Finally, I acknowledge the
limitations of this study and recommend future research opportunities to test and improve
upon this theoretical framework.
Argument
The main contention is that operational feasibility plays a significant role in
determining whether U.S. presidents are willing to intervene with boots on the ground in
foreign crises. It does not matter what the impetus is for the intervention – humanitarian,
security, or economic interests. Feasibility factors can explain why instances that seem
to be very compelling are still not acted upon; and at the same time, why opportunities
that were once deemed unsupportable can shift to become interventions.
The scholarly community has largely overlooked these concerns to date, instead
focusing on the relative importance of the source of the demand signals that create an
intervention opportunity to explain why or why not presidents choose to intervene. The
debate has been between those arguing in favor of external determinants such as
geopolitical pressures and alliances (Smith 1996), global economics (Fordham 2008), or
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international norms (Walling 2013), and those arguing on behalf of internal determinants
such as public opinion (Baum 2004), domestic economic conditions (DeRouen 1995), or
congressional support and ideology (Hildebrandt et al. 2013). In this work I charted a
third course that opens up a new range of considerations to help explain presidential
decision-making.
This approach is based on a three-part causal chain. First, presidents respond to
the demand signals discussed by previous scholars, identifying an opportunity for
potential military intervention. Then, with the assistance of their national security team,
they assess the likelihood of success for the use of force given the unique characteristics
of the crisis environment. Finally, taking into account the potential efficacy of the
mission, they determine whether to go forward with the intervention. This theoretical
proposition places a great deal of importance on the estimation of a successful outcome.
Other authors have understood the importance of the expectations of success,
using measures such as relative power comparisons in order to account for this factor
(e.g., Buena de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). This technique was most useful in the
bipolar Cold War era where interventions were often associated with proxy wars between
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. However, more recent works have not adequately operationalized
this concept to account for the changing strategic landscape following the fall of the
Soviet Union. Over the last few decades multilateral institutions such as the UN have
more frequently taken a leading role in initiating interventions, morphing traditional
views of sovereignty and state responsibilities with concepts such as the “right to protect”
(Bellamy 2008). Also, nongovernmental institutions have been instrumental, calling
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attention to humanitarian crises and generating demand for intervention (Chandler 2001).
Finally, civil conflicts and irregular warfare have continued apace absent the proxy wars
commonly associated with the Cold War, seeing new players such as diasporas and
smaller external state sponsors play more significant roles in starting or supporting
guerrilla and civil wars (Byman et al., 2001). These changes influence not only the
prevalence of intervention opportunities, but the rationales that either support or argue
against a potential military intervention. In light of these changes, the expectation of
success must account for something beyond relative power differentials between wouldbe adversaries. The question is what types of considerations make sense?
This issue – clearly articulating under what circumstances the U.S. should
commit to a military intervention – has been a concern for administrations dating back to
Reagan. The famous “Weinberger Doctrine,” presented by then Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger in response to concern of growing commitments in the Middle East
on the heels of the killing of 241 Americans in Lebanon, laid out six tests that should be
met before the U.S. would commit ground troops (Weinberger 1984; Record 2007;
LaFeber 2009):
1. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless
the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest
or that of our allies….
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given
situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of
winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to
achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all….
3. Third, if we do decide to commit to combat overseas, we should have clearly
defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how
our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should
have and send the forces needed to do just that….
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4. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have
committed---their size, composition and disposition—must be continually
reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably
change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, so must our
combat requirements….
5. Fifth, before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some
reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people
and their elected representatives in Congress….
6. Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

Five of the six tests above relate in some way to whether an action should be
taken. These concerns are based on what an intervention would accomplish (1); how it
should be undertaken (2 and 4); and under what political and diplomatic circumstances (5
and 6). Of note for this study is number three, which addresses clearly defined and
achievable military objectives. This is the criterion that deals with whether military
force can be applied to achieve the desired effect. To answer that concern requires the
articulation of the aims of the intervention and the subsequent development of military
options that could achieve them. In other words, in order to determine the answer to
number three, a feasibility assessment must be undertaken to develop an understanding of
what could be done and at what cost. Only then can the president determine whether a
reasonable option is even available.
This same doctrine was reinforced by then CJCS Colin Powell (1992) during
deliberations over a potential Bosnian intervention during the George H.W. Bush
administration, stressing the importance of assessing key factors before assuming the
risks involved with sending in combat troops. Similarly, Clinton also struggled to
circumscribe the instances where it is appropriate to intervene with ground forces,
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something he found necessary early in his administration following the Somalia
withdrawal and as he deliberated over the ongoing challenges in the former Yugoslavia.
Like Bush 41 before him, he sought to add clarity for those in the national security
establishment when developing recommendations in a period of increased pressure for
U.S. involvement. Toward that end, Clinton developed Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) / NSC-25 (Clinton 1994). In it, Clinton calls for the same clearly defined
objectives and an expectation of being able to achieve them decisively (read quickly) that
Powell had conveyed in the previous administration (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 Clinton PDD-25 Excerpt on Considerations for Significant U.S. Involvement
in Peace Enforcement Operations

Based on the above, this study looked to identify what elements of these crises
might either lead to more achievable military aims in short order, or alternatively make
them more difficult and protracted. By looking to how the presidents’ national security
teams conduct their assessment of these crises and develop their military options in the
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modern era, I have developed a useful set of conditions to indicate whether a crisis
environment is conducive to intervention or if it is likely to dissuade involvement:
feasibility factors.
There were four feasibility factors that proved most useful in this analysis:
1. CONFLICT - What type of conflict is it? If it is based on ethnic or religious
fault lines, then the violence is unlikely to be quelled quickly and will
contribute to persistent instability.
2. REGIME - Does the U.S. have a clear regime to support or install within the
state where the intervention would occur?
3. ENEMY - How is the enemy/adversary organized? Is the structure
hierarchical and susceptible to strike, or diffuse and difficult to target?
4. ACCESS - How accessible is the crisis environment? This addresses the
logistic concerns of supporting an intervention through existing port and
transportations networks, elements that are often lacking in the underdeveloped
locales where intervention opportunities arise.
These four feasibility factors are meant to tease out the most important aspects that
determine whether military options that have clear objectives, attainable within a short
amount of time, are even possible.
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Empirical Findings
Study Design
This study employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods research design to
assess the ability of feasibility factors to explain intervention decisions, while at the same
time comparing their explanatory power against, as well in combination with, the extant
scholarship’s more common determinants (Creswell 2013). First, I employ Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to test for unique combinations of feasibility factors with
the internal and external determinants that are most associated with intervention and
nonintervention decisions. This methodological choice is based on the theory above that
the internal and external determinant conditions expressed by other authors emit a
demand signal that results in an opportunity, but that opportunity is only acted upon when
the feasibility factors are advantageously aligned. QCA was able to identify the
combinations of conditions that yielded the most consistent results. Building on those
findings, I then conducted two paired comparison case studies, each within a single
administration to attempt to control for unobserved variables. The first looked at the
George H.W. Bush administration’s intervention decisions regarding Somalia and Bosnia
– the former resulting in an intervention and the latter nonintervention. By using the
QCA findings to guide the research into the presidential dialogues and NSC
deliberations, I was able to demonstrate the degree to which feasibility factors were
explicitly evident in the decision-making process. In the second paired comparison, the
same two crises were explored under the Clinton administration. The aim here was to
extend the theory, looking at whether changes in decisions (intervention to withdrawal in
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Somalia and nonintervention to intervention in Bosnia) were associated with concomitant
changes in feasibility factors, bolstering the argument for their inclusion in intervention
analyses.

I discuss each of these research contributions – QCA and the cases studies –

in turn.
Qualitative Comparative Analysis
The QCA portion of the study used 19 intervention opportunities to identify
unique combinatorial condition solutions – causal recipes of the feasibility factors mixed
with the internal and external determinants – associated with both intervention and
nonintervention and used those solutions for a predictive analysis with an out-of-sample
test. The parsimonious and intermediate solutions for intervention predicted the actual
decisions with 100% accuracy and the nonintervention solutions at 75%.
Specifically, the analysis looked at eight different hypotheses built around the
theoretical expectations associated with the feasibility factors above, and one for the null
hypothesis where the factors would be expected to have no effect. Only the null
hypothesis had no support.
Feasibility factors performed very well in the analyses. Of them, two were most
significant for intervention decisions: 1) Is there a supportable regime? and 2) Is the crisis
environment logistically accessible? In the parsimonious QCA solution these two
conditions account for 88% of the decisions to intervene from 1980 to 2013. The
enemy’s structure was also important. A hierarchical enemy structure was present in
every case of intervention and absent in two-thirds of the nonintervention cases. Lastly,
the conflict type also proved useful. The combination of an ethnically- or religiously-
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based conflict with no regime to support accounted for 83% of the cases of
nonintervention. This solution also supported the “Too Complex” hypothesis which
argued that there would be an additive quality to infeasible traits that would cause
presidents to balk.
The non-feasibility conditions that emerged to help explain the decisions were
presidential approval, trade ties, and conflict magnitude. The inclusion of these
conditions reinforces the position that both domestic and international systemic concerns
influence intervention decisions. Yet, alone they did not produce the outcomes in
question; they always required the addition of at least one feasibility factor in the
solution. This finding reinforces the theory put forward that the internal and external
determinants emit a demand signal, but that there is a feasibility threshold that must also
be crossed before troops are deployed. Demand alone is not enough.
Case Studies
The paired comparison of the Bush 41 intervention decisions in Chapter 4 for the
Somalia and the Yugoslavia/Bosnia crises reinforced the QCA findings. The two cases
were similar in that the conflicts had significant magnitude regarding deaths, refugees,
and internally displaced persons. Both garnered the support of multinational institutions
like the UN that cited international norms as a rationale to intervene. However, the
among the factors unrelated to feasibility, Bosnia clearly had a stronger case for
intervention. The crisis in the Balkans had drawn much more media coverage and could
tout much more important economic and political ties to allies. Yet, Bush 41 went in the
opposite direction and intervened in Somalia instead.
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As demonstrated, the key difference between the cases was in the feasibility
assessment. Yugoslavia was characterized by the Bush 41 administration as overly
complex; there was no established ceasefire in place that the intervention could enforce;
the opposing forces were primarily irregulars and decentralized; and logistical access to
the region was very limited. Compare this to the anticipated mission in Somalia which
did not seek to resolve the conflict, but instead only safeguard delivery of aid from the
administration thought were “juvenile delinquents” and “brigands” (NSC 0065, 3). In
addition, while Somalia was expected to be costly based on the need to support the
mission via sea and air, Bush 41 did not anticipate the mission lasting longer than 30
days, therefore making accessibility a minor concern (NSC 0065, 5).
This chapter also discovered an additional phenomenon that underscores the
importance of feasibility. Under Bush 41 the assessment of the Somalian intervention
opportunity underwent a series of transitions, highlighting how intervention decisions
may shift given changes in the mission requirements, and therefore the feasibility of
executing that mission. This fed directly into the next chapter which sought to address
this principle head on, looking at whether feasibility factor assessments changed under
the Clinton administration as they dealt with the same crises, and whether perhaps this
led to the reversal of decisions – getting out of Somalia and supporting intervention in
Bosnia.
In Chapter 5, when the feasibility factors changed from positive to negative, that
resulted in Clinton’s decision to withdraw. Likewise, when the initial conditions were
not supportive of intervention but then changed to promote a feasible mission, Clinton
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chose to accept the risk and put boots on the ground in Bosnia. In effect, what this
chapter accomplished was to extend the application of the theory. The results also add
greater weight to the argument put forward here because they demonstrated that changes
to the feasibility factors were in accordance with the theoretically anticipated outcomes.
Concerning Somalia, all four of the feasibility factors addressed in this study went
from favoring intervention under Bush 41 to supporting withdrawal under Clinton.
While Clinton’s initial assessment was basically the same as Bush 41’s above, that
changed over time as the mission grew in scope and was met with greater resistance.
Clinton’s team then recognized they were embroiled in a civil war with no regime to
support, facing multiple diffusely organized militias, with a much longer time horizon for
success, thereby greatly increasing the costs associated with logistically supporting the
operation.

This, in turn, led to withdrawal.

The assessment for Bosnia under Clinton likewise changed, most fundamentally
with the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. This significantly altered the
parameters of the mission and resulted in meaningful shifts in the feasibility factors. The
conflict was still ethnically-based, but now there was an agreed upon cease fire and a
separation of combatants. In addition, there was then no expected opposition, either
preventing the use of the Sarajevo airport or limiting the access across the region.

As a

result, the change in feasibility led to intervention.
In total, the two previous chapters furthered the understanding of how important
feasibility factors are to the decision-making process. The primary sources were able to
expose the deliberations occurring within the NSC and its supporting subcommittees,
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shedding further light on what it is that truly tilts the scales in one direction or the other.
This included the notes of meetings with the presidents and their most t

rusted

advisors, holding conversations that they knew would not be available for immediate
public consumption. At least in the cases explored here, concerns over operational
feasibility were quite evident and linked in a theoretically consistent way to ultimate
decisions.
Implications
Research
This study demonstrates that we can explain, at least partially, the inconsistencies
within the literature concerning intervention behavior. The variables that the previous
scholarship suggests are determinants, whether internally or externally oriented, really
serve as the demand signals that create an intervention opportunity. Those demands
must be paired with a combination of positively aligned feasibility factors in order to
cross the threshold that results in an intervention decision.
What this research does is operationalize the concept of “expectations of success”
that other authors have identified as an important element to be considered, but not
adequately accounted for in empirical analysis, particularly in the modern era (e.g., Baum
2004; Regan 1998 and 2002; Seybolt 2007). Therefore, this work builds on the
contributions of these authors by taking the factors that the military planning community
actually uses to develop options for consideration and translates these into concepts for
use in academia.
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Moving forward, scholars should view operational feasibility as a portion of the
decisional calculus that can be operationalized and included in future analyses. Based
on the findings here, these considerations may be much more appropriate for explaining
intervention decisions than any previous alternative, and therefore should be included and
expanded upon.
Beyond intervention-focused scholarship, the findings also reinforce work done in
studies focused on conflict and leader behavior more broadly. For instance, those that
have argued strongly that leaders will not go to war unless they are likely to win find
common ground here (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, and Siverson 2005).
This has been especially important for democratic leaders, who place a high value on the
probability of success, causing them to carefully pick their conflicts.
Policy
The theoretical premise that this study proposes is based on an understanding of
how decisions are made in the current national security apparatus. As such, the notion
that feasibility affects decisions is not novel; what is, is the elucidation of what factors
carry the most weight. Therefore, for the policy community, the primary contribution of
this study is in its shedding light on the most prominent feasibility concerns as
demonstrated through the systematic analysis of 19 cases. Beyond that, the additional
qualitative research of the paired case comparisons illuminates to an even greater degree
how decisions are made and the importance that feasibility assessments play.
Often the people that participate in the formulation of military options – military
planners, civilian employees within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the
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Joint Staff, and on the various layers of the NSC and its supporting staffs – are unaware
of what specific concerns are addressed in the small group sessions when the presidents
meet with their key advisors. This study, through material released via the Freedom of
Information Act, was able to shed light on those discussions. Through those records we
can see that the decisions are indeed complex, factoring in a number of concerns that all
bear on potential risk, repercussions of both action and inaction, and most importantly for
this study, a clear explication that feasibility concerns actually matter. Based on that, it
is important that those developing potential intervention options in the future ensure that
they clearly address these feasibility factors since they will likely be seminal to
discussions at the highest levels.
Lastly, for those in the policy realm, this study exhibits that intervention decisions
rest firmly in the practical concerns of the possible, not as popularly conceived to be at
the whims of political fancy. This should be somewhat vindicating for those who work
behind the scenes to support these missions, either in the conceptualization or in the
conduct of the missions themselves.
Public Awareness
More generally, this dissertation militates in a certain sense against unwarranted
blame. Often, we see presidents chastised for their inaction in the face of horrific
atrocities, such as the Rwandan genocide (e.g., New York Times 1994; Reuters 1998).
When charges that presidents are insensitive to the plight of those suffering in conflicts
around the world are levied, it is most commonly assumed that something can and should
be done.
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Most studies have emphasized the driving forces behind the should in their
analysis of why presidents choose to get involved. In other words, we as a scholarly
community constructed our assessment of why a president has intervened or not based on
whether the demand for action was enough. This study explored whether the
intervention can have the desire effect. By doing so, it opens more space in the debate
and criticism that surround these decisions in the public sphere.
Potential Adversaries
Knowledge of the importance of these factors will also prove informative for
regimes that would seek to deter U.S. involvement in their regional conflicts. If a
perpetrator wishes to dissuade U.S. intervention into their affairs, they could take actions
early that limit the logistic access to their region such as making air or sea ports unusable.
Or, they might purposefully organize their command and control structure in ways that
make it difficult to target or pursue more guerrilla tactics from the outset that make
targeting of larger formations challenging. Clearly, these concerns might be prudent for
an adversary of the U.S. regardless of the situation, but the study lays bare how important
these concerns are for the U.S. and the intervention decision-making process.
Limitations and Future Research Recommendations
Although this research has succeeded in providing an answer to why we have
witnessed apparently inconsistent intervention behavior by presidents in recent decades,
it is nonetheless limited. This is based primarily on the methodological choices I made
in the development of the research design. Those choices have a defensible logic that

201

supports their use, but at the same time they present challenges to the validity of the
study, begging further examination.
The universe of potential cases that could be considered in this study was
relatively small for three main reasons. First, intervention decisions are complex in that
they are made in an environment where a number of contributing factors are in interplay,
constantly shifting up until the point of decision. This realization that the combination
of certain conditions may hold greater explanations than individual variables led to the
choice to use QCA rather than more traditional statistical methods. This decision
required in-depth analysis of cases to gain knowledge of all the pertinent conditions used
in the analysis, much of which did not exist in current databases. The second reason is
tied to the first. Intervention decisions are rooted in the realities of an external world
that is constantly shifting, in its power relations, its economic interdependencies, and its
cultural norms. This presents problems in making comparisons across extensive time
periods. For this reason, I chose to limit the time frame to the previous three decades.
capturing the post-Cold War era plus the period of Soviet decline; this produced enough
instances of intervention to have a meaningful analysis using QCA. In addition, the case
studies were selected with the goal of minimizing unaccounted for variance in key
variables. Based on that, I chose to conduct two paired comparisons within single
administrations, which the second building upon the first. By using this design I was
able to demonstrate substantively through primary source material that the findings of the
QCA portion of the design had merit, and then extend the application of the theory to
include conditional shifts that generate decisional reversals.
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However, the case selection for the qualitative analyses using this approach could
be seen by some as problematic because of the dominant influence of the “Weinberger
Doctrine” discussed above on the administrations in question (Campbell 1998). As
noted previously, this doctrine emphasized the importance of clearly achievable goals and
exit strategies, obviously prizing feasibility concerns in the analysis. However, if these
concerns were peculiar to the Weinberger and Powell era, why do we see the same
feasibility concerns present in the broader systematic analysis when other leaders with
different advisors were at the helm? Still, future research should tackle this concern and
seek to validate or challenge the findings here as new materials become declassified for
the most recent administrations.
Even with the mitigating measures discussed above, this study carries some
validity challenges. First, concerning external validity, or the extent to which these
findings can be generalized to a broader universe, the few cases poses a problem. QCA,
like other forms of statistical analyses, is just as susceptible to the problems associated
with small sample sizes. Therefore, future research should look to expand on the
application of this design to larger sample sizes. However, as noted above, caution
should be taken in operationalizing the feasibility factors generally across time.
Temporal shifts can change the makeup of meaningful alliances or technological
advancements can overcome access challenges. Therefore, I recommend that studies
undertaken in this vein moving forward maintain the case-based research orientation used
here and purposively scope the studies to ensure there is logical consistency with the time
period in question and the factors being evaluated. In addition, research should extend
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beyond the U.S. to see if feasibility considerations are present elsewhere, particularly if
the same logic holds in different regime types.
Regarding internal validity, or the extent to which the study was executed in
manner that lends credibility to the findings, I have made every attempt at being
transparent in both the research and the analytic process. The raw data for the QCA is
found in Appendix A, along with sourcing references. For each data type, I have
provided the reasoning behind the dates used or judgements made, as well as maintained
consistency with previous scholars where appropriate. In the execution of the QCA I
have provided a step-by-step accounting of the analysis in Appendix C. However,
regardless of the transparency, it is still individual analysis. Therefore, future research
should delve deeper into the coding and validate or refine the choices I made in these
analyses, adding to the credibility of the findings.

Closing
This dissertation set out to understand why presidents seemingly made
inconsistent intervention decisions when evaluating foreign crises. Evidence has been
marshalled to support the contention that international systemic forces and international
norms are most persuasive in generating a response; and likewise, others have argued to
great effect for the impact of domestic concerns. However, all of these arguments
hinged on the role of demand. If the demand is high enough, the logic goes, an
intervention should occur. This study uncovered a third way of viewing these situations
that looked at the threshold for action as not tied to demand, but to the feasibility that the
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intervention could produce the desired effect within acceptable costs and time constraints.
The feasibility factors presented here gave meaning to what is really behind an
expectation of success. Demand may be present in the extreme, but without feasible
options it is unlikely that the U.S. will get involved. This realization should improve
future research of military intervention decisions and generate a richer understanding of
the attributes of a crisis that weigh most heavily on the choice to intervene.
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APPENDIX B: CONDITIONS ANALYSIS MATRIX
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APPENDIX C: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF QCA ANALYSIS
The csQCA process begins with identifying the necessary conditions for
intervention. If a condition scores a high consistency rate here (greater than .95 for
“quasi-necessity”) it can be dropped from the analysis since it is too common to be of
substantive interest (Bara 2014, 6). The analysis identified STRUCTURE, the
hierarchical organization of the adversary, as a necessary condition for intervention, but
not its absence for noninterventions. Therefore, I drop it from the analysis for
interventions, but retain it for noninterventions. This does not mean that the structure
of the enemy is unimportant to consider as a feasibility factor. To the contrary, it
provides substantive support for its consideration is perhaps the most important data point
when analyzing these intervention opportunities since it has such a high degree of
consistency with actual uses of force. Further discussion of this is in the main body of
the chapter.

From here, we turn attention to combinations of conditions that are sufficient for
intervention decisions. The first step is creating a spreadsheet for the analysis using a
truth table algorithm. The software generates all logical combinations of the conditions
and displays each of them in their own row with the number of cases exhibiting that
specific combination (Ragin and Davey, 2014). In addition, it also identifies the
proportion of the cases in that row that are part of the set displaying the outcome in
question - intervention. From this spreadsheet, the analyst must select those cases that
are relevant for further analysis. Since I have a small sample, I set the threshold for
selection to one case exhibiting that combination and a consistency score of greater than
.75 (Ragin 2008, 46).
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Next, I ran the standard analyses. This yielded the following complex and
parsimonious solutions.
Complex solution:
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Parsimonious solution:

The analysis of these outputs is in the main body of the chapter. Of note, using the
intermediate solution, I identified the UN condition as problematic based on its ubiquity
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across the solution set. The concern is that a security council approval for action already
accounts for the issues of feasibility addressed here. Therefore, I omit it from the further
analyses.
In an effort to arrive at pathways that are more meaningful to understanding the
intervention/nonintervention decisions, I test each for combinations of conditions that
exhibit higher consistencies and coverages when combined. The goal is to drop
conditions from the analysis that apparently lack explanatory power, while identifying
conditions that have synergistic effects with one another. The selection criteria I used
were a consistency > .75 and coverage >.70 (select simplest form to achieve that among
and between types of determinants)

Dropping structure and the UN condition, the new analysis of necessary
conditions identified seven conditions to retain for the analysis: ally, trade, mag,
unemploy, access, social, leader. The truth table reduces thus:
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This produced the following analyses.
Parsimonious solution:
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Intermediate Solution:

I then did the same process for the nonintervention set. The analysis of necessary
conditions did not result in any to eliminate from further analysis, although I did choose
to omit the UN based on the concern of multicollinearity. Using all of the conditions
proved futile in identifying lucrative and parsimonious pathways to nonintervention.
The analysis produces complex and unique combinations that provided little
commonality. Therefore, I again need to drop conditions for further analysis in order to
identify combinations of conditions that can explain more than single instances. To do
this, I again run a necessity test on combinations of conditions to find those most likely to
yield explanatory power.
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This process yielded a new model for nonintervention that included the following
conditions based on a .75 consistency threshold and a .70 coverage: ~leader, ~structure,
~social, ~access, ~approval, ~trade (~ denotes the absence of the condition). This
produced the following truth table:
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This produced the following parsimonious solution:
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This is the intermediate solution:

While I conducted other analyses using these conditions, these were the two sets
that I used for the arguments put forward in the main body. This concludes the detailed
analysis. The output files for these analyses are available upon request.
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